Sowmini Varadhan [Thu, 18 Jan 2018 21:11:07 +0000 (13:11 -0800)]
rds: tcp: compute m_ack_seq as offset from ->write_seq
rds-tcp uses m_ack_seq to track the tcp ack# that indicates
that the peer has received a rds_message. The m_ack_seq is
used in rds_tcp_is_acked() to figure out when it is safe to
drop the rds_message from the RDS retransmit queue.
The m_ack_seq must be calculated as an offset from the right
edge of the in-flight tcp buffer, i.e., it should be based on
the ->write_seq, not the ->snd_nxt.
Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit b589513e6354a5fd6934823b7fd66bffad41137a)
Signed-off-by: Hans Westgaard Ry <hans.westgaard.ry@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Qing Huang <qing.huang@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Currently in ext4_valid_block_bitmap() we expect the bitmap to be
positioned anywhere between 0 and s_blocksize clusters, but that's
wrong because the bitmap can be placed anywhere in the block group. This
causes false positives when validating bitmaps on perfectly valid file
system layouts. Fix it by checking whether the bitmap is within the group
boundary.
The problem can be reproduced using the following
mkfs -t ext3 -E stride=256 /dev/vdb1
mount /dev/vdb1 /mnt/test
cd /mnt/test
wget https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/linux-4.16.3.tar.xz
tar xf linux-4.16.3.tar.xz
Orabug: 28167032 Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Håkon Bugge [Mon, 18 Jun 2018 11:39:14 +0000 (13:39 +0200)]
net/rds: Fix bug in failover_group parsing
When supplying a module parameter value for the fail-over group as:
ib0,ib1;ib2,ib3;ib4,ib5;ib6,ib7;ib8,ib9
rdmaip / rds_rdma is unable to parse it correctly. Based on debug
prints, it does:
lab38 kernel: RDS/IB: ib0 is designated group 1
lab38 kernel: RDS/IB: ib1 is designated group 1
lab38 kernel: RDS/IB: ib2 is designated group 2
(no more prints).
This implies, that for Xn-8 systems, fail-over will not be distributed
correctly. We see:
lab38 kernel: RDS/IP: IP 192.2.23.100 migrated from ib0 to ib1:P01
lab38 kernel: RDS/IP: IP 192.2.23.102 migrated from ib2 to ib1:P03
lab38 kernel: RDS/IP: IP 192.2.23.104 migrated from ib4 to ib3:P05
lab38 kernel: RDS/IP: IP 192.2.23.106 migrated from ib6 to ib3:P07
lab38 kernel: RDS/IP: IP 192.2.23.108 migrated from ib8 to ib3:P09
That is, all fail-overs except for ib0 are migrated to ib3.
This commit fixes this. The following values for the module parameter
have been tested (in user space):
Alexey Kodanev [Fri, 9 Feb 2018 14:35:23 +0000 (17:35 +0300)]
sctp: verify size of a new chunk in _sctp_make_chunk()
When SCTP makes INIT or INIT_ACK packet the total chunk length
can exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN which leads to kernel panic when
transmitting these packets, e.g. the crash on sending INIT_ACK:
Here the chunk size for INIT_ACK packet becomes too big, mostly
because of the state cookie (INIT packet has large size with
many address parameters), plus additional server parameters.
Later this chunk causes the panic in skb_put_data():
'nskb' (head skb) was previously allocated with packet->size
from u16 'chunk->chunk_hdr->length'.
As suggested by Marcelo we should check the chunk's length in
_sctp_make_chunk() before trying to allocate skb for it and
discard a chunk if its size bigger than SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leinter@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 07f2c7ab6f8d0a7e7c5764c4e6cc9c52951b9d9c)
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
Denys provided an awesome KASAN report pointing to an use
after free in xt_TCPMSS
I have provided three patches to fix this issue, either in xt_TCPMSS or
in xt_tcpudp.c. It seems xt_TCPMSS patch has the smallest possible
impact.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <nuclearcat@nuclearcat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2638fd0f92d4397884fd991d8f4925cb3f081901) Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
(Cherry-picked from commit dd83c161fbcc) Signed-off-by: mridula shastry <mridula.c.shastry@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Jacob Wen [Fri, 1 Jun 2018 13:54:26 +0000 (21:54 +0800)]
crypto: drbg - fix shadow copy of the test buffer
drbg->test_data.list is expected to be empty.
tmp->test_data.list should be empty(head->next == head) as well,
otherwise the specified test entropy will not be used in drbg_seed.
Fixes: b07ca65d8 ("crypto: drbg - Convert to new rng interface")
Orabug: 28078838
Signed-off-by: Jacob Wen <jian.w.wen@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Tom Herbert [Tue, 15 Dec 2015 23:41:37 +0000 (15:41 -0800)]
netlink: add a start callback for starting a netlink dump
The start callback allows the caller to set up a context for the
dump callbacks. Presumably, the context can then be destroyed in
the done callback.
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit fc9e50f5a5a4e1fa9ba2756f745a13e693cf6a06)
Reviewed-by: Shannon Nelson <shannon.nelson@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Herbert Xu [Thu, 19 Oct 2017 12:51:10 +0000 (20:51 +0800)]
ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1137b5e2529a8f5ca8ee709288ecba3e68044df2)
Reviewed-by: Shannon Nelson <shannon.nelson@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Wei Lin Guay [Mon, 19 Mar 2018 13:26:34 +0000 (14:26 +0100)]
net/rds: prevent RDS connections using stale ARP entries
Active bonding fallback is an asynchronous event in the cluster. Thus,
there is a potential race where a host has sent out a CM REQ, using a
wrong remote gid, before IP migration happens at the remote end. The
side effect of this issue causes RDS connections only use one physical
IB port. When that particular IB port goes down, it causes send
completion error on those RDS connections and eventually increases the
brownout time.
To avoid this phenomenon, RDS has to reject all incoming CM REQ after
RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED or RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_CHANGE events until
route resolution has been performed locally. By doing so, we can
ensure that the gratituos ARPs are sent to the remote end and RDS
connections are established based on the correct ARP entries.
Wei Lin Guay [Fri, 25 Aug 2017 09:13:51 +0000 (11:13 +0200)]
net/rds: Avoid stalled connection due to CM REQ retries
RDS drops a connection and destroys its cm_id once a CM REJ is sent. In a
congested fabric, there is a race where a remote node receives a CM REJ
after CM has retried another CM REQ. In this scenario, the cm_id that sends
the CM REQ is no longer exists even though the remote end might respond
with a CM REP, and wait for an incoming CM RTU. This RDS connection
establishment is stuck until the connection is destroyed after the CM
timeout. As a result, this leads to a very long brownout time. Thus, this
patch adds a mechanism to detect a rejected CM REQ and rejects all the
subsequent CM REQ that are retried by the CM.
Wei Lin Guay [Fri, 9 Jun 2017 12:20:56 +0000 (14:20 +0200)]
net/rds: use one sided reconnection during a race
This commit reverts commit 812c02791add ("RDS: restore the exponential
back-off scheme") to use one sided reconnection when a race is
detected. When a race is detected, the active side reconnects as fast
as possible, whereas the passive side wait for 15s.
This reverts commit fde8284e499b ("Revert "net/rds: Revert "RDS: add
reconnect retry scheme for stalled connections""").
Here is the commit message for the first revert:
<quote>
Commit 54312602fb26 ("RDS: add reconnect retry scheme for stalled
connections") introduces the rds_reconnect_timeout to retry the
connection establishment after sysctl_reconnect_retry_ms (default is
1000ms). Nevertheless, this proactive mechanism is overkilled and it
is causing long brownout time in the virtualized environment. In
short, below are the justifications why said commit is reverted.
a) The retry counter starts ticking after RDS received an ADDR_CHANGE
event. After receiving an ADDR_CHANGE event, RDS needs to perform shutdown
via shutdown_worker. Then, initiate a new connection via connect_worker.
Eventually, a CM REQ is only sent out after RDS received
RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_RESOLVED and RDMA_CM_EVENT_ROUTE_RESOLVED events. If the
retry is made to cater for stalled connection due to missing CM messages,
the retry should only happen after a CM REQ is sent. With the current
retry scheme (and with the default 1000 ms) that happens after ADDR_CHANGE
event, it introduces congestion in the single threaded workqueue.
b) Assuming that we modify the retry counter to start ticking after a
CM REQ message is sent out. By introducing another retry timeout, it
complicates the system tuning. Why? First, the
sysctl_reconnect_retry_ms relies on the underlying
cma_response_timeout. Any modication of cma_response_timeout requires
to tune sysctl_reconnect_retry_ms. Second, it is hard to find a
universal timing that fits all configurations (bare-metal,
virtualized, mixed environment, and homo/heterogenous system).
</quote>
Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
net/rds/ib_cm.c
net/rds/rdma_transport.c
net/rds/threads.c
Joe Jin [Thu, 17 May 2018 19:33:28 +0000 (12:33 -0700)]
xen-swiotlb: fix the check condition for xen_swiotlb_free_coherent
When run raidconfig from Dom0 we found that the Xen DMA heap is reduced,
but Dom Heap is increased by the same size. Tracing raidconfig we found
that the related ioctl() in megaraid_sas will call dma_alloc_coherent()
to apply memory. If the memory allocated by Dom0 is not in the DMA area,
it will exchange memory with Xen to meet the requiment. Later drivers
call dma_free_coherent() to free the memory, on xen_swiotlb_free_coherent()
the check condition (dev_addr + size - 1 <= dma_mask) is always false,
it prevents calling xen_destroy_contiguous_region() to return the memory
to the Xen DMA heap.
This issue introduced by commit 6810df88dcfc2 "xen-swiotlb: When doing
coherent alloc/dealloc check before swizzling the MFNs.".
Signed-off-by: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com> Tested-by: John Sobecki <john.sobecki@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Wei Lin Guay [Mon, 30 Oct 2017 09:45:56 +0000 (10:45 +0100)]
net/rds: Assign the correct service level
Commit 2bbf6158c769 ("net/rds: remove the RDS specific path record
caching") has changed the service level (SL) to TOS mapping to be
1:1. Nevertheless, it has assigned the SL to be a 8-bit value even though
IB specification section 7.7.3 mentioned that the SL is only a 4-bit
field. Thus, this patch assigns the SL correctly.
Nicholas Bellinger [Tue, 4 Oct 2016 23:37:05 +0000 (16:37 -0700)]
target: Re-add missing SCF_ACK_KREF assignment in v4.1.y
This patch fixes a regression in >= v4.1.y code where the original
SCF_ACK_KREF assignment in target_get_sess_cmd() was dropped upstream
in commit 054922bb, but the series for addressing TMR ABORT_TASK +
LUN_RESET with fabric session reinstatement in commit febe562c20 still
depends on this code in transport_cmd_finish_abort().
The regression manifests itself as a se_cmd->cmd_kref +1 leak, where
ABORT_TASK + LUN_RESET can hang indefinately for a specific I_T session
for drivers using SCF_ACK_KREF, resulting in hung kthreads.
Nicholas Bellinger [Tue, 12 Jan 2016 05:31:09 +0000 (21:31 -0800)]
target: Fix LUN_RESET active I/O handling for ACK_KREF
This patch fixes a NULL pointer se_cmd->cmd_kref < 0
refcount bug during TMR LUN_RESET with active se_cmd
I/O, that can be triggered during se_cmd descriptor
shutdown + release via core_tmr_drain_state_list() code.
To address this bug, add common __target_check_io_state()
helper for ABORT_TASK + LUN_RESET w/ CMD_T_COMPLETE
checking, and set CMD_T_ABORTED + obtain ->cmd_kref for
both cases ahead of last target_put_sess_cmd() after
TFO->aborted_task() -> transport_cmd_finish_abort()
callback has completed.
It also introduces SCF_ACK_KREF to determine when
transport_cmd_finish_abort() needs to drop the second
extra reference, ahead of calling target_put_sess_cmd()
for the final kref_put(&se_cmd->cmd_kref).
It also updates transport_cmd_check_stop() to avoid
holding se_cmd->t_state_lock while dropping se_cmd
device state via target_remove_from_state_list(), now
that core_tmr_drain_state_list() is holding the
se_device lock while checking se_cmd state from
within TMR logic.
Finally, move transport_put_cmd() release of SGL +
TMR + extended CDB memory into target_free_cmd_mem()
in order to avoid potential resource leaks in TMR
ABORT_TASK + LUN_RESET code-paths. Also update
target_release_cmd_kref() accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Quinn Tran <quinn.tran@qlogic.com> Cc: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@qlogic.com> Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Cc: Andy Grover <agrover@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.10+ Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Orabug: 27781132
Bart Van Assche [Thu, 22 Oct 2015 22:57:04 +0000 (15:57 -0700)]
target: Invoke release_cmd() callback without holding a spinlock
This patch fixes the following kernel warning because it avoids that
IRQs are disabled while ft_release_cmd() is invoked (fc_seq_set_resp()
invokes spin_unlock_bh()):
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Thu, 24 May 2018 14:32:57 +0000 (10:32 -0400)]
x86/bugs: Report properly retpoline+IBRS
If the retpoline fallback is activated we want to properly
report that both of them are on.
This involves a bit of dance where we do not change
the spectre_v2_enabled ever again. But we still need the logic
to detect whether IBRS + retpoline is enabled. To make it
easier we change the name of the function to be more obvious.
