From 92ec4855034b2c4d13f117558dc73d20581fa9ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ido Schimmel Date: Wed, 14 May 2025 14:48:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 01/16] mlxsw: spectrum_router: Fix use-after-free when deleting GRE net devices The driver only offloads neighbors that are constructed on top of net devices registered by it or their uppers (which are all Ethernet). The device supports GRE encapsulation and decapsulation of forwarded traffic, but the driver will not offload dummy neighbors constructed on top of GRE net devices as they are not uppers of its net devices: # ip link add name gre1 up type gre tos inherit local 192.0.2.1 remote 198.51.100.1 # ip neigh add 0.0.0.0 lladdr 0.0.0.0 nud noarp dev gre1 $ ip neigh show dev gre1 nud noarp 0.0.0.0 lladdr 0.0.0.0 NOARP (Note that the neighbor is not marked with 'offload') When the driver is reloaded and the existing configuration is replayed, the driver does not perform the same check regarding existing neighbors and offloads the previously added one: # devlink dev reload pci/0000:01:00.0 $ ip neigh show dev gre1 nud noarp 0.0.0.0 lladdr 0.0.0.0 offload NOARP If the neighbor is later deleted, the driver will ignore the notification (given the GRE net device is not its upper) and will therefore keep referencing freed memory, resulting in a use-after-free [1] when the net device is deleted: # ip neigh del 0.0.0.0 lladdr 0.0.0.0 dev gre1 # ip link del dev gre1 Fix by skipping neighbor replay if the net device for which the replay is performed is not our upper. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_update+0x1ea/0x200 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888155b0e420 by task ip/2282 [...] Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xa0 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x6f/0x350 print_report+0x108/0x205 kasan_report+0xdf/0x110 mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_update+0x1ea/0x200 mlxsw_sp_router_rif_gone_sync+0x2a8/0x440 mlxsw_sp_rif_destroy+0x1e9/0x750 mlxsw_sp_netdevice_ipip_ol_event+0x3c9/0xdc0 mlxsw_sp_router_netdevice_event+0x3ac/0x15e0 notifier_call_chain+0xca/0x150 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7f/0x100 unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0xc8c/0x1d90 rtnl_dellink+0x34e/0xa50 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x6fb/0xb70 netlink_rcv_skb+0x131/0x360 netlink_unicast+0x426/0x710 netlink_sendmsg+0x75a/0xc20 __sock_sendmsg+0xc1/0x150 ____sys_sendmsg+0x5aa/0x7b0 ___sys_sendmsg+0xfc/0x180 __sys_sendmsg+0x121/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 Fixes: 8fdb09a7674c ("mlxsw: spectrum_router: Replay neighbours when RIF is made") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel Reviewed-by: Petr Machata Signed-off-by: Petr Machata Link: https://patch.msgid.link/c53c02c904fde32dad484657be3b1477884e9ad6.1747225701.git.petrm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c index 464821dd492d..a2033837182e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c @@ -3014,6 +3014,9 @@ static int mlxsw_sp_neigh_rif_made_sync(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp, .rif = rif, }; + if (!mlxsw_sp_dev_lower_is_port(mlxsw_sp_rif_dev(rif))) + return 0; + neigh_for_each(&arp_tbl, mlxsw_sp_neigh_rif_made_sync_each, &rms); if (rms.err) goto err_arp; -- 2.51.0 From 325eb217e41fa14f307c7cc702bd18d0bb38fe84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Chan Date: Tue, 13 May 2025 23:29:08 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 02/16] bnxt_en: bring back rtnl_lock() in the bnxt_open() path Error recovery, PCIe AER, resume, and TX timeout will invoke bnxt_open() with netdev_lock only. This will cause RTNL assert failure in netif_set_real_num_tx_queues(), netif_set_real_num_tx_queues(), and netif_set_real_num_tx_queues(). Example error recovery assert: RTNL: assertion failed at net/core/dev.c (3178) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 3392 at net/core/dev.c:3178 netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x1fd/0x210 Call Trace: ? __pfx_bnxt_msix+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en] __bnxt_open_nic+0x1ef/0xb20 [bnxt_en] bnxt_open+0xda/0x130 [bnxt_en] bnxt_fw_reset_task+0x21f/0x780 [bnxt_en] process_scheduled_works+0x9d/0x400 For now, bring back rtnl_lock() in all these code paths that can invoke bnxt_open(). In the bnxt_queue_start() error path, we don't have rtnl_lock held so we just change it to call netif_close() instead of bnxt_reset_task() for simplicity. This error path is unlikely so it should be fine. Fixes: 004b5008016a ("eth: bnxt: remove most dependencies on RTNL") Reviewed-by: Kalesh AP Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek Signed-off-by: Michael Chan Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250514062908.2766677-1-michael.chan@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c index 86a5de44b6f3..6afc2ab6fad2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c @@ -14013,13 +14013,28 @@ static void bnxt_unlock_sp(struct bnxt *bp) netdev_unlock(bp->dev); } +/* Same as bnxt_lock_sp() with additional rtnl_lock */ +static void bnxt_rtnl_lock_sp(struct bnxt *bp) +{ + clear_bit(BNXT_STATE_IN_SP_TASK, &bp->state); + rtnl_lock(); + netdev_lock(bp->dev); +} + +static void bnxt_rtnl_unlock_sp(struct bnxt *bp) +{ + set_bit(BNXT_STATE_IN_SP_TASK, &bp->state); + netdev_unlock(bp->dev); + rtnl_unlock(); +} + /* Only called from bnxt_sp_task() */ static void bnxt_reset(struct bnxt *bp, bool silent) { - bnxt_lock_sp(bp); + bnxt_rtnl_lock_sp(bp); if (test_bit(BNXT_STATE_OPEN, &bp->state)) bnxt_reset_task(bp, silent); - bnxt_unlock_sp(bp); + bnxt_rtnl_unlock_sp(bp); } /* Only called from bnxt_sp_task() */ @@ -14027,9 +14042,9 @@ static void bnxt_rx_ring_reset(struct bnxt *bp) { int i; - bnxt_lock_sp(bp); + bnxt_rtnl_lock_sp(bp); if (!test_bit(BNXT_STATE_OPEN, &bp->state)) { - bnxt_unlock_sp(bp); + bnxt_rtnl_unlock_sp(bp); return; } /* Disable and flush TPA before resetting the RX ring */ @@ -14068,7 +14083,7 @@ static void bnxt_rx_ring_reset(struct bnxt *bp) } if (bp->flags & BNXT_FLAG_TPA) bnxt_set_tpa(bp, true); - bnxt_unlock_sp(bp); + bnxt_rtnl_unlock_sp(bp); } static void bnxt_fw_fatal_close(struct bnxt *bp) @@ -14960,15 +14975,17 @@ static void bnxt_fw_reset_task(struct work_struct *work) bp->fw_reset_state = BNXT_FW_RESET_STATE_OPENING; fallthrough; case BNXT_FW_RESET_STATE_OPENING: - while (!netdev_trylock(bp->dev)) { + while (!rtnl_trylock()) { bnxt_queue_fw_reset_work(bp, HZ / 10); return; } + netdev_lock(bp->dev); rc = bnxt_open(bp->dev); if (rc) { netdev_err(bp->dev, "bnxt_open() failed during FW reset\n"); bnxt_fw_reset_abort(bp, rc); netdev_unlock(bp->dev); + rtnl_unlock(); goto ulp_start; } @@ -14988,6 +15005,7 @@ static void bnxt_fw_reset_task(struct work_struct *work) bnxt_dl_health_fw_status_update(bp, true); } netdev_unlock(bp->dev); + rtnl_unlock(); bnxt_ulp_start(bp, 0); bnxt_reenable_sriov(bp); netdev_lock(bp->dev); @@ -15936,7 +15954,7 @@ err_reset: rc); napi_enable_locked(&bnapi->napi); bnxt_db_nq_arm(bp, &cpr->cp_db, cpr->cp_raw_cons); - bnxt_reset_task(bp, true); + netif_close(dev); return rc; } @@ -16752,6 +16770,7 @@ static int bnxt_resume(struct device *device) struct bnxt *bp = netdev_priv(dev); int rc = 0; + rtnl_lock(); netdev_lock(dev); rc = pci_enable_device(bp->pdev); if (rc) { @@ -16796,6 +16815,7 @@ static int bnxt_resume(struct device *device) resume_exit: netdev_unlock(bp->dev); + rtnl_unlock(); bnxt_ulp_start(bp, rc); if (!rc) bnxt_reenable_sriov(bp); @@ -16961,6 +16981,7 @@ static void bnxt_io_resume(struct pci_dev *pdev) int err; netdev_info(bp->dev, "PCI Slot Resume\n"); + rtnl_lock(); netdev_lock(netdev); err = bnxt_hwrm_func_qcaps(bp); @@ -16978,6 +16999,7 @@ static void bnxt_io_resume(struct pci_dev *pdev) netif_device_attach(netdev); netdev_unlock(netdev); + rtnl_unlock(); bnxt_ulp_start(bp, err); if (!err) bnxt_reenable_sriov(bp); -- 2.51.0 From 491deb9b8c4ad12fe51d554a69b8165b9ef9429f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pengtao He Date: Wed, 14 May 2025 21:20:13 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 03/16] net/tls: fix kernel panic when alloc_page failed We cannot set frag_list to NULL pointer when alloc_page failed. It will be used in tls_strp_check_queue_ok when the next time tls_strp_read_sock is called. This is because we don't reset full_len in tls_strp_flush_anchor_copy() so the recv path will try to continue handling the partial record on the next call but we dettached the rcvq from the frag list. Alternative fix would be to reset full_len. Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000028 Call trace: tls_strp_check_rcv+0x128/0x27c tls_strp_data_ready+0x34/0x44 tls_data_ready+0x3c/0x1f0 tcp_data_ready+0x9c/0xe4 tcp_data_queue+0xf6c/0x12d0 tcp_rcv_established+0x52c/0x798 Fixes: 84c61fe1a75b ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser") Signed-off-by: Pengtao He Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250514132013.17274-1-hept.hept.hept@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/tls/tls_strp.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_strp.c b/net/tls/tls_strp.c index 77e33e1e340e..65b0da6fdf6a 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_strp.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_strp.c @@ -396,7 +396,6 @@ static int tls_strp_read_copy(struct tls_strparser *strp, bool qshort) return 0; shinfo = skb_shinfo(strp->anchor); - shinfo->frag_list = NULL; /* If we don't know the length go max plus page for cipher overhead */ need_spc = strp->stm.full_len ?: TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE; @@ -412,6 +411,8 @@ static int tls_strp_read_copy(struct tls_strparser *strp, bool qshort) page, 0, 0); } + shinfo->frag_list = NULL; + strp->copy_mode = 1; strp->stm.offset = 0; -- 2.51.0 From b3ca9eef6646576ad506a96d941d87a69f66732a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerhard Engleder Date: Wed, 14 May 2025 21:56:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 04/16] tsnep: fix timestamping with a stacked DSA driver This driver is susceptible to a form of the bug explained in commit c26a2c2ddc01 ("gianfar: Fix TX timestamping with a stacked DSA driver") and in Documentation/networking/timestamping.rst section "Other caveats for MAC drivers", specifically it timestamps any skb which has SKBTX_HW_TSTAMP, and does not consider if timestamping has been enabled in adapter->hwtstamp_config.tx_type. Evaluate the proper TX timestamping condition only once on the TX path (in tsnep_xmit_frame_ring()) and store the result in an additional TX entry flag. Evaluate the new TX entry flag in the TX confirmation path (in tsnep_tx_poll()). This way SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS is set by the driver as required, but never evaluated. SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS shall not be evaluated as it can be set by a stacked DSA driver and evaluating it would lead to unwanted timestamps. Fixes: 403f69bbdbad ("tsnep: Add TSN endpoint Ethernet MAC driver") Suggested-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: Gerhard Engleder Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250514195657.25874-1-gerhard@engleder-embedded.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/ethernet/engleder/tsnep_main.c | 30 ++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/engleder/tsnep_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/engleder/tsnep_main.c index 625245b0845c..eba73246f986 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/engleder/tsnep_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/engleder/tsnep_main.c @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ #define TSNEP_TX_TYPE_XDP_NDO_MAP_PAGE (TSNEP_TX_TYPE_XDP_NDO | TSNEP_TX_TYPE_MAP_PAGE) #define TSNEP_TX_TYPE_XDP (TSNEP_TX_TYPE_XDP_TX | TSNEP_TX_TYPE_XDP_NDO) #define TSNEP_TX_TYPE_XSK BIT(12) +#define TSNEP_TX_TYPE_TSTAMP BIT(13) +#define TSNEP_TX_TYPE_SKB_TSTAMP (TSNEP_TX_TYPE_SKB | TSNEP_TX_TYPE_TSTAMP) #define TSNEP_XDP_TX BIT(0) #define TSNEP_XDP_REDIRECT BIT(1) @@ -386,8 +388,7 @@ static void tsnep_tx_activate(struct tsnep_tx *tx, int index, int length, if (entry->skb) { entry->properties = length & TSNEP_DESC_LENGTH_MASK; entry->properties |= TSNEP_DESC_INTERRUPT_FLAG; - if ((entry->type & TSNEP_TX_TYPE_SKB) && - (skb_shinfo(entry->skb)->tx_flags & SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS)) + if ((entry->type & TSNEP_TX_TYPE_SKB_TSTAMP) == TSNEP_TX_TYPE_SKB_TSTAMP) entry->properties |= TSNEP_DESC_EXTENDED_WRITEBACK_FLAG; /* toggle user flag to prevent false acknowledge @@ -479,7 +480,8 @@ static int tsnep_tx_map_frag(skb_frag_t *frag, struct tsnep_tx_entry *entry, return mapped; } -static int tsnep_tx_map(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tsnep_tx *tx, int count) +static int tsnep_tx_map(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tsnep_tx *tx, int count, + bool do_tstamp) { struct device *dmadev = tx->adapter->dmadev; struct tsnep_tx_entry *entry; @@ -505,6 +507,9 @@ static int tsnep_tx_map(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tsnep_tx *tx, int count) entry->type = TSNEP_TX_TYPE_SKB_INLINE; mapped = 0; } + + if (do_tstamp) + entry->type |= TSNEP_TX_TYPE_TSTAMP; } else { skb_frag_t *frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i - 1]; @@ -558,11 +563,12 @@ static int tsnep_tx_unmap(struct tsnep_tx *tx, int index, int count) static netdev_tx_t tsnep_xmit_frame_ring(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tsnep_tx *tx) { - int count = 1; struct tsnep_tx_entry *entry; + bool do_tstamp = false; + int count = 1; int length; - int i; int retval; + int i; if (skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags > 0) count += skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; @@ -579,7 +585,13 @@ static netdev_tx_t tsnep_xmit_frame_ring(struct sk_buff *skb, entry = &tx->entry[tx->write]; entry->skb = skb; - retval = tsnep_tx_map(skb, tx, count); + if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags & SKBTX_HW_TSTAMP) && + tx->adapter->hwtstamp_config.tx_type == HWTSTAMP_TX_ON) { + skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags |= SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS; + do_tstamp = true; + } + + retval = tsnep_tx_map(skb, tx, count, do_tstamp); if (retval < 0) { tsnep_tx_unmap(tx, tx->write, count); dev_kfree_skb_any(entry->skb); @@ -591,9 +603,6 @@ static netdev_tx_t tsnep_xmit_frame_ring(struct sk_buff *skb, } length = retval; - if (skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags & SKBTX_HW_TSTAMP) - skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags |= SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS; - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) tsnep_tx_activate(tx, (tx->write + i) & TSNEP_RING_MASK, length, i == count - 1); @@ -844,8 +853,7 @@ static bool tsnep_tx_poll(struct tsnep_tx *tx, int napi_budget) length = tsnep_tx_unmap(tx, tx->read, count); - if ((entry->type & TSNEP_TX_TYPE_SKB) && - (skb_shinfo(entry->skb)->tx_flags & SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS) && + if (((entry->type & TSNEP_TX_TYPE_SKB_TSTAMP) == TSNEP_TX_TYPE_SKB_TSTAMP) && (__le32_to_cpu(entry->desc_wb->properties) & TSNEP_DESC_EXTENDED_WRITEBACK_FLAG)) { struct