From: Darren Kenny Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 19:12:20 +0000 (+0000) Subject: x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL X-Git-Tag: v4.1.12-124.31.3~1148 X-Git-Url: https://www.infradead.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=407b0b9d0f4b1451d37aedbfd0cbe9789bf72e53;p=users%2Fjedix%2Flinux-maple.git x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit") Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: David Woodhouse Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecxr3b@starbug-vm.ie.oracle.com (cherry picked from commit af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881) Orabug: 27477743 CVE: CVE-2017-5715 Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin --- diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 0a77c74e3b0a..6ff030a734b8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future - * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided. + * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided. */ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) {