OraBug: 27897282 Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
---
v2: Remove the pr_err('Spectre v2 mitigation IBRS is set.\n')
Make the retpoline_only_enabled optimized.
Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
This patch uses the original value of nr_events (from userspace) to
increment aio-nr and count against aio-max-nr, which resolves those.
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reported-by: Lekshmi C. Pillai <lekshmi.cpillai@in.ibm.com> Tested-by: Lekshmi C. Pillai <lekshmi.cpillai@in.ibm.com> Tested-by: Paul Nguyen <nguyenp@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Orabug: 28079082
(cherry picked from commit 2a8a98673c13cb2a61a6476153acf8344adfa992) Signed-off-by: Rajan Shanmugavelu <rajan.shanmugavelu@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Calum Mackay <calum.mackay@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Rajan Shanmugavelu [Mon, 4 Jun 2018 22:22:43 +0000 (15:22 -0700)]
qla2xxx: Enable buffer boundary check when DIF bundling is on.
The Qlogic firmware requires the upper 32-bit of dma buffer address
not flipped, this happens when DIF bundling is enabled and the SGE
buffer address plus length changes the upper 32-bit address, a local
buffer is used for DIF information.
Co-authored-by: Giri Malavali <giridhar.malavali@cavium.com> Co-authored-by: Joe Carnuccio <joe.carnuccio@cavium.com> Reviewed-by: Giri Malavali <giridhar.malavali@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Rajan Shanmugavelu <rajan.shanmugavelu@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Mihai Carabas [Tue, 29 May 2018 09:32:58 +0000 (12:32 +0300)]
x86/bugs/IBRS: Keep SSBD mitigation in effect if spectre_v2=ibrs is selected
From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
If the system admins picks to disable memory disambiguation at bootup
(spec_store_bypass_disable=on) and enable IBRS (spectre_v2=ibrs) we
end up briefly at bootup disabling memory disambiguation and then
IBRS SPEC_CTRL kicks - and memory disambiguation is enabled back again.
The logic is there for the 'auto' case, but we missed it for
the other ones. Lets fix it up.
Fixes: 89981b51b9240ec16e506304990ce2311e93285b ("x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation") Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Wang Long [Thu, 21 May 2015 16:34:22 +0000 (09:34 -0700)]
fs/pstore: update the backend parameter in pstore module
This patch update the module parameter backend, so it is visible
through /sys/module/pstore/parameters/backend.
For example:
if pstore backend is ramoops, with this patch:
# cat /sys/module/pstore/parameters/backend
ramoops
and without this patch:
# cat /sys/module/pstore/parameters/backend
(null)
Signed-off-by: Wang Long <long.wanglong@huawei.com> Acked-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 42222c2a5d5da7fe4839491d5c44034f40761071)
Orabug: 27994372 Signed-off-by: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
This is more or less a revert of commit 2c82878b0cb3 ("KVM: VMX: require
virtual NMI support", 2017-03-27); it turns out that Core 2 Duo machines
only had virtual NMIs in some SKUs.
The revert is not trivial because in the meanwhile there have been several
fixes to nested NMI injection. Therefore, the entire vNMI state is moved
to struct loaded_vmcs.
Another change compared to before the patch is a simplification here:
if (unlikely(!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() && vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked &&
!(is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_cpu_has_virtual_nmis(
get_vmcs12(vcpu))))) {
The final condition here is always true (because nested_cpu_has_virtual_nmis
is always false) and is removed.
Fixes: 2c82878b0cb38fd516fd612c67852a6bbf282003 Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1490803 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8a1b43922d0d1279e7936ba85c4c2a870403c95f)
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
Conflicts are due to the fact that a large number of patches affecting this
area of the code have not been ported to UEK4-QU7. Portions of the
cherry-picked patch had to be manually inserted in the correct places, but
no logical changes were required.
Milan Broz [Tue, 6 Jun 2017 07:07:01 +0000 (09:07 +0200)]
dm crypt: add big-endian variant of plain64 IV
The big-endian IV (plain64be) is needed to map images from extracted
disks that are used in some external (on-chip FDE) disk encryption
drives, e.g.: data recovery from external USB/SATA drives that support
"internal" encryption.
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7e3fd855ad66ffc0dd926911da23dd21e59f9462) Signed-off-by: Si-Wei Liu <si-wei.liu@oracle.com> Tested-by: Qiang Wang <qiang.z.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Orabug: 28043932 Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Thu, 17 May 2018 03:18:09 +0000 (23:18 -0400)]
x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO
The "336996 Speculative Execution Side Channel Mitigations" from
May defines this as SSB_NO, hence lets sync-up.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Orabug: 28063992
CVE: CVE-2018-3639
(cherry picked from commit 240da953) Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
[msr-index.h: different file location]
Tom Lendacky [Thu, 10 May 2018 20:06:39 +0000 (22:06 +0200)]
KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD
Expose the new virtualized architectural mechanism, VIRT_SSBD, for using
speculative store bypass disable (SSBD) under SVM. This will allow guests
to use SSBD on hardware that uses non-architectural mechanisms for enabling
SSBD.
[ tglx: Folded the migration fixup from Paolo Bonzini ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Orabug: 28063992
CVE: CVE-2018-3639
(cherry picked from commit bc226f07) Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
[
We did not have cpu_has_high_real_mode_segbase entry at all.
Also msr_info is not in this patchset, I will take care of it
in Orabug: 28069548 in a future patchset.
]
Thomas Gleixner [Thu, 10 May 2018 18:42:48 +0000 (20:42 +0200)]
x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG
Add the necessary logic for supporting the emulated VIRT_SPEC_CTRL MSR to
x86_virt_spec_ctrl(). If either X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD or
X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL is set then use the new guest_virt_spec_ctrl
argument to check whether the state must be modified on the host. The
update reuses speculative_store_bypass_update() so the ZEN-specific sibling
coordination can be reused.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Orabug: 28063992
CVE: CVE-2018-3639
(cherry picked from commit 47c61b39) Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
[
bugs.c: different file name
spec-ctrl.h: contextual changes. Diff couldn't be applied
]
Thomas Gleixner [Sat, 12 May 2018 18:10:00 +0000 (20:10 +0200)]
x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic
x86_spec_ctrL_mask is intended to mask out bits from a MSR_SPEC_CTRL value
which are not to be modified. However the implementation is not really used
and the bitmask was inverted to make a check easier, which was removed in
"x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set()"
Aside of that it is missing the STIBP bit if it is supported by the
platform, so if the mask would be used in x86_virt_spec_ctrl() then it
would prevent a guest from setting STIBP.
Add the STIBP bit if supported and use the mask in x86_virt_spec_ctrl() to
sanitize the value which is supplied by the guest.
(cherry picked from commit be6fcb54) Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
[Konrad:
As we have the IBRS support and boy that makes it double hard.