skb_shared_hwtstamps hwtstamps; -- 2.51.0 From 0afc44d8cdf6029cce0a92873f0de5ac9416cec8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Taehee Yoo Date: Wed, 14 May 2025 15:40:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 05/16] net: devmem: fix kernel panic when netlink socket close after module unload Kernel panic occurs when a devmem TCP socket is closed after NIC module is unloaded. This is Devmem TCP unregistration scenarios. number is an order. (a)netlink socket close (b)pp destroy (c)uninstall result 1 2 3 OK 1 3 2 (d)Impossible 2 1 3 OK 3 1 2 (e)Kernel panic 2 3 1 (d)Impossible 3 2 1 (d)Impossible (a) netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy() is called when devmem TCP socket is closed. (b) page_pool_destroy() is called when the interface is down. (c) mp_ops->uninstall() is called when an interface is unregistered. (d) There is no scenario in mp_ops->uninstall() is called before page_pool_destroy(). Because unregister_netdevice_many_notify() closes interfaces first and then calls mp_ops->uninstall(). (e) netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy() accesses struct net_device to acquire netdev_lock(). But if the interface module has already been removed, net_device pointer is invalid, so it causes kernel panic. In summary, there are only 3 possible scenarios. A. sk close -> pp destroy -> uninstall. B. pp destroy -> sk close -> uninstall. C. pp destroy -> uninstall -> sk close. Case C is a kernel panic scenario. In order to fix this problem, It makes mp_dmabuf_devmem_uninstall() set binding->dev to NULL. It indicates an bound net_device was unregistered. It makes netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy() do not acquire netdev_lock() if binding->dev is NULL. A new binding->lock is added to protect a dev of a binding. So, lock ordering is like below. priv->lock netdev_lock(dev) binding->lock Tests: Scenario A: ./ncdevmem -s 192.168.1.4 -c 192.168.1.2 -f $interface -l -p 8000 \ -v 7 -t 1 -q 1 & pid=$! sleep 10 kill $pid ip link set $interface down modprobe -rv $module Scenario B: ./ncdevmem -s 192.168.1.4 -c 192.168.1.2 -f $interface -l -p 8000 \ -v 7 -t 1 -q 1 & pid=$! sleep 10 ip link set $interface down kill $pid modprobe -rv $module Scenario C: ./ncdevmem -s 192.168.1.4 -c 192.168.1.2 -f $interface -l -p 8000 \ -v 7 -t 1 -q 1 & pid=$! sleep 10 modprobe -rv $module sleep 5 kill $pid Splat looks like: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc001fffa9f7: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x00000000fffd4fb8-0x00000000fffd4fbf] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2041 Comm: ncdevmem Tainted: G B W 6.15.0-rc1+ #2 PREEMPT(undef) 0947ec89efa0fd68838b78e36aa1617e97ff5d7f Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock (./include/linux/sched.h:2244 kernel/locking/mutex.c:400 kernel/locking/mutex.c:443 kernel/locking/mutex.c:605 kernel/locking/mutex.c:746) Code: ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 4f 13 00 00 49 8b 1e 48 83 e3 f8 74 6a 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7b 34 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 f RSP: 0018:ffff88826f7ef730 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000fffd4f88 RCX: ffffffffaa9bc811 RDX: 000000001fffa9f7 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000fffd4fbc RBP: ffff88826f7ef8b0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed103e6aa1a4 R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff88826f7ef442 R12: fffffbfff669f65e R13: ffff88812a830040 R14: ffff8881f3550d20 R15: 00000000fffd4f88 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888866c05000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000563bed0cb288 CR3: 00000001a7c98000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: ... netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy (net/core/netdev-genl.c:953 (discriminator 3)) genl_release (net/netlink/genetlink.c:653 net/netlink/genetlink.c:694 net/netlink/genetlink.c:705) ... netlink_release (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:737) ... __sock_release (net/socket.c:647) sock_close (net/socket.c:1393) Fixes: 1d22d3060b9b ("net: drop rtnl_lock for queue_mgmt operations") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250514154028.1062909-1-ap420073@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/core/devmem.c | 7 +++++++ net/core/devmem.h | 2 ++ net/core/netdev-genl.c | 11 +++++++++++ 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/core/devmem.c b/net/core/devmem.c index 6e27a47d0493..2db428ab6b8b 100644 --- a/net/core/devmem.c +++ b/net/core/devmem.c @@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ net_devmem_bind_dmabuf(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int dmabuf_fd, refcount_set(&binding->ref, 1); + mutex_init(&binding->lock); + binding->dmabuf = dmabuf; binding->attachment = dma_buf_attach(binding->dmabuf, dev->dev.parent); @@ -379,6 +381,11 @@ static void mp_dmabuf_devmem_uninstall(void *mp_priv, xa_for_each(&binding->bound_rxqs, xa_idx, bound_rxq) { if (bound_rxq == rxq) { xa_erase(&binding->bound_rxqs, xa_idx); + if (xa_empty(&binding->bound_rxqs)) { + mutex_lock(&binding->lock); + binding->dev = NULL; + mutex_unlock(&binding->lock); + } break; } } diff --git a/net/core/devmem.h b/net/core/devmem.h index 7fc158d52729..a1aabc9685cc 100644 --- a/net/core/devmem.h +++ b/net/core/devmem.h @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ struct net_devmem_dmabuf_binding { struct sg_table *sgt; struct net_device *dev; struct gen_pool *chunk_pool; + /* Protect dev */ + struct mutex lock; /* The user holds a ref (via the netlink API) for as long as they want * the binding to remain alive. Each page pool using this binding holds diff --git a/net/core/netdev-genl.c b/net/core/netdev-genl.c index dae9f0d432fb..a877693fecd6 100644 --- a/net/core/netdev-genl.c +++ b/net/core/netdev-genl.c @@ -979,14 +979,25 @@ void netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy(struct netdev_nl_sock *priv) { struct net_devmem_dmabuf_binding *binding; struct net_devmem_dmabuf_binding *temp; + netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; struct net_device *dev; mutex_lock(&priv->lock); list_for_each_entry_safe(binding, temp, &priv->bindings, list) { + mutex_lock(&binding->lock); dev = binding->dev; + if (!dev) { + mutex_unlock(&binding->lock); + net_devmem_unbind_dmabuf(binding); + continue; + } + netdev_hold(dev, &dev_tracker, GFP_KERNEL); + mutex_unlock(&binding->lock); + netdev_lock(dev); net_devmem_unbind_dmabuf(binding); netdev_unlock(dev); + netdev_put(dev, &dev_tracker); } mutex_unlock(&priv->lock); } -- 2.51.0 From 7af8479d9eb4319b4ba7b47a8c4d2c55af1c31e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Date: Wed, 7 May 2025 15:00:30 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 06/16] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix not checking l2cap_chan security level l2cap_check_enc_key_size shall check the security level of the l2cap_chan rather than the hci_conn since for incoming connection request that may be different as hci_conn may already been encrypted using a different security level. Fixes: 522e9ed157e3 ("Bluetooth: l2cap: Check encryption key size on incoming connection") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index 73472756618a..042d3ac3b4a3 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -1411,7 +1411,8 @@ static void l2cap_request_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn) sizeof(req), &req); } -static bool l2cap_check_enc_key_size(struct hci_conn *hcon) +static bool l2cap_check_enc_key_size(struct hci_conn *hcon, + struct l2cap_chan *chan) { /* The minimum encryption key size needs to be enforced by the * host stack before establishing any L2CAP connections. The @@ -1425,7 +1426,7 @@ static bool l2cap_check_enc_key_size(struct hci_conn *hcon) int min_key_size = hcon->hdev->min_enc_key_size; /* On FIPS security level, key size must be 16 bytes */ - if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) + if (chan->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) min_key_size = 16; return (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) || @@ -1453,7 +1454,7 @@ static void l2cap_do_start(struct l2cap_chan *chan) !