bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation

Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus,
memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the
bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel.

To avoid leaking kernel data round up array-based maps and mask the index
after bounds check, so speculated load with out of bounds index will load
either valid value from the array or zero from the padded area.

Unconditionally mask index for all array types even when max_entries
are not rounded to power of 2 for root user.
When map is created by unpriv user generate a sequence of bpf insns
that includes AND operation to make sure that JITed code includes
the same 'index & index_mask' operation.

If prog_array map is created by unpriv user replace
  bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
with
  if (index >= max_entries) {
    index &= map->index_mask;
    bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
  }
(along with roundup to power 2) to prevent out-of-bounds speculation.
There is secondary redundant 'if (index >= max_entries)' in the interpreter
and in all JITs, but they can be optimized later if necessary.

Other array-like maps (cpumap, devmap, sockmap, perf_event_array, cgroup_array)
cannot be used by unpriv, so no changes there.

That fixes bpf side of "Variant 1: bounds check bypass (CVE-2017-5753)" on
all architectures with and without JIT.

v2->v3:
Daniel noticed that attack potentially can be crafted via syscall commands
without loading the program, so add masking to those paths as well.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index e55e4255a21082325f0888ffcd464615add708b8..1b985ca4ffbe5d75877d12e06c3e77e7163a3ecf 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ struct bpf_map {
        u32 pages;
        u32 id;
        int numa_node;
+       bool unpriv_array;
        struct user_struct *user;
        const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
        struct work_struct work;
@@ -221,6 +222,7 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux {
 struct bpf_array {
        struct bpf_map map;
        u32 elem_size;
+       u32 index_mask;
        /* 'ownership' of prog_array is claimed by the first program that
         * is going to use this map or by the first program which FD is stored
         * in the map to make sure that all callers and callees have the same

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
index 7c25426d3cf5699ffde545ee9a8d5e254f16f517..aaa319848e7d57422225aa99055b574dc904e36d 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -53,9 +53,10 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 {
        bool percpu = attr->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY;
        int numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr);
+       u32 elem_size, index_mask, max_entries;
+       bool unpriv = !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
        struct bpf_array *array;
        u64 array_size;
-       u32 elem_size;
 
        /* check sanity of attributes */
        if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
@@ -72,11 +73,20 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 
        elem_size = round_up(attr->value_size, 8);
 
+       max_entries = attr->max_entries;
+       index_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(max_entries) - 1;
+
+       if (unpriv)
+               /* round up array size to nearest power of 2,
+                * since cpu will speculate within index_mask limits
+                */
+               max_entries = index_mask + 1;
+
        array_size = sizeof(*array);
        if (percpu)
-               array_size += (u64) attr->max_entries * sizeof(void *);
+               array_size += (u64) max_entries * sizeof(void *);
        else
-               array_size += (u64) attr->max_entries * elem_size;
+               array_size += (u64) max_entries * elem_size;
 
        /* make sure there is no u32 overflow later in round_up() */
        if (array_size >= U32_MAX - PAGE_SIZE)
@@ -86,6 +96,8 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
        array = bpf_map_area_alloc(array_size, numa_node);
        if (!array)
                return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+       array->index_mask = index_mask;
+       array->map.unpriv_array = unpriv;
 
        /* copy mandatory map attributes */
        array->map.map_type = attr->map_type;
@@ -121,12 +133,13 @@ static void *array_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key)
        if (unlikely(index >= array->map.max_entries))
                return NULL;
 
-       return array->value + array->elem_size * index;
+       return array->value + array->elem_size * (index & array->index_mask);
 }
 
 /* emit BPF instructions equivalent to C code of array_map_lookup_elem() */
 static u32 array_map_gen_lookup(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_insn *insn_buf)
 {
+       struct bpf_array *array = container_of(map, struct bpf_array, map);
        struct bpf_insn *insn = insn_buf;
        u32 elem_size = round_up(map->value_size, 8);
        const int ret = BPF_REG_0;
@@ -135,7 +148,12 @@ static u32 array_map_gen_lookup(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_insn *insn_buf)
 
