batadv_nc_skb_decode_packet() trusts coded_len and checks only against
skb->len. XOR starts at sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet), reducing
payload headroom, and the source skb length is not verified, allowing an
out-of-bounds read and a small out-of-bounds write.
Validate that coded_len fits within the payload area of both destination
and source sk_buffs before XORing.
Fixes: 2df5278b0267 ("batman-adv: network coding - receive coded packets and decode them")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Stanislav Fort <disclosure@aisle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fort <stanislav.fort@aisle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
coding_len = ntohs(coded_packet_tmp.coded_len);
- if (coding_len > skb->len)
+ /* ensure dst buffer is large enough (payload only) */
+ if (coding_len + h_size > skb->len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* ensure src buffer is large enough (payload only) */
+ if (coding_len + h_size > nc_packet->skb->len)
return NULL;
/* Here the magic is reversed: