]> www.infradead.org Git - users/dwmw2/linux.git/commitdiff
powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry
authorNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:41:58 +0000 (10:41 +1100)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sun, 22 Nov 2020 09:02:25 +0000 (10:02 +0100)
commit f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695 upstream.

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before
it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible
for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method,
since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures
to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the
attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel
user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of
Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility
it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the
privileged code to construct an attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries
of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h
arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h
arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h
arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c

index 8dbc8d4ec8f0cca7cff2007adabd961c77d16066..973861421264ef0fc459c93c8e0c5630991d840e 100644 (file)
                                               mds=off [X86]
                                               tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
                                               kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
+                                              no_entry_flush [PPC]
 
                                Exceptions:
                                               This does not have any effect on
 
        noefi           Disable EFI runtime services support.
 
+       no_entry_flush  [PPC] Don't flush the L1-D cache when entering the kernel.
+
        noexec          [IA-64]
 
        noexec          [X86]
index a86feddddad0cdceb012e2249c229fa7f6e31ff2..35fb5b11955a0b2cceb185b77ef78c7d3fe579e2 100644 (file)
        nop;                                                            \
        nop
 
+#define ENTRY_FLUSH_SLOT                                               \
+       ENTRY_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION;                                      \
+       nop;                                                            \
+       nop;                                                            \
+       nop;
+
 /*
  * r10 must be free to use, r13 must be paca
  */
 #define INTERRUPT_TO_KERNEL                                            \
-       STF_ENTRY_BARRIER_SLOT
+       STF_ENTRY_BARRIER_SLOT;                                         \
+       ENTRY_FLUSH_SLOT
 
 /*
  * Macros for annotating the expected destination of (h)rfid
index 40a6c9261a6bfab2994fa5fa6e93b70f398ee560..9ad779d87b23c4d3c68f8cee789ac85575c36e7d 100644 (file)
@@ -205,6 +205,14 @@ label##3:                                          \
        FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 955b-956b;                     \
        .popsection;
 
+#define ENTRY_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION                      \
+957:                                                   \
+       .pushsection __entry_flush_fixup,"a";           \
+       .align 2;                                       \
+958:                                                   \
+       FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 957b-958b;                     \
+       .popsection;
+
 #define RFI_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION                                \
 951:                                                   \
        .pushsection __rfi_flush_fixup,"a";             \
@@ -237,8 +245,10 @@ label##3:                                          \
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
 extern long stf_barrier_fallback;
+extern long entry_flush_fallback;
 extern long __start___stf_entry_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup;
 extern long __start___stf_exit_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_exit_barrier_fixup;
+extern long __start___entry_flush_fixup, __stop___entry_flush_fixup;
 extern long __start___rfi_flush_fixup, __stop___rfi_flush_fixup;
 extern long __start___barrier_nospec_fixup, __stop___barrier_nospec_fixup;
 extern long __start__btb_flush_fixup, __stop__btb_flush_fixup;
index ccf44c135389a111023a244498f9fab60a8583f5..082b56bf678dd33b2fa7ee49e8491a103f99bf94 100644 (file)
@@ -84,12 +84,16 @@ static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(unsigned long feature)
 // Software required to flush link stack on context switch
 #define SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK       0x0000000000001000ull
 
+// The L1-D cache should be flushed when entering the kernel
+#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY                0x0000000000004000ull
+
 
 // Features enabled by default
 #define SEC_FTR_DEFAULT \
        (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV | \
         SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR | \
         SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR | \
+        SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY | \
         SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY)
 
 #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H */
index 65676e2325b85f919a9e2c49aef84b99bfeeb482..556635217e5cb5ac6f8bc552d7d36651f4565ef1 100644 (file)
@@ -52,12 +52,15 @@ enum l1d_flush_type {
 };
 
 void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type, bool enable);
+void setup_entry_flush(bool enable);
+void setup_uaccess_flush(bool enable);
 void do_rfi_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types);
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC
 void setup_barrier_nospec(void);
 #else
 static inline void setup_barrier_nospec(void) { };
 #endif
+void do_entry_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types);
 void do_barrier_nospec_fixups(bool enable);
 extern bool barrier_nospec_enabled;
 
index fcf459694ccb3dd21de344e117bfd499c1b346c3..75551690e96e1fbe8286c8577b8c2277c34bb20c 100644 (file)
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(unrecover_mce)
        b       1b
 
 
-EXC_REAL(data_access, 0x300, 0x80)
+EXC_REAL_OOL(data_access, 0x300, 0x80)
 EXC_VIRT(data_access, 0x4300, 0x80, 0x300)
 TRAMP_KVM_SKIP(PACA_EXGEN, 0x300)
 
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ EXC_VIRT_END(data_access_slb, 0x4380, 0x80)
 TRAMP_KVM_SKIP(PACA_EXSLB, 0x380)
 
 
-EXC_REAL(instruction_access, 0x400, 0x80)
+EXC_REAL_OOL(instruction_access, 0x400, 0x80)
 EXC_VIRT(instruction_access, 0x4400, 0x80, 0x400)
 TRAMP_KVM(PACA_EXGEN, 0x400)
 
@@ -889,13 +889,13 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_TM)
 
 
 EXC_REAL_OOL_MASKABLE(decrementer, 0x900, 0x80, IRQS_DISABLED)
-EXC_VIRT_MASKABLE(decrementer, 0x4900, 0x80, 0x900, IRQS_DISABLED)
+EXC_VIRT_OOL_MASKABLE(decrementer, 0x4900, 0x80, 0x900, IRQS_DISABLED)
 TRAMP_KVM(PACA_EXGEN, 0x900)
 EXC_COMMON_ASYNC(decrementer_common, 0x900, timer_interrupt)
 
 
-EXC_REAL_HV(hdecrementer, 0x980, 0x80)
-EXC_VIRT_HV(hdecrementer, 0x4980, 0x80, 0x980)
+EXC_REAL_OOL_HV(hdecrementer, 0x980, 0x80)
+EXC_VIRT_OOL_HV(hdecrementer, 0x4980, 0x80, 0x980)
 TRAMP_KVM_HV(PACA_EXGEN, 0x980)
 EXC_COMMON(hdecrementer_common, 0x980, hdec_interrupt)
 
@@ -1529,6 +1529,43 @@ TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(stf_barrier_fallback)
        .endr
        blr
 
+TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(entry_flush_fallback)
+       std     r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
+       std     r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
+       std     r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
+       mfctr   r9
+       ld      r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13)
+       ld      r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SIZE(r13)
+       srdi    r11,r11,(7 + 3) /* 128 byte lines, unrolled 8x */
+       mtctr   r11
+       DCBT_BOOK3S_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */
+
+       /* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */
+       sync
+
+       /*
+        * The load addresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines,
+        * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not
+        * hurt).
+        */
+1:
+       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*0(r10)
+       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*1(r10)
+       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*2(r10)
+       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*3(r10)
+       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*4(r10)
+       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*5(r10)
+       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*6(r10)
+       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*7(r10)
+       addi    r10,r10,0x80*8
+       bdnz    1b
+
+       mtctr   r9
+       ld      r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
+       ld      r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
+       ld      r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
+       blr
+
 TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(rfi_flush_fallback)
        SET_SCRATCH0(r13);
        GET_PACA(r13);
index bd4996958b13d464486ca57760bee43e5ebba72f..7bbd9d22d66e4e3d8cd201e509ed21a309731ca4 100644 (file)
@@ -863,7 +863,9 @@ early_initcall(disable_hardlockup_detector);
 static enum l1d_flush_type enabled_flush_types;
 static void *l1d_flush_fallback_area;
 static bool no_rfi_flush;
+static bool no_entry_flush;
 bool rfi_flush;
+bool entry_flush;
 
 static int __init handle_no_rfi_flush(char *p)
 {
@@ -873,6 +875,14 @@ static int __init handle_no_rfi_flush(char *p)
 }
 early_param("no_rfi_flush", handle_no_rfi_flush);
 
+static int __init handle_no_entry_flush(char *p)
+{
+       pr_info("entry-flush: disabled on command line.");
+       no_entry_flush = true;
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("no_entry_flush", handle_no_entry_flush);
+
 /*
  * The RFI flush is not KPTI, but because users will see doco that says to use
  * nopti we hijack that option here to also disable the RFI flush.
@@ -904,6 +914,18 @@ void rfi_flush_enable(bool enable)
        rfi_flush = enable;
 }
 
+void entry_flush_enable(bool enable)
+{
+       if (enable) {
+               do_entry_flush_fixups(enabled_flush_types);
+               on_each_cpu(do_nothing, NULL, 1);
+       } else {
+               do_entry_flush_fixups(L1D_FLUSH_NONE);
+       }
+
+       entry_flush = enable;
+}
+
 static void __ref init_fallback_flush(void)
 {
        u64 l1d_size, limit;
@@ -957,10 +979,19 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable)
 
        enabled_flush_types = types;
 
-       if (!no_rfi_flush && !cpu_mitigations_off())
+       if (!cpu_mitigations_off() && !no_rfi_flush)
                rfi_flush_enable(enable);
 }
 
+void setup_entry_flush(bool enable)
+{
+       if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+               return;
+
+       if (!no_entry_flush)
+               entry_flush_enable(enable);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
 static int rfi_flush_set(void *data, u64 val)
 {
@@ -988,9 +1019,36 @@ static int rfi_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val)
 
 DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_rfi_flush, rfi_flush_get, rfi_flush_set, "%llu\n");
 
