bpf: Don't mark arguments to fentry/fexit programs as trusted.

The PTR_TRUSTED flag should only be applied to pointers where the verifier can
guarantee that such pointers are valid.
The fentry/fexit/fmod_ret programs are not in this category.
Only arguments of SEC("tp_btf") and SEC("iter") programs are trusted
(which have BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP and BPF_TRACE_ITER attach_type correspondingly)

This bug was masked because convert_ctx_accesses() was converting trusted
loads into BPF_PROBE_MEM loads. Fix it as well.
The loads from trusted pointers don't need exception handling.

Fixes: 3f00c5239344 ("bpf: Allow trusted pointers to be passed to KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221124215314.55890-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
index bd336910023941b0b54663a2789c31c8a3450482..d11cbf8cece7c84a1f886cacb147ee4a12c46227 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
@@ -5821,9 +5821,19 @@ static u32 get_ctx_arg_idx(struct btf *btf, const struct btf_type *func_proto,
        return nr_args + 1;
 }
 
-static bool prog_type_args_trusted(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type)
+static bool prog_args_trusted(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
-       return prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING || prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS;
+       enum bpf_attach_type atype = prog->expected_attach_type;
+
+       switch (prog->type) {
+       case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
+               return atype == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP || atype == BPF_TRACE_ITER;
+       case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
+       case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
+               return true;
+       default:
+               return false;
+       }
 }
 
 bool btf_ctx_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type,
@@ -5969,7 +5979,7 @@ bool btf_ctx_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type,
        }
 
        info->reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
-       if (prog_type_args_trusted(prog->type))
+       if (prog_args_trusted(prog))
                info->reg_type |= PTR_TRUSTED;
 
        if (tgt_prog) {

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index f4500479f1c2d143dd8ae52a95d710a065c74460..6599d25dae38a21fe0a5362a7e81b97d90e4f4f3 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -14905,7 +14905,6 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
                        break;
                case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
                case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
-               case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED:
                /* PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC always has a valid lifetime, unlike
                 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and an active ref_obj_id, but the same cannot
                 * be said once it is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, hence we must handle
@@ -14913,8 +14912,6 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
                 * for this case.
                 */
                case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
-               case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED | PTR_TRUSTED:
-               case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_TRUSTED:
                        if (type == BPF_READ) {
                                insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM |
                                        BPF_SIZE((insn)->code);