The first part of this patch is to invert the mask, no biggie.
But the mask for the IBRS mode (that is - we want to set SPEC_CTRL
MSR to 1<<0 in kernel space, but in user-space we want it to be
1<<1) didn't set the SSBD bit as we should not set the SSBD
in kernel mode. But with the inversion that is OK.
Next part is the two values - x86_spec_ctrl_base and x86_spec_ctrl_priv.
The x86_spec_ctrl_base is what userspace is going to have (so
tack on SSBD), and x86_spec_ctrl_priv what runs in kernel (so
tack on IBRS, but _NOT_ SSBD).
That means the whole logic of filtering the supported SPEC_CTRL
value depending on what the host supports should be seeded
with x86_spec_ctrl_priv.
With all that the logic works - we end up ANDing our mask
and what we can support (and the initial boot-time value of the
MSR), and then ORing what the guest wants with our mask.
All the while supporting any other bits in the SPEC_CTRL that
may come in the future.
And this logic is fine on AMD too - where the SSBD bit does not
show up in the SPEC_CTRL mask
P.S.
To make it more fun the x86_spec_ctrl_priv |= IBRS is set in a
header (see set_ibrs_inuse).]
Thomas Gleixner [Sat, 12 May 2018 18:49:16 +0000 (20:49 +0200)]
x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly
x86_spec_ctrl_base is the system wide default value for the SPEC_CTRL MSR.
x86_spec_ctrl_get_default() returns x86_spec_ctrl_base and was intended to
prevent modification to that variable. Though the variable is read only
after init and globaly visible already.
Remove the function and export the variable instead.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Orabug: 28063992
CVE: CVE-2018-3639
(cherry picked from commit fa8ac498) Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
[Contextual changes: things weren't in the expected place]
Function bodies are very similar and are going to grow more almost
identical code. Add a bool arg to determine whether SPEC_CTRL is being set
for the guest or restored to the host.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Orabug: 28063992
CVE: CVE-2018-3639
(cherry picked from commit cc69b349) Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
[Different filename bugs_64.c]
The upcoming support for the virtual SPEC_CTRL MSR on AMD needs to reuse
speculative_store_bypass_update() to avoid code duplication. Add an
argument for supplying a thread info (TIF) value and create a wrapper
speculative_store_bypass_update_current() which is used at the existing
call site.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Orabug: 28063992
CVE: CVE-2018-3639
(cherry picked from commit 0270be3e) Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
[Different filename (bugs_64.c)]
Tom Lendacky [Thu, 17 May 2018 15:09:18 +0000 (17:09 +0200)]
x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support
Some AMD processors only support a non-architectural means of enabling
speculative store bypass disable (SSBD). To allow a simplified view of
this to a guest, an architectural definition has been created through a new
CPUID bit, 0x80000008_EBX[25], and a new MSR, 0xc001011f. With this, a
hypervisor can virtualize the existence of this definition and provide an
architectural method for using SSBD to a guest.
Add the new CPUID feature, the new MSR and update the existing SSBD
support to use this MSR when present.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Orabug: 28063992
CVE: CVE-2018-3639
(cherry picked from commit 11fb0683) Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
arch/x86/kernel/process.c
[
cpufeatures.h: different file name and different index
msr-index.h: different file location
bugs.c: different file name
process.c: different file structure
common.c: This is because we skipped the first two patches from the patch
series. We do no have enough feature bits to align all the actual feature in
our cpufeature structure. We created a synthetic feature and this is where we
detect and set it.
]
Thomas Gleixner [Wed, 9 May 2018 21:01:01 +0000 (23:01 +0200)]
x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
AMD is proposing a VIRT_SPEC_CTRL MSR to handle the Speculative Store
Bypass Disable via MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG so that guests do not have to care
about the bit position of the SSBD bit and thus facilitate migration.
Also, the sibling coordination on Family 17H CPUs can only be done on
the host.
Extend x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest() and x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() with an
extra argument for the VIRT_SPEC_CTRL MSR.
Hand in 0 from VMX and in SVM add a new virt_spec_ctrl member to the CPU
data structure which is going to be used in later patches for the actual
implementation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Orabug: 28063992
CVE: CVE-2018-3639
(cherry picked from commit ccbcd267) Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
[
We skipped cherry-picking two commits from upstream:
x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration ...
x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS ...
x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP ...
Because we do not enough space in word 7 of synthetic bits for cpufeature. Also
we do not have the word 13 to move the bits around (like upstream did). We
cannot add word 13 because we will break kABI. So we do no have VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
cpufeature but we have VIRT_SSBD cpufeature which is a bit in virt_spec_ctrl
MSR.
]
Thomas Gleixner [Wed, 9 May 2018 19:53:09 +0000 (21:53 +0200)]
x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD
The AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is a per core MSR on Family 17H CPUs. That means when
hyperthreading is enabled the SSBD bit toggle needs to take both cores into
account. Otherwise the following situation can happen:
CPU0 CPU1
disable SSB
disable SSB
enable SSB <- Enables it for the Core, i.e. for CPU0 as well
So after the SSB enable on CPU1 the task on CPU0 runs with SSB enabled
again.
On Intel the SSBD control is per core as well, but the synchronization
logic is implemented behind the per thread SPEC_CTRL MSR. It works like
this:
i.e. if one of the threads enables a mitigation then this affects both and
the mitigation is only disabled in the core when both threads disabled it.
Add the necessary synchronization logic for AMD family 17H. Unfortunately
that requires a spinlock to serialize the access to the MSR, but the locks
are only shared between siblings.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Orabug: 28063992
CVE: CVE-2018-3639
(cherry picked from commit 1f50ddb4) Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/process.c
arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
[Contextual changes: in UEK4 files are pretty different and do not match the diff]
Thomas Gleixner [Thu, 10 May 2018 14:26:00 +0000 (16:26 +0200)]
x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN
Add a ZEN feature bit so family-dependent static_cpu_has() optimizations
can be built for ZEN.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Orabug: 28063992
CVE: CVE-2018-3639
(cherry picked from commit d1035d97) Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
[Different filename and differnet bit for FEATURE_ZEN]
CPUID Fn8000_0007_EDX[CPB] is wrongly 0 on models up to B1. But they do
support CPB (AMD's Core Performance Boosting cpufreq CPU feature), so fix that.
(cherry picked from commit f7f3dc00) Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Annoyingly, modify_user_hw_breakpoint() unnecessarily complicates the
modification of a breakpoint - simplify it and remove the pointless
local variables.
Also update the stale Docbook while at it.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit f67b15037a7a50c57f72e69a6d59941ad90a0f0f) Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 11 May 2018 13:21:01 +0000 (15:21 +0200)]
KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS
svm_vcpu_run() invokes x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() after VMEXIT, but
before the host GS is restored. x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() uses 'current'
to determine the host SSBD state of the thread. 'current' is GS based, but
host GS is not yet restored and the access causes a triple fault.