__l2cap_no_conn_pending(chan)) return; - if (l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon)) + if (l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon, chan)) l2cap_start_connection(chan); else __set_chan_timer(chan, L2CAP_DISC_TIMEOUT); @@ -1528,7 +1529,7 @@ static void l2cap_conn_start(struct l2cap_conn *conn) continue; } - if (l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon)) + if (l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon, chan)) l2cap_start_connection(chan); else l2cap_chan_close(chan, ECONNREFUSED); @@ -3992,7 +3993,7 @@ static void l2cap_connect(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, /* Check if the ACL is secure enough (if not SDP) */ if (psm != cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_PSM_SDP) && (!hci_conn_check_link_mode(conn->hcon) || - !l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon))) { + !l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon, pchan))) { conn->disc_reason = HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE; result = L2CAP_CR_SEC_BLOCK; goto response; @@ -7352,7 +7353,7 @@ static void l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt) } if (chan->state == BT_CONNECT) { - if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon)) + if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon, chan)) l2cap_start_connection(chan); else __set_chan_timer(chan, L2CAP_DISC_TIMEOUT); @@ -7362,7 +7363,7 @@ static void l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt) struct l2cap_conn_rsp rsp; __u16 res, stat; - if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon)) { + if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon, chan)) { if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) { res = L2CAP_CR_PEND; stat = L2CAP_CS_AUTHOR_PEND; -- 2.51.0 From 4bcb0c7dc25446b99fc7a8fa2a143d69f3314162 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: En-Wei Wu Date: Thu, 8 May 2025 22:15:20 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 07/16] Bluetooth: btusb: use skb_pull to avoid unsafe access in QCA dump handling Use skb_pull() and skb_pull_data() to safely parse QCA dump packets. This avoids direct pointer math on skb->data, which could lead to invalid access if the packet is shorter than expected. Fixes: 20981ce2d5a5 ("Bluetooth: btusb: Add WCN6855 devcoredump support") Signed-off-by: En-Wei Wu Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c index a42dedb78e0a..256b451bbe06 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c @@ -3014,9 +3014,8 @@ static void btusb_coredump_qca(struct hci_dev *hdev) static int handle_dump_pkt_qca(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) { int ret = 0; + unsigned int skip = 0; u8 pkt_type; - u8 *sk_ptr; - unsigned int sk_len; u16 seqno; u32 dump_size; @@ -3025,18 +3024,13 @@ static int handle_dump_pkt_qca(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) struct usb_device *udev = btdata->udev; pkt_type = hci_skb_pkt_type(skb); - sk_ptr = skb->data; - sk_len = skb->len; + skip = sizeof(struct hci_event_hdr); + if (pkt_type == HCI_ACLDATA_PKT) + skip += sizeof(struct hci_acl_hdr); - if (pkt_type == HCI_ACLDATA_PKT) { - sk_ptr += HCI_ACL_HDR_SIZE; - sk_len -= HCI_ACL_HDR_SIZE; - } - - sk_ptr += HCI_EVENT_HDR_SIZE; - sk_len -= HCI_EVENT_HDR_SIZE; + skb_pull(skb, skip); + dump_hdr = (struct qca_dump_hdr *)skb->data; - dump_hdr = (struct qca_dump_hdr *)sk_ptr; seqno = le16_to_cpu(dump_hdr->seqno); if (seqno == 0) { set_bit(BTUSB_HW_SSR_ACTIVE, &btdata->flags); @@ -3056,16 +3050,15 @@ static int handle_dump_pkt_qca(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) btdata->qca_dump.ram_dump_size = dump_size; btdata->qca_dump.ram_dump_seqno = 0; - sk_ptr += offsetof(struct qca_dump_hdr, data0); - sk_len -= offsetof(struct qca_dump_hdr, data0); + + skb_pull(skb, offsetof(struct qca_dump_hdr, data0)); usb_disable_autosuspend(udev); bt_dev_info(hdev, "%s memdump size(%u)\n", (pkt_type == HCI_ACLDATA_PKT) ? "ACL" : "event", dump_size); } else { - sk_ptr += offsetof(struct qca_dump_hdr, data); - sk_len -= offsetof(struct qca_dump_hdr, data); + skb_pull(skb, offsetof(struct qca_dump_hdr, data)); } if (!btdata->qca_dump.ram_dump_size) { @@ -3085,7 +3078,6 @@ static int handle_dump_pkt_qca(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) return ret; } - skb_pull(skb, skb->len - sk_len); hci_devcd_append(hdev, skb); btdata->qca_dump.ram_dump_seqno++; if (seqno == QCA_LAST_SEQUENCE_NUM) { @@ -3113,68 +3105,58 @@ out: /* Return: true if the ACL packet is a dump packet, false otherwise. */ static bool acl_pkt_is_dump_qca(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) { - u8 *sk_ptr; - unsigned int sk_len; - struct hci_event_hdr *event_hdr; struct hci_acl_hdr *acl_hdr; struct qca_dump_hdr *dump_hdr; + struct sk_buff *clone = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + bool is_dump = false; - sk_ptr = skb->data; - sk_len = skb->len; - - acl_hdr = hci_acl_hdr(skb); - if (le16_to_cpu(acl_hdr->handle) != QCA_MEMDUMP_ACL_HANDLE) + if (!clone) return false; - sk_ptr += HCI_ACL_HDR_SIZE; - sk_len -= HCI_ACL_HDR_SIZE; - event_hdr = (struct hci_event_hdr *)sk_ptr; - - if ((event_hdr->evt != HCI_VENDOR_PKT) || - (event_hdr->plen != (sk_len - HCI_EVENT_HDR_SIZE))) - return false; + acl_hdr = skb_pull_data(clone, sizeof(*acl_hdr)); + if (!acl_hdr || (le16_to_cpu(acl_hdr->handle) != QCA_MEMDUMP_ACL_HANDLE)) + goto out; - sk_ptr += HCI_EVENT_HDR_SIZE; - sk_len -= HCI_EVENT_HDR_SIZE; + event_hdr = skb_pull_data(clone, sizeof(*event_hdr)); + if (!event_hdr || (event_hdr->evt != HCI_VENDOR_PKT)) + goto out; - dump_hdr = (struct qca_dump_hdr *)sk_ptr; - if ((sk_len < offsetof(struct qca_dump_hdr, data)) || - (dump_hdr->vse_class != QCA_MEMDUMP_VSE_CLASS) || - (dump_hdr->msg_type != QCA_MEMDUMP_MSG_TYPE)) - return false; + dump_hdr = skb_pull_data(clone, sizeof(*dump_hdr)); + if (!dump_hdr || (dump_hdr->vse_class != QCA_MEMDUMP_VSE_CLASS) || + (dump_hdr->msg_type != QCA_MEMDUMP_MSG_TYPE)) + goto out; - return true; + is_dump = true; +out: + consume_skb(clone); + return is_dump; } /* Return: true if the event packet is a dump packet, false otherwise. */ static bool evt_pkt_is_dump_qca(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) { - u8 *sk_ptr; - unsigned int sk_len; - struct hci_event_hdr *event_hdr; struct qca_dump_hdr *dump_hdr; + struct sk_buff *clone = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + bool is_dump = false; - sk_ptr = skb->data; - sk_len = skb->len; - - event_hdr = hci_event_hdr(skb); - - if ((event_hdr->evt != HCI_VENDOR_PKT) - || (event_hdr->plen != (sk_len - HCI_EVENT_HDR_SIZE))) + if (!clone) return false; - sk_ptr += HCI_EVENT_HDR_SIZE; - sk_len -= HCI_EVENT_HDR_SIZE; + event_hdr = skb_pull_data(clone, sizeof(*event_hdr)); + if (!event_hdr || (event_hdr->evt != HCI_VENDOR_PKT)) + goto out; - dump_hdr = (struct qca_dump_hdr *)sk_ptr; - if ((sk_len < offsetof(struct qca_dump_hdr, data)) || - (dump_hdr->vse_class != QCA_MEMDUMP_VSE_CLASS) || - (dump_hdr->msg_type != QCA_MEMDUMP_MSG_TYPE)) - return false; + dump_hdr = skb_pull_data(clone, sizeof(*dump_hdr)); + if (!dump_hdr || (dump_hdr->vse_class != QCA_MEMDUMP_VSE_CLASS) || + (dump_hdr->msg_type != QCA_MEMDUMP_MSG_TYPE)) + goto out; - return true; + is_dump = true; +out: + consume_skb(clone); + return is_dump; } static int btusb_recv_acl_qca(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) -- 2.51.0 From c9e455581e2ba87ee38c126e8dc49a424b9df0cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sagi Maimon Date: Wed, 14 May 2025 10:35:41 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 08/16] ptp: ocp: Limit signal/freq counts in summary output functions The debugfs summary output could access uninitialized elements in the freq_in[] and signal_out[] arrays, causing NULL pointer dereferences and triggering a kernel Oops (page_fault_oops). This patch adds u8 fields (nr_freq_in, nr_signal_out) to track the number of initialized elements, with a maximum of 4 per array. The summary output functions are updated to respect these limits, preventing out-of-bounds access and ensuring safe array handling. Widen the label variables because the change confuses GCC about max length of the strings. Fixes: ef61f5528fca ("ptp: ocp: add Adva timecard support") Signed-off-by: Sagi Maimon Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250514073541.35817-1-maimon.sagi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/ptp/ptp_ocp.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/ptp/ptp_ocp.c b/drivers/ptp/ptp_ocp.c index 2ccdca4f6960..e63481f24238 100644 --- a/drivers/ptp/ptp_ocp.c +++ b/drivers/ptp/ptp_ocp.c @@ -315,6 +315,8 @@ struct ptp_ocp_serial_port { #define OCP_BOARD_ID_LEN 13 #define OCP_SERIAL_LEN 6 #define OCP_SMA_NUM 4 +#define OCP_SIGNAL_NUM 4 +#define OCP_FREQ_NUM 4 enum { PORT_GNSS, @@ -342,8 +344,8 @@ struct ptp_ocp { struct dcf_master_reg __iomem *dcf_out; struct dcf_slave_reg __iomem *dcf_in; struct tod_reg __iomem *nmea_out; - struct frequency_reg __iomem *freq_in[4]; - struct ptp_ocp_ext_src *signal_out[4]; + struct frequency_reg __iomem *freq_in[OCP_FREQ_NUM]; + struct ptp_ocp_ext_src *signal_out[OCP_SIGNAL_NUM]; struct ptp_ocp_ext_src *pps; struct ptp_ocp_ext_src *ts0; struct ptp_ocp_ext_src *ts1; @@ -378,10 +380,12 @@ struct ptp_ocp { u32 utc_tai_offset; u32 ts_window_adjust; u64 fw_cap; - struct ptp_ocp_signal signal[4]; + struct ptp_ocp_signal signal[OCP_SIGNAL_NUM]; struct ptp_ocp_sma_connector sma[OCP_SMA_NUM]; const struct ocp_sma_op *sma_op; struct dpll_device *dpll; + int signals_nr; + int freq_in_nr; }; #define OCP_REQ_TIMESTAMP BIT(0) @@ -2697,6 +2701,8 @@ ptp_ocp_fb_board_init(struct ptp_ocp *bp, struct ocp_resource *r) bp->eeprom_map = fb_eeprom_map; bp->fw_version = ioread32(&bp->image->version); bp->sma_op = &ocp_fb_sma_op; + bp->signals_nr = 4; + bp->freq_in_nr = 4; ptp_ocp_fb_set_version(bp); @@ -2862,6 +2868,8 @@ ptp_ocp_art_board_init(struct ptp_ocp *bp, struct ocp_resource *r) bp->fw_version = ioread32(&bp->reg->version); bp->fw_tag = 2; bp->sma_op = &ocp_art_sma_op; + bp->signals_nr = 4; + bp->freq_in_nr = 4; /* Enable MAC serial port during initialisation */ iowrite32(1, &bp->board_config->mro50_serial_activate); @@ -2888,6 +2896,8 @@ ptp_ocp_adva_board_init(struct ptp_ocp *bp, struct ocp_resource *r) bp->flash_start = 0xA00000; bp->eeprom_map = fb_eeprom_map; bp->sma_op = &ocp_adva_sma_op; + bp->signals_nr = 2; + bp->freq_in_nr = 2; version = ioread32(&bp->image->version); /* if lower 16 bits are empty, this is the fw loader. */ @@ -4008,7 +4018,7 @@ _signal_summary_show(struct seq_file *s, struct ptp_ocp *bp, int nr) { struct signal_reg __iomem *reg = bp->signal_out[nr]->mem; struct ptp_ocp_signal *signal = &bp->signal[nr]; - char label[8]; + char label[16]; bool on; u32 val; @@ -4031,7 +4041,7 @@ static void _frequency_summary_show(struct seq_file *s, int nr, struct frequency_reg __iomem *reg) { - char label[8]; + char label[16]; bool on; u32 val; @@ -4175,11 +4185,11 @@ ptp_ocp_summary_show(struct seq_file *s, void *data) } if (bp->fw_cap & OCP_CAP_SIGNAL) - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) + for (i = 0; i < bp->signals_nr; i++) _signal_summary_show(s, bp, i); if (bp->fw_cap & OCP_CAP_FREQ) - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) + for (i = 0; i < bp->freq_in_nr; i++) _frequency_summary_show(s, i, bp->freq_in[i]); if (bp->irig_out) { -- 2.51.0 From 6b1d3c5f675cc794a015138b115afff172fb4c58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stanislav Fomichev Date: Wed, 14 May 2025 15:03:19 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 09/16] team: grab team lock during team_change_rx_flags Syzkaller reports the following issue: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:578 netdev_lock include/linux/netdevice.h:2751 [inline] netdev_lock_ops include/net/netdev_lock.h:42 [inline] dev_set_promiscuity+0x10e/0x260 net/core/dev_api.c:285 bond_set_promiscuity drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:922 [inline] bond_change_rx_flags+0x219/0x690 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4732 dev_change_rx_flags net/core/dev.c:9145 [inline] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x3f5/0x590 net/core/dev.c:9189 netif_set_promiscuity+0x50/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:9201 dev_set_promiscuity+0x126/0x260 net/core/dev_api.c:286 ^^ all of the above is under rcu lock team_change_rx_flags+0x1b3/0x330 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1785 dev_change_rx_flags net/core/dev.c:9145 [inline] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x3f5/0x590 net/core/dev.c:9189 netif_set_promiscuity+0x50/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:9201 dev_set_promiscuity+0x126/0x260 net/core/dev_api.c:286 hsr_del_port+0x25e/0x2d0 net/hsr/hsr_slave.c:233 hsr_netdev_notify+0x827/0xb60 net/hsr/hsr_main.c:104 notifier_call_chain+0x1b3/0x3e0 kernel/notifier.c:85 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2214 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2228 [inline] unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x15d8/0x2330 net/core/dev.c:11970 rtnl_delete_link net/core/rtnetlink.c:3522 [inline] rtnl_dellink+0x488/0x710 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3564 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7cc/0xb70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6955 netlink_rcv_skb+0x219/0x490 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2534 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1313 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x758/0x8d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 netlink_sendmsg+0x805/0xb30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883 team_change_rx_flags runs under rcu lock which means we can't grab instance lock for the lower devices. Switch to team->lock, similar to what we already do for team_set_mac_address and team_change_mtu. Fixes: 78cd408356fe ("net: add missing instance lock to dev_set_promiscuity") Reported-by: syzbot+53485086a41dbb43270a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=53485086a41dbb43270a Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6822cc81.050a0220.f2294.00e8.GAE@google.com Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250514220319.3505158-1-stfomichev@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/team/team_core.