From bc1265b5c982fc73077812a8be727ba3d734164b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ping-Ke Shih Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2025 10:54:24 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] wifi: rtw89: fw: cast mfw_hdr pointer from address of zeroth byte of firmware->data The firmware->size is validated before using firmware->data, but Coverity still reports: Downcasting "firmware->data" from "u8 const *" to "struct rtw89_mfw_hdr" implies that the data that this pointer points to is tainted." Using &firmware->data[0] to avoid the warning. No change logic at all. Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1494046 ("Untrusted loop bound") Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1544385 ("Untrusted array index read") Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250325025424.14079-1-pkshih@realtek.com --- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/fw.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/fw.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/fw.c index c7172334f895..16499fce94cc 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/fw.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/fw.c @@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ const struct rtw89_mfw_hdr *rtw89_mfw_get_hdr_ptr(struct rtw89_dev *rtwdev, if (sizeof(*mfw_hdr) > firmware->size) return NULL; - mfw_hdr = (const struct rtw89_mfw_hdr *)firmware->data; + mfw_hdr = (const struct rtw89_mfw_hdr *)&firmware->data[0]; if (mfw_hdr->sig != RTW89_MFW_SIG) return NULL; -- 2.50.1