Fixes: 885f82bfbc6f x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 15e6c22fd8e5a42c5ed6d487b7c9fe44c2517765) Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Fri, 11 May 2018 20:50:35 +0000 (16:50 -0400)]
x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void
Fixes: 7bb4d366c ("x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static") Fixes: 24f7fc83b ("x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation")
OraBug: 28041771
CVE: CVE-2018-3639
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
(cherry picked from commit ffed645e3be0e32f8e9ab068d257aee8d0fe8eec) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
[It is called bugs_64 in UEK4]
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
(cherry picked from commit 7bb4d366cba992904bffa4820d24e70a3de93e76) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
[It is called bugs_64.c]
Fixes: 24f7fc83b9204 ("x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation") Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
(cherry picked from commit d66d8ff3d21667b41eddbe86b35ab411e40d8c5f) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
[It is called bugs_64.c]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
(cherry picked from commit dd0792699c4058e63c0715d9a7c2d40226fcdddc) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Wed, 9 May 2018 19:41:38 +0000 (21:41 +0200)]
proc: Use underscores for SSBD in 'status'
The style for the 'status' file is CamelCase or this. _.
Fixes: fae1fa0fc ("proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations")
OraBug: 28041771
CVE: CVE-2018-3639
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
(cherry picked from commit e96f46ee8587607a828f783daa6eb5b44d25004d) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Wed, 9 May 2018 19:41:38 +0000 (21:41 +0200)]
x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD
Intel collateral will reference the SSB mitigation bit in IA32_SPEC_CTL[2]
as SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable).
Hence changing it.
It is unclear yet what the MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (0x10a) Bit(4) name
is going to be. Following the rename it would be SSBD_NO but that rolls out
to Speculative Store Bypass Disable No.
Also fixed the missing space in X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD.
[ tglx: Fixup x86_amd_rds_enable() and rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg() as well ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
(cherry picked from commit f21b53b20c754021935ea43364dbf53778eeba32) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
[It is called Documentation/kernel-paramters.txt]
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
[Different name..]
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
[And again, bugs_64.c, and also we did provide the SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_USERSPACE]
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 4 May 2018 13:12:06 +0000 (15:12 +0200)]
seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code
The migitation control is simpler to implement in architecture code as it
avoids the extra function call to check the mode. Aside of that having an
explicit seccomp enabled mode in the architecture mitigations would require
even more workarounds.
Move it into architecture code and provide a weak function in the seccomp
code. Remove the 'which' argument as this allows the architecture to decide
which mitigations are relevant for seccomp.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
(cherry picked from commit 8bf37d8c067bb7eb8e7c381bdadf9bd89182b6bc) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
[Which is called bugs_64.c in UEK4]
include/linux/nospec.h
Kees Cook [Thu, 3 May 2018 21:56:12 +0000 (14:56 -0700)]
seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation
If a seccomp user is not interested in Speculative Store Bypass mitigation
by default, it can set the new SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW flag when
adding filters.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
(cherry picked from commit b849a812f7eb92e96d1c8239b06581b2cfd8b275) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Sun, 13 May 2018 15:47:19 +0000 (11:47 -0400)]
prctl: Add force disable speculation
For certain use cases it is desired to enforce mitigations so they cannot
be undone afterwards. That's important for loader stubs which want to
prevent a child from disabling the mitigation again. Will also be used for
seccomp(). The extra state preserving of the prctl state for SSB is a
preparatory step for EBPF dymanic speculation control.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
(cherry picked from commit 356e4bfff2c5489e016fdb925adbf12a1e3950ee) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
Kees Cook [Tue, 1 May 2018 22:07:31 +0000 (15:07 -0700)]
seccomp: Enable speculation flaw mitigations
When speculation flaw mitigations are opt-in (via prctl), using seccomp
will automatically opt-in to these protections, since using seccomp
indicates at least some level of sandboxing is desired.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
(cherry picked from commit 5c3070890d06ff82eecb808d02d2ca39169533ef) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
kernel/seccomp.c
[The include file is called nospec-branch.h instead of nospec.h]
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Fri, 4 May 2018 06:15:44 +0000 (06:15 +0000)]
x86/bugs/IBRS: Disable SSB (RDS) if IBRS is sslected for spectre_v2.
If =userspace is selected we want frob the SPEC_CTRL MSR on every
userspace entrace (disable memory disambigation), and also on every
kernel entrace (enable memory disambiguation). However we have
to be careful as having MSR frobbed and retpoline being enabled
slows the machine even further.
Therefore if possible swap over to using SPEC_CTRL MSR (IBRS) on
every kernel entrace instead of using retpoline.
Naturally this heuristic is controlled by various knobs.
To summarize, if "spectre_v2=retpoline spec_store_bypass_disable=userspace"
is set then we will switch the spectre_v2 to IBRS.
This table may explain this better:
effect | spectre_v2 | spec_store_bypass_disable | remark
==========+=============+===========================+======
IBRS | ibrs | userspace |
IBRS | auto | userspace | *1 *2
IBRS | retpoline | userspace | *1
IBRS | ibrs | boot |
retpoline | auto | boot |
retpoline | retpoline | boot |
retpoline | auto | boot |
retpoline | auto | auto |
*1: If spectre_v2_heuristic=off or spectre_v2_heuristic=rds=off
is selected then the spec_store_bypass_disable=userspace parameter
is not followed and the effect is both retpoline and IBRS enabled
in the kernel.
*2: If we run under Skylake+ the 'spec_store_bypass_disable=auto'
will disable retpoline and enable IBRS. If not on Skylake+, then
retpoline and IBRS are both enabled.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 29 Apr 2018 13:26:40 +0000 (15:26 +0200)]
x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation
Add prctl based control for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation and make it
the default mitigation for Intel and AMD.
Andi Kleen provided the following rationale (slightly redacted):
There are multiple levels of impact of Speculative Store Bypass:
1) JITed sandbox.
It cannot invoke system calls, but can do PRIME+PROBE and may have call
interfaces to other code
2) Native code process.
No protection inside the process at this level.
3) Kernel.
4) Between processes.
The prctl tries to protect against case (1) doing attacks.
If the untrusted code can do random system calls then control is already
lost in a much worse way. So there needs to be system call protection in
some way (using a JIT not allowing them or seccomp). Or rather if the
process can subvert its environment somehow to do the prctl it can already
execute arbitrary code, which is much worse than SSB.
To put it differently, the point of the prctl is to not allow JITed code
to read data it shouldn't read from its JITed sandbox. If it already has
escaped its sandbox then it can already read everything it wants in its
address space, and do much worse.
The ability to control Speculative Store Bypass allows to enable the
protection selectively without affecting overall system performance.
Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen. Completely rewritten.
Mihai Carabas [Fri, 18 May 2018 09:42:44 +0000 (12:42 +0300)]
x86: thread_info.h: move RDS from index 5 to 23
In UEK4, the thread flags field is split in two parts:
- lower bits of the word which are used usually for "pending work-to-be-done"
- upper bits of the word
There is a comment in arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h:88 where it says that
the lower bits are hard-coded in entry_64.S. In entry_64.S a mask of 0x0000ffff
is used to check the state of the thread and determine if it would go to
userspace or not. Because we used bit "5", which was in the lower bits part,
one of the checked condition was always true and the program never returned
from kernel.
We moved RDS to bit 23 which was free to solve the issue.
Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 29 Apr 2018 13:21:42 +0000 (15:21 +0200)]
x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass
The Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability can be mitigated with the
Reduced Data Speculation (RDS) feature. To allow finer grained control of
this eventually expensive mitigation a per task mitigation control is
required.
Add a new TIF_RDS flag and put it into the group of TIF flags which are
evaluated for mismatch in switch_to(). If these bits differ in the previous
and the next task, then the slow path function __switch_to_xtra() is
invoked. Implement the TIF_RDS dependent mitigation control in the slow
path.
If the prctl for controlling Speculative Store Bypass is disabled or no
task uses the prctl then there is no overhead in the switch_to() fast
path.
Update the KVM related speculation control functions to take TID_RDS into
account as well.
Based on a patch from Tim Chen. Completely rewritten.
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 29 Apr 2018 13:20:11 +0000 (15:20 +0200)]
prctl: Add speculation control prctls
Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites
and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance
impacting mitigations.
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with
the following meaning:
Bit Define Description
0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
disabled
2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
enabled
If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is
available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
misfeature will fail.
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the
control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.
The common return values are:
EINVAL prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl()
arguments are not 0
ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values:
ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE
ENXIO prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled
The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is
PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between
architectures.
Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten.
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 29 Apr 2018 13:01:37 +0000 (15:01 +0200)]
x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell
Having everything in nospec-branch.h creates a hell of dependencies when
adding the prctl based switching mechanism. Move everything which is not
required in nospec-branch.h to spec-ctrl.h and fix up the includes in the
relevant files.
x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requested
AMD does not need the Speculative Store Bypass mitigation to be enabled.
The parameters for this are already available and can be done via MSR
C001_1020. Each family uses a different bit in that MSR for this.
[ tglx: Expose the bit mask via a variable and move the actual MSR fiddling
into the bugs code as that's the right thing to do and also required
to prepare for dynamic enable/disable ]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1115a859f33276fe8afb31c60cf9d8e657872558) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
[It is called bugs_64.c]
x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS
Intel CPUs expose methods to:
- Detect whether RDS capability is available via CPUID.7.0.EDX[31],
- The SPEC_CTRL MSR(0x48), bit 2 set to enable RDS.
- MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, Bit(4) no need to enable RRS.
With that in mind if spec_store_bypass_disable=[auto,on] is selected set at
boot-time the SPEC_CTRL MSR to enable RDS if the platform requires it.
Note that this does not fix the KVM case where the SPEC_CTRL is exposed to
guests which can muck with it, see patch titled :
KVM/SVM/VMX/x86/spectre_v2: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS.
And for the firmware (IBRS to be set), see patch titled:
x86/spectre_v2: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits
[ tglx: Distangled it from the intel implementation and kept the call order ]
x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation
Contemporary high performance processors use a common industry-wide
optimization known as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which loads from
addresses to which a recent store has occurred may (speculatively) see an
older value. Intel refers to this feature as "Memory Disambiguation" which
is part of their "Smart Memory Access" capability.
Memory Disambiguation can expose a cache side-channel attack against such
speculatively read values. An attacker can create exploit code that allows
them to read memory outside of a sandbox environment (for example,
malicious JavaScript in a web page), or to perform more complex attacks
against code running within the same privilege level, e.g. via the stack.
As a first step to mitigate against such attacks, provide two boot command
line control knobs:
By default affected x86 processors will power on with Speculative
Store Bypass enabled. Hence the provided kernel parameters are written
from the point of view of whether to enable a mitigation or not.
The parameters are as follows:
- auto - Kernel detects whether your CPU model contains an implementation
of Speculative Store Bypass and picks the most appropriate
mitigation.
- on - disable Speculative Store Bypass
- off - enable Speculative Store Bypass
[ tglx: Reordered the checks so that the whole evaluation is not done
when the CPU does not support RDS ]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0cc5fa00b0a88dad140b4e5c2cead9951ad36822) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
[It is called cpufeature.h]
[We also need to use the scattered function to set the flag similar
to how the rest of CPUID.7.0.EDX[31] are done]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit c456442cd3a59eeb1d60293c26cbe2ff2c4e42cf) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
[It is a different file - cpufeature.h]
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
[As well, called bugs_64.c]
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
[Location of cpu_set_bug_bits is different and also had to drop the __initconst]
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160906184254.94440-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit f5fbf848303c8704d0e1a1e7cabd08fd0a49552f) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/platform/atom/punit_atom_debug.c
[Does not exist]
drivers/pci/pci-mid.c
drivers/powercap/intel_rapl.c
[We never added the support for it]
x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS
A guest may modify the SPEC_CTRL MSR from the value used by the
kernel. Since the kernel doesn't use IBRS, this means a value of zero is
what is needed in the host.
But the 336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf refers to
the other bits as reserved so the kernel should respect the boot time
SPEC_CTRL value and use that.
This allows to deal with future extensions to the SPEC_CTRL interface if
any at all.
Note: This uses wrmsrl() instead of native_wrmsl(). I does not make any
difference as paravirt will over-write the callq *0xfff.. with the wrmsrl
assembler code.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5cf687548705412da47c9cec342fd952d71ed3d5) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
[We need to preserve the check for ibrs_inuse - which we can do now in the
functions]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Sun, 13 May 2018 23:06:42 +0000 (23:06 +0000)]
x86/bugs/IBRS: Use variable instead of defines for enabling IBRS
This follows what "x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use
reserved bits" patch does - that is respect the other bits of the
SPEC CTRL MSR (if any at all).
This necessitates to convert all the assembler macros over, all
the various uses of the SPEC CTRL guarded by 'use_ibrs'.
Note the not so obvious change in the assembler macro from 'cmp' to
'test' to verify the right bit being set.
And to make sure it works with the IBRS support we need to
recognize it in x86_spec_ctrl_set.
This is not upstreamed. It builds on top of IBRS backport.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs_64.c
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Sat, 12 May 2018 01:11:04 +0000 (21:11 -0400)]
x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits
The 336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf refers to all
the other bits as reserved. The Intel SDM glossary defines reserved as
implementation specific - aka unknown.
