L1TF core kernel workarounds are cheap and normally always enabled, However
they still should be reported in sysfs if the system is vulnerable or
mitigated. Add the necessary CPU feature/bug bits.
- Extend the existing checks for Meltdowns to determine if the system is
vulnerable. All CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown are also not
vulnerable to L1TF
- Check for 32bit non PAE and emit a warning as there is no practical way
for mitigation due to the limited physical address bits
- If the system has more than MAX_PA/2 physical memory the invert page
workarounds don't protect the system against the L1TF attack anymore,
because an inverted physical address will also point to valid
memory. Print a warning in this case and report that the system is
vulnerable.
Add a function which returns the PFN limit for the L1TF mitigation, which
will be used in follow up patches for sanity and range checks.
[ tglx: Renamed the CPU feature bit to L1TF_PTEINV ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Orabug:
28220674
CVE: CVE-2018-3620
(cherry picked from commit
17dbca119312b4e8173d4e25ff64262119fcef38)
Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Conflicts for UEK5:
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
[
cpufeatures.h: we do not have that entry free. use another
bugs.c: we have in place the ibrs logic, compared to upstream
]
Conflicts for UEK4:
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
cpufeatures.h: different file name and also moved the feature to word 2. We also removed word 2 as we won't use Transmeta on UEK4
bugs.c: different file name (bugs_64.c)
common.c: contextual (cpu_set_bug_bits didn't have __init)
#define X86_FEATURE_3DNOWEXT ( 1*32+30) /* AMD 3DNow! extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_3DNOW ( 1*32+31) /* 3DNow! */
-/* Transmeta-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80860001, word 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RECOVERY ( 2*32+ 0) /* CPU in recovery mode */
-#define X86_FEATURE_LONGRUN ( 2*32+ 1) /* Longrun power control */
-#define X86_FEATURE_LRTI ( 2*32+ 3) /* LongRun table interface */
+/*
+ * Auxiliary flags completing word 6: Linux defined - For features scattered
+ * in various CPUID levels like 0x6, 0xA etc, word 2
+ */
+#define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 2*32+0) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */
/* Other features, Linux-defined mapping, word 3 */
/* This range is used for feature bits which conflict or are synthesized */
#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 X86_BUG(15) /* conditional branches */
#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16) /* indirect branches */
#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
+#define X86_BUG_L1TF X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
#if defined(__KERNEL__) && !defined(__ASSEMBLY__)
extern void cpu_detect(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void fpu_detect(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+static inline unsigned long l1tf_pfn_limit(void)
+{
+ return BIT(boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits - 1 - PAGE_SHIFT) - 1;
+}
+
extern void early_cpu_init(void);
extern void identify_boot_cpu(void);
extern void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *);
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/e820.h>
/*
* use_ibrs flags:
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static bool ssbd_ibrs_selected(void);
+static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
/*
* Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any
*/
ssb_select_mitigation();
+ l1tf_select_mitigation();
+
alternative_instructions();
/*
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
}
+static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 half_pa;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+ return;
+
+#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 2
+ pr_warn("Kernel not compiled for PAE. No mitigation for L1TF\n");
+ return;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * This is extremely unlikely to happen because almost all
+ * systems have far more MAX_PA/2 than RAM can be fit into
+ * DIMM slots.
+ */
+ half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (e820_any_mapped(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_RAM)) {
+ pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV);
+}
/*
* Disable retpoline and attempt to fall back to another Spectre v2 mitigation.
case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
+ case X86_BUG_L1TF:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Page Table Inversion\n");
+ break;
+
default:
break;
}
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_L1TF);
+}
#endif
{}
};
+static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_l1tf[] = {
+ /* in addition to cpu_no_speculation */
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1 },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2 },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM },
+ {}
+};
+
static void cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 ia32_cap = 0;
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
+
+ if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_l1tf))
+ return;
+
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
}
/*
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
}
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_store_bypass, 0444, cpu_show_spec_store_bypass, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
&dev_attr_spectre_v1.attr,
&dev_attr_spectre_v2.attr,
&dev_attr_spec_store_bypass.attr,
+ &dev_attr_l1tf.attr,
NULL
};
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
const struct attribute_group **groups,