+static int entry_flush_set(void *data, u64 val)
+{
+       bool enable;
+
+       if (val == 1)
+               enable = true;
+       else if (val == 0)
+               enable = false;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       /* Only do anything if we're changing state */
+       if (enable != entry_flush)
+               entry_flush_enable(enable);
+
+       return 0;
+}
+
+static int entry_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val)
+{
+       *val = entry_flush ? 1 : 0;
+       return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_entry_flush, entry_flush_get, entry_flush_set, "%llu\n");
+
 static __init int rfi_flush_debugfs_init(void)
 {
        debugfs_create_file("rfi_flush", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_rfi_flush);
+       debugfs_create_file("entry_flush", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_entry_flush);
        return 0;
 }
 device_initcall(rfi_flush_debugfs_init);
index d081d726ca8eac6c4d0e52d849f8a2a971e49239..1432cf996201a6ad6b909885651b700a5b7db0a0 100644 (file)
@@ -140,6 +140,13 @@ SECTIONS
                __stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup = .;
        }
 
+       . = ALIGN(8);
+       __entry_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__entry_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+               __start___entry_flush_fixup = .;
+               *(__entry_flush_fixup)
+               __stop___entry_flush_fixup = .;
+       }
+
        . = ALIGN(8);
        __stf_exit_barrier_fixup : AT(ADDR(__stf_exit_barrier_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
                __start___stf_exit_barrier_fixup = .;
index dbe478e7b8e094028637f509ae3ffd82a2cb7eeb..22bae8741cae5777e6873c84035541a3e6c37cd4 100644 (file)
@@ -232,6 +232,60 @@ void do_stf_barrier_fixups(enum stf_barrier_type types)
        do_stf_exit_barrier_fixups(types);
 }
 
+void do_entry_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types)
+{
+       unsigned int instrs[3], *dest;
+       long *start, *end;
+       int i;
+
+       start = PTRRELOC(&__start___entry_flush_fixup);
+       end = PTRRELOC(&__stop___entry_flush_fixup);
+
+       instrs[0] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
+       instrs[1] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
+       instrs[2] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
+
+       i = 0;
+       if (types == L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK) {
+               instrs[i++] = 0x7d4802a6; /* mflr r10           */
+               instrs[i++] = 0x60000000; /* branch patched below */
+               instrs[i++] = 0x7d4803a6; /* mtlr r10           */
+       }
+
+       if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) {
+               instrs[i++] = 0x63ff0000; /* ori 31,31,0 speculation barrier */
+               instrs[i++] = 0x63de0000; /* ori 30,30,0 L1d flush*/
+       }
+
+       if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
+               instrs[i++] = 0x7c12dba6; /* mtspr TRIG2,r0 (SPR #882) */
+
+       for (i = 0; start < end; start++, i++) {
+               dest = (void *)start + *start;
+
+               pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)dest);
+
+               patch_instruction(dest, instrs[0]);
+
+               if (types == L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK)
+                       patch_branch((dest + 1), (unsigned long)&entry_flush_fallback,
+                                    BRANCH_SET_LINK);
+               else
+                       patch_instruction((dest + 1), instrs[1]);
+
+               patch_instruction((dest + 2), instrs[2]);
+       }
+
+       printk(KERN_DEBUG "entry-flush: patched %d locations (%s flush)\n", i,
+               (types == L1D_FLUSH_NONE)       ? "no" :
+               (types == L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK)   ? "fallback displacement" :
+               (types &  L1D_FLUSH_ORI)        ? (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
+                                                       ? "ori+mttrig type"
+                                                       : "ori type" :
+               (types &  L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)     ? "mttrig type"
+                                               : "unknown");
+}
+
 void do_rfi_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types)
 {
        unsigned int instrs[3], *dest;
index adddde023622754d00f2c33168e18bfd16d95a80..ad51349e479b6b9ed148b2bf2bfccd8fa133ad50 100644 (file)
@@ -125,12 +125,23 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void)
                        type = L1D_FLUSH_ORI;
        }
 
+       /*
+        * If we are non-Power9 bare metal, we don't need to flush on kernel
+        * entry: it fixes a P9 specific vulnerability.
+        */
+       if (!pvr_version_is(PVR_POWER9))
+               security_ftr_clear(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY);
+
        enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) && \
                 (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR)   || \
                  security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV));
 
        setup_rfi_flush(type, enable);
        setup_count_cache_flush();
+
+       enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
+                security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY);
+       setup_entry_flush(enable);
 }
 
 static void __init pnv_setup_arch(void)
index c2d318d1df0211ff3adf3d463342c212bdea676e..8aa4dd87cbf2be96fcdbb29fb648ae7124edc276 100644 (file)
@@ -565,6 +565,10 @@ void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void)
 
        setup_rfi_flush(types, enable);
        setup_count_cache_flush();
+
+       enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
+                security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY);
+       setup_entry_flush(enable);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PCI_IOV