The keys are only used during initialisation so we don't need to carry them
in esp_data.  Since we don't have to allocate them again, there is no need
to place a limit on the authentication key length anymore.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
 
 struct ah_data
 {
-       u8                      *key;
-       int                     key_len;
        u8                      *work_icv;
        int                     icv_full_len;
        int                     icv_trunc_len;
 
        if (!x->aalg)
                goto error;
 
-       /* null auth can use a zero length key */
-       if (x->aalg->alg_key_len > 512)
-               goto error;
-
        if (x->encap)
                goto error;
 
        if (ahp == NULL)
                return -ENOMEM;
 
-       ahp->key = x->aalg->alg_key;
-       ahp->key_len = (x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
        tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(x->aalg->alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
        if (IS_ERR(tfm))
                goto error;
 
        ahp->tfm = tfm;
-       if (crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, ahp->key, ahp->key_len))
+       if (crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, x->aalg->alg_key,
+                              (x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8))
                goto error;
 
        /*
 
        if (!x->aalg)
                goto error;
 
-       /* null auth can use a zero length key */
-       if (x->aalg->alg_key_len > 512)
-               goto error;
-
        if (x->encap)
                goto error;
 
        if (ahp == NULL)
                return -ENOMEM;
 
-       ahp->key = x->aalg->alg_key;
-       ahp->key_len = (x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
        tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(x->aalg->alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
        if (IS_ERR(tfm))
                goto error;
 
        ahp->tfm = tfm;
-       if (crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, ahp->key, ahp->key_len))
+       if (crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, x->aalg->alg_key,
+                              (x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8))
                goto error;
 
        /*