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/team/team_core.c b/drivers/net/team/team_core.c index d8fc0c79745d..b75ceb90359f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/team/team_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/team/team_core.c @@ -1778,8 +1778,8 @@ static void team_change_rx_flags(struct net_device *dev, int change) struct team_port *port; int inc; - rcu_read_lock(); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(port, &team->port_list, list) { + mutex_lock(&team->lock); + list_for_each_entry(port, &team->port_list, list) { if (change & IFF_PROMISC) { inc = dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC ? 1 : -1; dev_set_promiscuity(port->dev, inc); @@ -1789,7 +1789,7 @@ static void team_change_rx_flags(struct net_device *dev, int change) dev_set_allmulti(port->dev, inc); } } - rcu_read_unlock(); + mutex_unlock(&team->lock); } static void team_set_rx_mode(struct net_device *dev) -- 2.51.0 From ba54bce747fa9e07896c1abd9b48545f7b4b31d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakob Unterwurzacher Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 09:29:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 10/16] net: dsa: microchip: linearize skb for tail-tagging switches The pointer arithmentic for accessing the tail tag only works for linear skbs. For nonlinear skbs, it reads uninitialized memory inside the skb headroom, essentially randomizing the tag. I have observed it gets set to 6 most of the time. Example where ksz9477_rcv thinks that the packet from port 1 comes from port 6 (which does not exist for the ksz9896 that's in use), dropping the packet. Debug prints added by me (not included in this patch): [ 256.645337] ksz9477_rcv:323 tag0=6 [ 256.645349] skb len=47 headroom=78 headlen=0 tailroom=0 mac=(64,14) mac_len=14 net=(78,0) trans=78 shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=1 gso(size=0 type=0 segs=0)) csum(0x0 start=0 offset=0 ip_summed=0 complete_sw=0 valid=0 level=0) hash(0x0 sw=0 l4=0) proto=0x00f8 pkttype=1 iif=3 priority=0x0 mark=0x0 alloc_cpu=0 vlan_all=0x0 encapsulation=0 inner(proto=0x0000, mac=0, net=0, trans=0) [ 256.645377] dev name=end1 feat=0x0002e10200114bb3 [ 256.645386] skb headroom: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 256.645395] skb headroom: 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 256.645403] skb headroom: 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 256.645411] skb headroom: 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 256.645420] skb headroom: 00000040: ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 1c 19 f2 e2 db 08 06 [ 256.645428] skb frag: 00000000: 00 01 08 00 06 04 00 01 00 1c 19 f2 e2 db 0a 02 [ 256.645436] skb frag: 00000010: 00 83 00 00 00 00 00 00 0a 02 a0 2f 00 00 00 00 [ 256.645444] skb frag: 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 [ 256.645452] ksz_common_rcv:92 dsa_conduit_find_user returned NULL Call skb_linearize before trying to access the tag. This patch fixes ksz9477_rcv which is used by the ksz9896 I have at hand, and also applies the same fix to ksz8795_rcv which seems to have the same problem. Signed-off-by: Jakob Unterwurzacher CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 016e43a26bab ("net: dsa: ksz: Add KSZ8795 tag code") Fixes: 8b8010fb7876 ("dsa: add support for Microchip KSZ tail tagging") Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250515072920.2313014-1-jakob.unterwurzacher@cherry.de Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/dsa/tag_ksz.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/dsa/tag_ksz.c b/net/dsa/tag_ksz.c index c33d4bf17929..0b7564b53790 100644 --- a/net/dsa/tag_ksz.c +++ b/net/dsa/tag_ksz.c @@ -140,7 +140,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *ksz8795_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) static struct sk_buff *ksz8795_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) { - u8 *tag = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - KSZ_EGRESS_TAG_LEN; + u8 *tag; + + if (skb_linearize(skb)) + return NULL; + + tag = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - KSZ_EGRESS_TAG_LEN; return ksz_common_rcv(skb, dev, tag[0] & KSZ8795_TAIL_TAG_EG_PORT_M, KSZ_EGRESS_TAG_LEN); @@ -311,10 +316,16 @@ static struct sk_buff *ksz9477_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, static struct sk_buff *ksz9477_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) { - /* Tag decoding */ - u8 *tag = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - KSZ_EGRESS_TAG_LEN; - unsigned int port = tag[0] & KSZ9477_TAIL_TAG_EG_PORT_M; unsigned int len = KSZ_EGRESS_TAG_LEN; + unsigned int port; + u8 *tag; + + if (skb_linearize(skb)) + return NULL; + + /* Tag decoding */ + tag = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - KSZ_EGRESS_TAG_LEN; + port = tag[0] & KSZ9477_TAIL_TAG_EG_PORT_M; /* Extra 4-bytes PTP timestamp */ if (tag[0] & KSZ9477_PTP_TAG_INDICATION) { -- 2.51.0 From 91b6dbced0ef1d680afdd69b14fc83d50ebafaf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ido Schimmel Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 11:48:48 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 11/16] bridge: netfilter: Fix forwarding of fragmented packets When netfilter defrag hooks are loaded (due to the presence of conntrack rules, for example), fragmented packets entering the bridge will be defragged by the bridge's pre-routing hook (br_nf_pre_routing() -> ipv4_conntrack_defrag()). Later on, in the bridge's post-routing hook, the defragged packet will be fragmented again. If the size of the largest fragment is larger than what the kernel has determined as the destination MTU (using ip_skb_dst_mtu()), the defragged packet will be dropped. Before commit ac6627a28dbf ("net: ipv4: Consolidate ipv4_mtu and ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward"), ip_skb_dst_mtu() would return dst_mtu() as the destination MTU. Assuming the dst entry attached to the packet is the bridge's fake rtable one, this would simply be the bridge's MTU (see fake_mtu()). However, after above mentioned commit, ip_skb_dst_mtu() ends up returning the route's MTU stored in the dst entry's metrics. Ideally, in case the dst entry is the bridge's fake rtable one, this should be the bridge's MTU as the bridge takes care of updating this metric when its MTU changes (see br_change_mtu()). Unfortunately, the last operation is a no-op given the metrics attached to the fake rtable entry are marked as read-only. Therefore, ip_skb_dst_mtu() ends up returning 1500 (the initial MTU value) and defragged packets are dropped during fragmentation when dealing with large fragments and high MTU (e.g., 9k). Fix by moving the fake rtable entry's metrics to be per-bridge (in a similar fashion to the fake rtable entry itself) and marking them as writable, thereby allowing MTU changes to be reflected. Fixes: 62fa8a846d7d ("net: Implement read-only protection and COW'ing of metrics.") Fixes: 33eb9873a283 ("bridge: initialize fake_rtable metrics") Reported-by: Venkat Venkatsubra Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/PH0PR10MB4504888284FF4CBA648197D0ACB82@PH0PR10MB4504.namprd10.prod.outlook.com/ Tested-by: Venkat Venkatsubra Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250515084848.727706-1-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/bridge/br_nf_core.c | 7 ++----- net/bridge/br_private.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bridge/br_nf_core.c b/net/bridge/br_nf_core.c index 98aea5485aae..a8c67035e23c 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_nf_core.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_nf_core.c @@ -65,17 +65,14 @@ static struct dst_ops fake_dst_ops = { * ipt_REJECT needs it. Future netfilter modules might * require us to fill additional fields. */ -static const u32 br_dst_default_metrics[RTAX_MAX] = { - [RTAX_MTU - 1] = 1500, -}; - void br_netfilter_rtable_init(struct net_bridge *br) { struct rtable *rt = &br->fake_rtable; rcuref_init(&rt->dst.