* the guest has, while on VMEXIT we restore the host view. This
  * would be easier if SPEC_CTRL were architecturally maskable or
  * shadowable for guests but this is not (currently) the case.
- * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter.
+ * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter and also
+ * the guest's version of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, if emulated.
  */
-extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64);
-extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64);
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl,
+                                   u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl);
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl,
+                                      u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl);
 
 /* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */
 extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
 
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default);
 
-void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
+/**
+ * x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest - Set speculation control registers for the guest
+ * @guest_spec_ctrl:           The guest content of MSR_SPEC_CTRL
+ * @guest_virt_spec_ctrl:      The guest controlled bits of MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
+ *                             (may get translated to MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG bits)
+ *
+ * Avoids writing to the MSR if the content/bits are the same
+ */
+void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl)
 {
        u64 host = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest);
 
-void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
+/**
+ * x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host - Restore host speculation control registers
+ * @guest_spec_ctrl:           The guest content of MSR_SPEC_CTRL
+ * @guest_virt_spec_ctrl:      The guest controlled bits of MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
+ *                             (may get translated to MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG bits)
+ *
+ * Avoids writing to the MSR if the content/bits are the same
+ */
+void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl)
 {
        u64 host = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
 
        } host;
 
        u64 spec_ctrl;
+       /*
+        * Contains guest-controlled bits of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, which will be
+        * translated into the appropriate L2_CFG bits on the host to
+        * perform speculative control.
+        */
+       u64 virt_spec_ctrl;
 
        u32 *msrpm;
 
 
        vcpu->arch.microcode_version = 0x01000065;
        svm->spec_ctrl = 0;
+       svm->virt_spec_ctrl = 0;
 
        if (!init_event) {
                svm->vcpu.arch.apic_base = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE |
         * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
         * being speculatively taken.
         */
-       x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl);
+       x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
 
        asm volatile (
                "push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t"
        if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
                svm->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
 
-       x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->spec_ctrl);
+       x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
 
        reload_tss(vcpu);
 
 
         * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
         * being speculatively taken.
         */
-       x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl);
+       x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
 
        vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched;
 
        if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
                vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
 
-       x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl);
+       x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
 
        /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
        vmexit_fill_RSB();