In our code-base from Intel we still use IBRS_ATT, so lets
fix it to what is upstream.
Orabug:
27477743
CVE: CVE-2017-5715
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS ( 7*32+20) /* Control Speculation Control */
#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+21) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
#define X86_FEATURE_IA32_ARCH_CAPS ( 7*32+22) /* Control Speculation Control */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ATT ( 7*32+23) /* IBRS all the time */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ALL ( 7*32+23) /* IBRS all the time */
/* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (EBX), word 13.
* But thanks to kABI we have to jam it somewhere else. */
mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD) {
disable_ibrs_and_friends(false /* Do use IPBP if possible */);
}
- /* Future CPUs with IBRS_ATT might be able to avoid this. */
+ /* Future CPUs with IBRS_ALL might be able to avoid this. */
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_VMEXIT_RSB_FULL);
/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
u64 cap;
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, cap);
if (cap & 2) /* IBRS all the time */
- set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ATT);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ALL);
}
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS))