Encrypt digests being signed with IBM TSS2.

The digest itself will end up on the wire. But the computed hash including
the secrets should probably be obsecured. For the TPM that's an input
parameter, which it must decrypt. Hence TPMA_SESSION_DECRYPT.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

diff --git a/gnutls_tpm2_ibm.c b/gnutls_tpm2_ibm.c
index 1077c694cf7581f71650c4ece76bea7a94eb7a90..0ad8607ad6b539ae6ebb538ee29cb3a66bba7e65 100644 (file)
--- a/gnutls_tpm2_ibm.c
+++ b/gnutls_tpm2_ibm.c
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ int tpm2_rsa_sign_hash_fn(gnutls_privkey_t key, gnutls_sign_algorithm_t algo,
                         (COMMAND_PARAMETERS *)&in,
                         NULL,
                         TPM_CC_RSA_Decrypt,
-                        authHandle, pass, 0,
+                        authHandle, pass, TPMA_SESSION_DECRYPT,
                         TPM_RH_NULL, NULL, 0);
        if (rc == KEY_AUTH_FAILED) {
                free_pass(&pass);
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ int tpm2_ec_sign_hash_fn(gnutls_privkey_t key, gnutls_sign_algorithm_t algo,
                         (COMMAND_PARAMETERS *)&in,
                         NULL,
                         TPM_CC_Sign,
-                        authHandle, pass, 0,
+                        authHandle, pass, TPMA_SESSION_DECRYPT,
                         TPM_RH_NULL, NULL, 0);
        if (rc == KEY_AUTH_FAILED) {
                free_pass(&pass);