may_follow_link(): trim arguments

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 05efcc0fc4b6d6da9f4c4c45e63bd8e5c783368e..82cb1bc9a1bf0b868b0a69741a8fab783ef021fc 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -765,7 +765,6 @@ int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0;
 
 /**
  * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations
- * @link: The path of the symlink
  * @nd: nameidata pathwalk data
  *
  * In the case of the sysctl_protected_symlinks sysctl being enabled,
@@ -779,7 +778,7 @@ int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0;
  *
  * Returns 0 if following the symlink is allowed, -ve on error.
  */
-static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
+static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd)
 {
        const struct inode *inode;
        const struct inode *parent;
@@ -788,7 +787,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
                return 0;
 
        /* Allowed if owner and follower match. */
-       inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
+       inode = nd->link.dentry->d_inode;
        if (uid_eq(current_cred()->fsuid, inode->i_uid))
                return 0;
 
@@ -801,8 +800,8 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
        if (uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
                return 0;
 
-       audit_log_link_denied("follow_link", link);
-       path_put(link);
+       audit_log_link_denied("follow_link", &nd->link);
+       path_put(&nd->link);
        path_put(&nd->path);
        return -EACCES;
 }
@@ -1985,7 +1984,7 @@ static void path_cleanup(struct nameidata *nd)
 static int trailing_symlink(struct nameidata *nd)
 {
        const char *s;
-       int error = may_follow_link(&nd->link, nd);
+       int error = may_follow_link(nd);
        if (unlikely(error))
                return error;
        nd->flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;