/* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing
  * bpf_check() is called under lock, so no race to access these global vars
  */
-static u32 log_level, log_size, log_len;
-static char *log_buf;
+static struct bpf_verifer_log verifier_log;
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);
 
  */
 static __printf(1, 2) void verbose(const char *fmt, ...)
 {
+       struct bpf_verifer_log *log = &verifier_log;
        va_list args;
 
-       if (log_level == 0 || log_len >= log_size - 1)
+       if (!log->level || bpf_verifier_log_full(log))
                return;
 
        va_start(args, fmt);
-       log_len += vscnprintf(log_buf + log_len, log_size - log_len, fmt, args);
+       log->len_used += vscnprintf(log->kbuf + log->len_used,
+                                   log->len_total - log->len_used, fmt, args);
        va_end(args);
 }
 
         * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off
         * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe.
         */
-       if (log_level)
+       if (verifier_log.level)
                print_verifier_state(state);
        /* The minimum value is only important with signed
         * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
                verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", insn->dst_reg);
                return -EACCES;
        }
-       if (log_level)
+       if (verifier_log.level)
                print_verifier_state(this_branch);
        return 0;
 }
                        return err;
                if (err == 1) {
                        /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
-                       if (log_level) {
+                       if (verifier_log.level) {
                                if (do_print_state)
                                        verbose("\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n",
                                                prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
                if (need_resched())
                        cond_resched();
 
-               if (log_level > 1 || (log_level && do_print_state)) {
-                       if (log_level > 1)
+               if (verifier_log.level > 1 ||
+                   (verifier_log.level && do_print_state)) {
+                       if (verifier_log.level > 1)
                                verbose("%d:", insn_idx);
                        else
                                verbose("\nfrom %d to %d:",
                        do_print_state = false;
                }
 
-               if (log_level) {
+               if (verifier_log.level) {
                        verbose("%d: ", insn_idx);
                        print_bpf_insn(env, insn);
                }
 
 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr)
 {
-       char __user *log_ubuf = NULL;
+       struct bpf_verifer_log *log = &verifier_log;
        struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
        int ret = -EINVAL;
 
                /* user requested verbose verifier output
                 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace
                 */
-               log_level = attr->log_level;
-               log_ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf;
-               log_size = attr->log_size;
-               log_len = 0;
+               log->level = attr->log_level;
+               log->ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf;
+               log->len_total = attr->log_size;
+               log->len_used = 0;
 
                ret = -EINVAL;
-               /* log_* values have to be sane */
-               if (log_size < 128 || log_size > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
-                   log_level == 0 || log_ubuf == NULL)
+               /* log attributes have to be sane */
+               if (log->len_total < 128 || log->len_total > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
+                   !log->level || !log->ubuf)
                        goto err_unlock;
 
                ret = -ENOMEM;
-               log_buf = vmalloc(log_size);
-               if (!log_buf)
+               log->kbuf = vmalloc(log->len_total);
+               if (!log->kbuf)
                        goto err_unlock;
        } else {
-               log_level = 0;
+               log->level = 0;
        }
 
        env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT);
        if (ret == 0)
                ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env);
 
-       if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
-               BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
+       if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) {
+               BUG_ON(log->len_used >= log->len_total);
                /* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */
                ret = -ENOSPC;
                /* fall through to return what was recorded */
        }
 
        /* copy verifier log back to user space including trailing zero */
-       if (log_level && copy_to_user(log_ubuf, log_buf, log_len + 1) != 0) {
+       if (log->level && copy_to_user(log->ubuf, log->kbuf,
+                                      log->len_used + 1) != 0) {
                ret = -EFAULT;
                goto free_log_buf;
        }
        }
 
 free_log_buf:
-       if (log_level)
-               vfree(log_buf);
+       if (log->level)
+               vfree(log->kbuf);
        if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps)
                /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release
                 * them now. Otherwise free_bpf_prog_info() will release them.
        /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
        mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
 
-       log_level = 0;
+       verifier_log.level = 0;
 
        env->strict_alignment = false;
        if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))