As such at bootup this must be taken it into account and proper masking for
the bits in use applied.
A copy of this document is available at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511
Suggested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1b86883ccb8d5d9506529d42dbe1a5257cb30b18) Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
[As we don't have the firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start and
firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end and end up with a different
name. See commit 473ad76ea8d76f34555d764a3d5820bc1b33cabf
"x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware"]
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
[File is called bugs_64.c in UEK4]
[Also the backport needs nospec-branch.h in different files ,and we can't
use __ro_after_init]
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Sat, 12 May 2018 00:12:34 +0000 (20:12 -0400)]
x86/bugs/IBRS: Turn on IBRS in spectre_v2_select_mitigation
instead of during early bootup. This makes the bootup much
faster as we may get an NMI (watchdog) during booting before we
make it to spectre_v2_select_mitigation - which means we would
be running with IBRS enabled.
Fixes: XYZ ("x86/bugs/IBRS: Use variable instead of defines for enabling IBRS") Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Hannes Reinecke [Fri, 30 Sep 2016 09:01:14 +0000 (11:01 +0200)]
scsi: libfc: Revisit kref handling
The kref handling in fc_rport is a mess. This patch updates
the kref handling according to the following rules:
- Take a reference whenever scheduling a workqueue
- Take a reference whenever an ELS command is send
- Drop the reference at the end of the workqueue function
- Drop the reference at the end of handling ELS replies
- Take a reference when allocating an rport
- Drop the reference when removing an rport
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jth@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
OraBug: 27363267
(cherry picked from commit 4d2095cc42a2d8062590891f929d9d694cbd927f) Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Fred Herard <fred.herard@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Rajan Shanmugavelu <rajan.shanmugavelu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Hannes Reinecke [Fri, 5 Aug 2016 12:55:02 +0000 (14:55 +0200)]
scsi: libfc: reset exchange manager during LOGO handling
FC-LS mandates that we should invalidate all sequences before sending a
LOGO. And we should set the event to RPORT_EV_STOP when a LOGO request
has been received to signal that all exchanges are terminated.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Chad Dupuis <chad.dupuis@qlogic.com> Tested-by: Chad Dupuis <chad.dupuis@qlogic.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
OraBug: 27363267
(cherry picked from commit 649eb8693857e9b9fca009fba4eb7e80f9f3a326) Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Fred Herard <fred.herard@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Rajan Shanmugavelu <rajan.shanmugavelu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Hannes Reinecke [Fri, 5 Aug 2016 12:55:01 +0000 (14:55 +0200)]
scsi: libfc: send LOGO for PLOGI failure
When running in point-to-multipoint mode PLOGI is done after FLOGI
completed. So when the PLOGI fails we should be sending a LOGO to the
remote port.
[mkp: Applied by hand]
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Chad Dupuis <chad.dupuis@qlogic.com> Tested-by: Chad Dupuis <chad.dupuis@qlogic.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
OraBug: 27363267
(cherry picked from commit d391966a03846176a78ef8d53898de8b4302a2be) Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Fred Herard <fred.herard@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Rajan Shanmugavelu <rajan.shanmugavelu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Hannes Reinecke [Fri, 5 Aug 2016 12:55:00 +0000 (14:55 +0200)]
scsi: libfc: Issue PRLI after a PRLO has been received
When receiving a PRLO it just means that the operating parameters have
changed, it does _not_ mean that the port doesn't want to communicate
with us. So instead of implicitly logging out we should be issueing a
PRLI to figure out the new operating parameters. We can always recover
once PRLI fails.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Chad Dupuis <chad.dupuis@qlogic.com> Tested-by: Chad Dupuis <chad.dupuis@qlogic.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
OraBug: 27363267
(cherry picked from commit 166f310b629c046b7f5ca846adf978cda47b06c2) Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Fred Herard <fred.herard@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Rajan Shanmugavelu <rajan.shanmugavelu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Hannes Reinecke [Tue, 24 May 2016 06:11:58 +0000 (08:11 +0200)]
libfc: Update rport reference counting
Originally libfc would just be initializing the refcount to '1', and
using the disc_mutex to synchronize if and when the final put should be
happening. This has a race condition as the mutex might be delayed,
causing other threads to access an invalid structure. This patch
updates the rport reference counting to increase the reference every
time 'rport_lookup' is called, and decreases the reference
correspondingly. This removes the need to hold 'disc_mutex' when
removing the structure, and avoids the above race condition.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Acked-by: Vasu Dev <vasu.dev@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
OraBug: 27363267
(cherry picked from commit baa6719f902af9c03e528b08dfb847de295b5137) Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Fred Herard <fred.herard@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Rajan Shanmugavelu <rajan.shanmugavelu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Elena Ufimtseva [Fri, 27 Apr 2018 23:53:51 +0000 (19:53 -0400)]
amd/kvm: do not intercept new MSRs for spectre v2 mitigation
Do not intercept MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD on AMD
for Spectre v2 mitigation.
As IBRS is not used on AMD, attempt to intercept MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
will have guest crash with injected GP fault.
Also change the comment about field 'always' in svm_direct_access_msrs structure
for clarity.
Signed-off-by: Elena Ufimtseva <elena.ufimtseva@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
set rm->atomic.op_active to 0 when rds_pin_pages() fails
or the user supplied address is invalid,
this prevents a NULL pointer usage in rds_atomic_free_op()
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 7d11f77f84b27cef452cee332f4e469503084737)
Reviewed-by: Shan Hai <shan.hai@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
There's no need to be printing a raw kernel pointer to the kernel log at
every boot. So just remove it, and change the whole message to use the
correct dev_info() call at the same time.
Reported-by: Wang Qize <wang_qize@venustech.com.cn> Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 43cdd1b716b26f6af16da4e145b6578f98798bf6)
Reviewed-by: Shan Hai <shan.hai@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Venkat Venkatsubra [Wed, 16 May 2018 21:08:50 +0000 (14:08 -0700)]
net: ipv4: add support for ECMP hash policy choice
This patch adds support for ECMP hash policy choice via a new sysctl
called fib_multipath_hash_policy and also adds support for L4 hashes.
The current values for fib_multipath_hash_policy are:
0 - layer 3 (default)
1 - layer 4
If there's an skb hash already set and it matches the chosen policy then it
will be used instead of being calculated (currently only for L4).
In L3 mode we always calculate the hash due to the ICMP error special
case, the flow dissector's field consistentification should handle the
address order thus we can remove the address reversals.
If the skb is provided we always use it for the hash calculation,
otherwise we fallback to fl4, that is if skb is NULL fl4 has to be set.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit bf4e0a3db97eb882368fd82980b3b1fa0b5b9778)
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Venkat Venkatsubra <venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
include/net/ip_fib.h
include/net/netns/ipv4.h
include/net/route.h
net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
net/ipv4/icmp.c
net/ipv4/route.c
net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
host h1 with IP 12.0.0.1 has 2 paths to host h3 at 15.0.0.5:
root@h1:~# ip ro ls
...