        *insn++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, map_ptr, offsetof(struct bpf_array, value));
        *insn++ = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, ret, index, 0);
-       *insn++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, ret, map->max_entries, 3);
+       if (map->unpriv_array) {
+               *insn++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, ret, map->max_entries, 4);
+               *insn++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, ret, array->index_mask);
+       } else {
+               *insn++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, ret, map->max_entries, 3);
+       }
 
        if (is_power_of_2(elem_size)) {
                *insn++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, ret, ilog2(elem_size));
@@ -157,7 +175,7 @@ static void *percpu_array_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key)
        if (unlikely(index >= array->map.max_entries))
                return NULL;
 
-       return this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index]);
+       return this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask]);
 }
 
 int bpf_percpu_array_copy(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value)
@@ -177,7 +195,7 @@ int bpf_percpu_array_copy(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value)
         */
        size = round_up(map->value_size, 8);
        rcu_read_lock();
-       pptr = array->pptrs[index];
+       pptr = array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask];
        for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
                bpf_long_memcpy(value + off, per_cpu_ptr(pptr, cpu), size);
                off += size;
@@ -225,10 +243,11 @@ static int array_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value,
                return -EEXIST;
 
        if (array->map.map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY)
-               memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index]),
+               memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask]),
                       value, map->value_size);
        else
-               memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index,
+               memcpy(array->value +
+                      array->elem_size * (index & array->index_mask),
                       value, map->value_size);
        return 0;
 }
@@ -262,7 +281,7 @@ int bpf_percpu_array_update(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value,
         */
        size = round_up(map->value_size, 8);
        rcu_read_lock();
-       pptr = array->pptrs[index];
+       pptr = array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask];
        for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
                bpf_long_memcpy(per_cpu_ptr(pptr, cpu), value + off, size);
                off += size;
@@ -613,6 +632,7 @@ static void *array_of_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key)
 static u32 array_of_map_gen_lookup(struct bpf_map *map,
                                   struct bpf_insn *insn_buf)
 {
+       struct bpf_array *array = container_of(map, struct bpf_array, map);
        u32 elem_size = round_up(map->value_size, 8);
        struct bpf_insn *insn = insn_buf;
        const int ret = BPF_REG_0;
@@ -621,7 +641,12 @@ static u32 array_of_map_gen_lookup(struct bpf_map *map,
 
        *insn++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, map_ptr, offsetof(struct bpf_array, value));
        *insn++ = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, ret, index, 0);
-       *insn++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, ret, map->max_entries, 5);
+       if (map->unpriv_array) {
+               *insn++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, ret, map->max_entries, 6);
+               *insn++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, ret, array->index_mask);
+       } else {
+               *insn++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, ret, map->max_entries, 5);
+       }
        if (is_power_of_2(elem_size))
                *insn++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, ret, ilog2(elem_size));
        else

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 04b24876cd23c83c9502afc60853c871ee3fee13..b414d6b2d47070505f3a60fcd8b58478b293d2ad 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1729,6 +1729,13 @@ static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
        err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta);
        if (err)
                return err;
+       if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+               if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
+                       verbose(env, "verifier bug\n");
+                       return -EINVAL;
+               }
+               env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
+       }
        err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta);
        if (err)
                return err;
@@ -4456,6 +4463,35 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
                         */
                        insn->imm = 0;
                        insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL;
+
+                       /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call
+                        * emit two extra insns:
+                        * if (index >= max_entries) goto out;
+                        * index &= array->index_mask;
+                        * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation
+                        */
+                       map_ptr = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].map_ptr;
+                       if (map_ptr == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON) {
+                               verbose(env, "tail_call obusing map_ptr\n");
+                               return -EINVAL;
+                       }
+                       if (!map_ptr->unpriv_array)
+                               continue;
+                       insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3,
+                                                 map_ptr->max_entries, 2);
+                       insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3,
+                                                   container_of(map_ptr,
+                                                                struct bpf_array,
+                                                                map)->index_mask);
+                       insn_buf[2] = *insn;
+                       cnt = 3;
+                       new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
+                       if (!new_prog)
+                               return -ENOMEM;
+
+                       delta    += cnt - 1;
+                       env->prog = prog = new_prog;
+                       insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
                        continue;
                }