__rcuref, 1); rt->dst.dev = br->dev; - dst_init_metrics(&rt->dst, br_dst_default_metrics, true); + dst_init_metrics(&rt->dst, br->metrics, false); + dst_metric_set(&rt->dst, RTAX_MTU, br->dev->mtu); rt->dst.flags = DST_NOXFRM | DST_FAKE_RTABLE; rt->dst.ops = &fake_dst_ops; } diff --git a/net/bridge/br_private.h b/net/bridge/br_private.h index d5b3c5936a79..4715a8d6dc32 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_private.h +++ b/net/bridge/br_private.h @@ -505,6 +505,7 @@ struct net_bridge { struct rtable fake_rtable; struct rt6_info fake_rt6_info; }; + u32 metrics[RTAX_MAX]; #endif u16 group_fwd_mask; u16 group_fwd_mask_required; -- 2.51.0 From 43f0999af011fba646e015f0bb08b6c3002a0170 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronak Doshi Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 19:04:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 12/16] vmxnet3: update MTU after device quiesce Currently, when device mtu is updated, vmxnet3 updates netdev mtu, quiesces the device and then reactivates it for the ESXi to know about the new mtu. So, technically the OS stack can start using the new mtu before ESXi knows about the new mtu. This can lead to issues for TSO packets which use mss as per the new mtu configured. This patch fixes this issue by moving the mtu write after device quiesce. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d1a890fa37f2 ("net: VMware virtual Ethernet NIC driver: vmxnet3") Signed-off-by: Ronak Doshi Acked-by: Guolin Yang Changes v1-> v2: Moved MTU write after destroy of rx rings Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250515190457.8597-1-ronak.doshi@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c b/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c index 3df6aabc7e33..c676979c7ab9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c +++ b/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c @@ -3607,8 +3607,6 @@ vmxnet3_change_mtu(struct net_device *netdev, int new_mtu) struct vmxnet3_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev); int err = 0; - WRITE_ONCE(netdev->mtu, new_mtu); - /* * Reset_work may be in the middle of resetting the device, wait for its * completion. @@ -3622,6 +3620,7 @@ vmxnet3_change_mtu(struct net_device *netdev, int new_mtu) /* we need to re-create the rx queue based on the new mtu */ vmxnet3_rq_destroy_all(adapter); + WRITE_ONCE(netdev->mtu, new_mtu); vmxnet3_adjust_rx_ring_size(adapter); err = vmxnet3_rq_create_all(adapter); if (err) { @@ -3638,6 +3637,8 @@ vmxnet3_change_mtu(struct net_device *netdev, int new_mtu) "Closing it\n", err); goto out; } + } else { + WRITE_ONCE(netdev->mtu, new_mtu); } out: -- 2.51.0 From d6d2b0e1538d5c381ec0ca95afaf772c096ea5dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lorenzo Bianconi Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 08:33:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 13/16] net: airoha: Fix page recycling in airoha_qdma_rx_process() Do not recycle the page twice in airoha_qdma_rx_process routine in case of error. Just run dev_kfree_skb() if the skb has been allocated and marked for recycling. Run page_pool_put_full_page() directly if the skb has not been allocated yet. Moreover, rely on DMA address from queue entry element instead of reading it from the DMA descriptor for DMA syncing in airoha_qdma_rx_process(). Fixes: e12182ddb6e71 ("net: airoha: Enable Rx Scatter-Gather") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250515-airoha-fix-rx-process-error-condition-v2-1-657e92c894b9@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/ethernet/airoha/airoha_eth.c | 22 +++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/airoha/airoha_eth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/airoha/airoha_eth.c index d748dc6de923..1e9ab65218ff 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/airoha/airoha_eth.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/airoha/airoha_eth.c @@ -614,7 +614,6 @@ static int airoha_qdma_rx_process(struct airoha_queue *q, int budget) struct airoha_queue_entry *e = &q->entry[q->tail]; struct airoha_qdma_desc *desc = &q->desc[q->tail]; u32 hash, reason, msg1 = le32_to_cpu(desc->msg1); - dma_addr_t dma_addr = le32_to_cpu(desc->addr); struct page *page = virt_to_head_page(e->buf); u32 desc_ctrl = le32_to_cpu(desc->ctrl); struct airoha_gdm_port *port; @@ -623,22 +622,16 @@ static int airoha_qdma_rx_process(struct airoha_queue *q, int budget) if (!(desc_ctrl & QDMA_DESC_DONE_MASK)) break; - if (!dma_addr) - break; - - len = FIELD_GET(QDMA_DESC_LEN_MASK, desc_ctrl); - if (!len) - break; - q->tail = (q->tail + 1) % q->ndesc; q->queued--; - dma_sync_single_for_cpu(eth->dev, dma_addr, + dma_sync_single_for_cpu(eth->dev, e->dma_addr, SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(q->buf_size), dir); + len = FIELD_GET(QDMA_DESC_LEN_MASK, desc_ctrl); data_len = q->skb ? q->buf_size : SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(q->buf_size); - if (data_len < len) + if (!len || data_len < len) goto free_frag; p = airoha_qdma_get_gdm_port(eth, desc); @@ -701,9 +694,12 @@ static int airoha_qdma_rx_process(struct airoha_queue *q, int budget) q->skb = NULL; continue; free_frag: - page_pool_put_full_page(q->page_pool, page, true); - dev_kfree_skb(q->skb); - q->skb = NULL; + if (q->skb) { + dev_kfree_skb(q->skb); + q->skb = NULL; + } else { + page_pool_put_full_page(q->page_pool, page, true); + } } airoha_qdma_fill_rx_queue(q); -- 2.51.0 From c46286fdd6aa1d0e33c245bcffe9ff2428a777bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 18:49:26 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 14/16] mr: consolidate the ipmr_can_free_table() checks. Guoyu Yin reported a splat in the ipmr netns cleanup path: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 14564 at net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 ipmr_free_table net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 14564 at net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 ipmr_rules_exit+0x135/0x1c0 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:361 Modules linked in: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 14564 Comm: syz.4.838 Not tainted 6.14.0 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:ipmr_free_table net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 [inline] RIP: 0010:ipmr_rules_exit+0x135/0x1c0 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:361 Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 7d 48 c7 83 60 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 71 67 7f 00 e8 4c 2d 8a fd 90 <0f> 0b 90 eb 93 e8 41 2d 8a fd 0f b6 2d 80 54 ea 01 31 ff 89 ee e8 RSP: 0018:ffff888109547c58 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888108c12dc0 RCX: ffffffff83e09868 RDX: ffff8881022b3300 RSI: ffffffff83e098d4 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: ffff888104288000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed10211825c9 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff88801816c4a0 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff888108c13320 R14: ffff888108c12dc0 R15: fffffbfff0b74058 FS: 00007f84f39316c0(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f84f3930f98 CR3: 0000000113b56000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: ipmr_net_exit_batch+0x50/0x90 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:3160 ops_exit_list+0x10c/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:177 setup_net+0x47d/0x8e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:394 copy_net_ns+0x25d/0x410 