12.0.0.0/24 dev swp1 proto kernel scope link src 12.0.0.1
15.0.0.0/16
nexthop via 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 weight 1
nexthop via 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 weight 1
...
If the link between tor3 and tor1 is down and the link between tor1
and tor2 then tor1 is effectively cut-off from h1. Yet the route lookups
in h1 are alternating between the 2 routes: ping 15.0.0.5 gets one and
ssh 15.0.0.5 gets the other. Connections that attempt to use the
12.0.0.2 nexthop fail since that neighbor is not reachable:
root@h1:~# ip neigh show
...
12.0.0.3 dev swp1 lladdr 00:02:00:00:00:1b REACHABLE
12.0.0.2 dev swp1 FAILED
...
The failed path can be avoided by considering known neighbor information
when selecting next hops. If the neighbor lookup fails we have no
knowledge about the nexthop, so give it a shot. If there is an entry
then only select the nexthop if the state is sane. This is similar to
what fib_detect_death does.
To maintain backward compatibility use of the neighbor information is
based on a new sysctl, fib_multipath_use_neigh.
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit a6db4494d218c2e559173661ee972e048dc04fdd)
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Venkat Venkatsubra <venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
Signed-off-by: Peter Nørlund <pch@ordbogen.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 0e884c78ee19e902f300ed147083c28a0c6302f0)
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Venkat Venkatsubra <venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
include/net/ip_fib.h
net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed)
Reviewd-by: Shan Hai <shan.hai@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
NFS: only invalidate dentrys that are clearly invalid.
Since commit bafc9b754f75 ("vfs: More precise tests in d_invalidate")
in v3.18, a return of '0' from ->d_revalidate() will cause the dentry
to be invalidated even if it has filesystems mounted on or it or on a
descendant. The mounted filesystem is unmounted.
This means we need to be careful not to return 0 unless the directory
referred to truly is invalid. So -ESTALE or -ENOENT should invalidate
the directory. Other errors such a -EPERM or -ERESTARTSYS should be
returned from ->d_revalidate() so they are propagated to the caller.
A particular problem can be demonstrated by:
1/ mount an NFS filesystem using NFSv3 on /mnt
2/ mount any other filesystem on /mnt/foo
3/ ls /mnt/foo
4/ turn off network, or otherwise make the server unable to respond
5/ ls /mnt/foo &
6/ cat /proc/$!/stack # note that nfs_lookup_revalidate is in the call stack
7/ kill -9 $! # this results in -ERESTARTSYS being returned
8/ observe that /mnt/foo has been unmounted.
This patch changes nfs_lookup_revalidate() to only treat
-ESTALE from nfs_lookup_verify_inode() and
-ESTALE or -ENOENT from ->lookup()
as indicating an invalid inode. Other errors are returned.
Also nfs_check_inode_attributes() is changed to return -ESTALE rather
than -EIO. This is consistent with the error returned in similar
circumstances from nfs_update_inode().
As this bug allows any user to unmount a filesystem mounted on an NFS
filesystem, this fix is suitable for stable kernels.
Fixes: bafc9b754f75 ("vfs: More precise tests in d_invalidate") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.18+) Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Orabug: 27870824
(cherry picked from commit cc89684c9a265828ce061037f1f79f4a68ccd3f7) Signed-off-by: Calum Mackay <calum.mackay@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jack Vogel <jack.vogel@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
David Ahern [Tue, 16 May 2017 06:19:17 +0000 (23:19 -0700)]
net: Improve handling of failures on link and route dumps
In general, rtnetlink dumps do not anticipate failure to dump a single
object (e.g., link or route) on a single pass. As both route and link
objects have grown via more attributes, that is no longer a given.
netlink dumps can handle a failure if the dump function returns an
error; specifically, netlink_dump adds the return code to the response
if it is <= 0 so userspace is notified of the failure. The missing
piece is the rtnetlink dump functions returning the error.
Fix route and link dump functions to return the errors if no object is
added to an skb (detected by skb->len != 0). IPv6 route dumps
(rt6_dump_route) already return the error; this patch updates IPv4 and
link dumps. Other dump functions may need to be ajusted as well.
Reported-by: Jan Moskyto Matejka <mq@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Orabug: 27959177
(cherry picked from commit f6c5775ff0bfa62b072face6bf1d40f659f194b2)
Add missing err variable for the cherry-pick in rtnetlink.c Signed-off-by: Jack Vogel <jack.vogel@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Duval <dan.duval@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Bytes b4 ffff8801f582d750: ae 01 ff ff 00 00 00 00 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ........ZZZZZZZZ
Object ffff8801f582d760: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object ffff8801f582d770: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkk.
Redzone ffff8801f582d778: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........
Padding ffff8801f582d8b8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8801f582d600: fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff8801f582d680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8801f582d700: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fc
!shared memory policy is not protected against parallel removal by other
thread which is normally protected by the mmap_sem. do_get_mempolicy,
however, drops the lock midway while we can still access it later.
Early premature up_read is a historical artifact from times when
put_user was called in this path see https://lwn.net/Articles/124754/
but that is gone since 8bccd85ffbaf ("[PATCH] Implement sys_* do_*
layering in the memory policy layer."). but when we have the the
current mempolicy ref count model. The issue was introduced
accordingly.
Fix the issue by removing the premature release.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502950924-27521-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Orabug: 27963519
CVE: CVE-2018-10675
(cherry picked from commit 73223e4e2e3867ebf033a5a8eb2e5df0158ccc99) Signed-off-by: Jack Vogel <jack.vogel@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Shan Hai <shan.hai@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
The memmap options sent to the udl framebuffer driver were not being
checked for all sets of possible crazy values. Fix this up by properly
bounding the allowed values.
Eric Sandeen [Tue, 17 Apr 2018 06:07:27 +0000 (23:07 -0700)]
xfs: set format back to extents if xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree
If xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree fails in a mode where we call
xfs_iroot_realloc(-1) to de-allocate the root, set the
format back to extents.
Otherwise we can assume we can dereference ifp->if_broot
based on the XFS_DINODE_FMT_BTREE format, and crash.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199423 Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2c4306f719b083d17df2963bc761777576b8ad1b)
Orabug: 27963576
CVE: CVE-2018-10323 Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c
Drop a part of the patch which is inapplicable to the current kernel.
The WARN_ON_ONCE in the dropped part is introduced in the upstream
commit 2fcc319d2467 as a debugging facility since v4.11 kernel.
Signed-off-by: Shan Hai <shan.hai@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jack Vogel <jack.vogel@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
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