net/core/net_namespace.c:516 create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xaf0 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc3/0x180 kernel/nsproxy.c:228 ksys_unshare+0x78d/0x9a0 kernel/fork.c:3342 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3413 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3411 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x31/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3411 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xa6/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f84f532cc29 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f84f3931038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f84f5615fa0 RCX: 00007f84f532cc29 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000040000400 RBP: 00007f84f53fba18 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f84f5615fa0 R15: 00007fff51c5f328 The running kernel has CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES disabled, and the sanity check for such build is still too loose. Address the issue consolidating the relevant sanity check in a single helper regardless of the kernel configuration. Also share it between the ipv4 and ipv6 code. Reported-by: Guoyu Yin Fixes: 50b94204446e ("ipmr: tune the ipmr_can_free_table() checks.") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Link: https://patch.msgid.link/372dc261e1bf12742276e1b984fc5a071b7fc5a8.1747321903.git.pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- include/linux/mroute_base.h | 5 +++++ net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 12 +----------- net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 12 +----------- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/mroute_base.h b/include/linux/mroute_base.h index 58a2401e4b55..0075f6e5c3da 100644 --- a/include/linux/mroute_base.h +++ b/include/linux/mroute_base.h @@ -262,6 +262,11 @@ struct mr_table { int mroute_reg_vif_num; }; +static inline bool mr_can_free_table(struct net *net) +{ + return !check_net(net) || !net_initialized(net); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_COMMON void vif_device_init(struct vif_device *v, struct net_device *dev, diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c index a8b04d4abcaa..85dc208f32e9 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c @@ -120,11 +120,6 @@ static void ipmr_expire_process(struct timer_list *t); lockdep_rtnl_is_held() || \ list_empty(&net->ipv4.mr_tables)) -static bool ipmr_can_free_table(struct net *net) -{ - return !check_net(net) || !net_initialized(net); -} - static struct mr_table *ipmr_mr_table_iter(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt) { @@ -317,11 +312,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ipmr_rule_default); #define ipmr_for_each_table(mrt, net) \ for (mrt = net->ipv4.mrt; mrt; mrt = NULL) -static bool ipmr_can_free_table(struct net *net) -{ - return !check_net(net); -} - static struct mr_table *ipmr_mr_table_iter(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt) { @@ -437,7 +427,7 @@ static void ipmr_free_table(struct mr_table *mrt) { struct net *net = read_pnet(&mrt->net); - WARN_ON_ONCE(!ipmr_can_free_table(net)); + WARN_ON_ONCE(!mr_can_free_table(net)); timer_shutdown_sync(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer); mroute_clean_tables(mrt, MRT_FLUSH_VIFS | MRT_FLUSH_VIFS_STATIC | diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c index b413c9c8a21c..3276cde5ebd7 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -108,11 +108,6 @@ static void ipmr_expire_process(struct timer_list *t); lockdep_rtnl_is_held() || \ list_empty(&net->ipv6.mr6_tables)) -static bool ip6mr_can_free_table(struct net *net) -{ - return !check_net(net) || !net_initialized(net); -} - static struct mr_table *ip6mr_mr_table_iter(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt) { @@ -306,11 +301,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip6mr_rule_default); #define ip6mr_for_each_table(mrt, net) \ for (mrt = net->ipv6.mrt6; mrt; mrt = NULL) -static bool ip6mr_can_free_table(struct net *net) -{ - return !check_net(net); -} - static struct mr_table *ip6mr_mr_table_iter(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt) { @@ -416,7 +406,7 @@ static void ip6mr_free_table(struct mr_table *mrt) { struct net *net = read_pnet(&mrt->net); - WARN_ON_ONCE(!ip6mr_can_free_table(net)); + WARN_ON_ONCE(!mr_can_free_table(net)); timer_shutdown_sync(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer); mroute_clean_tables(mrt, MRT6_FLUSH_MIFS | MRT6_FLUSH_MIFS_STATIC | -- 2.51.0 From 239af1970bcb039a1551d2c438d113df0010c149 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilia Gavrilov Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 12:20:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 15/16] llc: fix data loss when reading from a socket in llc_ui_recvmsg() For SOCK_STREAM sockets, if user buffer size (len) is less than skb size (skb->len), the remaining data from skb will be lost after calling kfree_skb(). To fix this, move the statement for partial reading above skb deletion. Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) Fixes: 30a584d944fb ("[LLX]: SOCK_DGRAM interface fixes") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ilia Gavrilov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/llc/af_llc.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/llc/af_llc.c b/net/llc/af_llc.c index 0259cde394ba..cc77ec5769d8 100644 --- a/net/llc/af_llc.c +++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c @@ -887,15 +887,15 @@ static int llc_ui_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) goto copy_uaddr; + /* Partial read */ + if (used + offset < skb_len) + continue; + if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) { skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue); kfree_skb(skb); *seq = 0; } - - /* Partial read */ - if (used + offset < skb_len) - continue; } while (len > 0); out: -- 2.51.0 From bbd95160a03dbfcd01a541f25c27ddb730dfbbd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jacob Keller Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2025 11:13:52 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 16/16] ice: fix vf->num_mac count with port representors The ice_vc_repr_add_mac() function indicates that it does not store the MAC address filters in the firmware. However, it still increments vf->num_mac. This is incorrect, as vf->num_mac should represent the number of MAC filters currently programmed to firmware. Indeed, we only perform this increment if the requested filter is a unicast address that doesn't match the existing vf->hw_lan_addr. In addition, ice_vc_repr_del_mac() does not decrement the vf->num_mac counter. This results in the counter becoming out of sync with the actual count. As it turns out, vf->num_mac is currently only used in legacy made without port representors. The single place where the value is checked is for enforcing a filter limit on untrusted VFs. Upcoming patches to support VF Live Migration will use this value when determining the size of the TLV for MAC address filters. Fix the representor mode function to stop incrementing the counter incorrectly. Fixes: ac19e03ef780 ("ice: allow process VF opcodes in different ways") Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Tested-by: Sujai Buvaneswaran Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c index 7c3006eb68dd..6446d0fcc052 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c @@ -4275,7 +4275,6 @@ static int ice_vc_repr_add_mac(struct ice_vf *vf, u8 *msg) } ice_vfhw_mac_add(vf, &al->list[i]); - vf->num_mac++; break; } -- 2.51.0