]> www.infradead.org Git - users/dwmw2/linux.git/commitdiff
powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses
authorNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:52:44 +0000 (10:52 +1100)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sun, 22 Nov 2020 09:00:24 +0000 (10:00 +0100)
commit 9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de upstream.

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before
it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible
for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method,
since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures
to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the
attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel
user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of
Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility
it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the
privileged code to construct an attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries
of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
12 files changed:
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h [new file with mode: 0644]
arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h
arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h
arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c

index d61d15de22cb8404906ee942be18339816dde7dc..357c64b53cdc7146c43fe1adac26db7fdb7b32f6 100644 (file)
                                               tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
                                               kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
                                               no_entry_flush [PPC]
+                                              no_uaccess_flush [PPC]
 
                                Exceptions:
                                               This does not have any effect on
        nospec_store_bypass_disable
                        [HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
 
+       no_uaccess_flush
+                       [PPC] Don't flush the L1-D cache after accessing user data.
+
        noxsave         [BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
                        and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
                        enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..aa54ac2
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_BOOK3S_64_KUP_RADIX_H
+#define _ASM_POWERPC_BOOK3S_64_KUP_RADIX_H
+
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(uaccess_flush_key);
+
+/* Prototype for function defined in exceptions-64s.S */
+void do_uaccess_flush(void);
+
+static __always_inline void allow_user_access(void __user *to, const void __user *from,
+                                             unsigned long size)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void prevent_user_access(void __user *to, const void __user *from,
+                                      unsigned long size)
+{
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&uaccess_flush_key))
+               do_uaccess_flush();
+}
+
+#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_BOOK3S_64_KUP_RADIX_H */
index e282e8146c9df616464234682e15ffcbd3f9e185..745c017b8de6079936a7d8d5e83e7f9eef9423ea 100644 (file)
@@ -203,6 +203,14 @@ label##3:                                          \
        FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 955b-956b;                     \
        .popsection;
 
+#define UACCESS_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION                    \
+959:                                                   \
+       .pushsection __uaccess_flush_fixup,"a";         \
+       .align 2;                                       \
+960:                                                   \
+       FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 959b-960b;                     \
+       .popsection;
+
 #define ENTRY_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION                      \
 957:                                                   \
        .pushsection __entry_flush_fixup,"a";           \
@@ -246,6 +254,7 @@ extern long stf_barrier_fallback;
 extern long entry_flush_fallback;
 extern long __start___stf_entry_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup;
 extern long __start___stf_exit_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_exit_barrier_fixup;
+extern long __start___uaccess_flush_fixup, __stop___uaccess_flush_fixup;
 extern long __start___entry_flush_fixup, __stop___entry_flush_fixup;
 extern long __start___rfi_flush_fixup, __stop___rfi_flush_fixup;
 extern long __start___barrier_nospec_fixup, __stop___barrier_nospec_fixup;
index 7895d5eeaf212ef087d181ec931011253e8b841a..f0f8e36ad71f51708b65c5aeceedb7757fddfecf 100644 (file)
@@ -6,10 +6,14 @@
 
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
+#include <asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h>
+#else
 static inline void allow_user_access(void __user *to, const void __user *from,
                                     unsigned long size) { }
 static inline void prevent_user_access(void __user *to, const void __user *from,
                                       unsigned long size) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
 
 static inline void allow_read_from_user(const void __user *from, unsigned long size)
 {
index 082b56bf678dd33b2fa7ee49e8491a103f99bf94..3b45a64e491e54af5e14d92ed113324d123a6521 100644 (file)
@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(unsigned long feature)
 // The L1-D cache should be flushed when entering the kernel
 #define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY                0x0000000000004000ull
 
+// The L1-D cache should be flushed after user accesses from the kernel
+#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS      0x0000000000008000ull
 
 // Features enabled by default
 #define SEC_FTR_DEFAULT \
@@ -94,6 +96,7 @@ static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(unsigned long feature)
         SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR | \
         SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR | \
         SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY | \
+        SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS | \
         SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY)
 
 #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H */
index 02dfa8b1147e64b8cdd95c24247ba69208f898e6..6750ad3cd3b1a0d62ee9562c8a37baa8ced24185 100644 (file)
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void);
 #else
 static inline void setup_barrier_nospec(void) { };
 #endif
+void do_uaccess_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types);
 void do_entry_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types);
 void do_barrier_nospec_fixups(bool enable);
 extern bool barrier_nospec_enabled;
index 2712331190af4bf16fe566a6ff3c84c3b23472f9..b313628966adbd9a81d4585b26610773f0f731b4 100644 (file)
@@ -1459,11 +1459,8 @@ TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(stf_barrier_fallback)
        .endr
        blr
 
-TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(entry_flush_fallback)
-       std     r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
-       std     r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
-       std     r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
-       mfctr   r9
+/* Clobbers r10, r11, ctr */
+.macro L1D_DISPLACEMENT_FLUSH
        ld      r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13)
        ld      r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SIZE(r13)
        srdi    r11,r11,(7 + 3) /* 128 byte lines, unrolled 8x */
@@ -1489,7 +1486,14 @@ TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(entry_flush_fallback)
        ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*7(r10)
        addi    r10,r10,0x80*8
        bdnz    1b
+.endm
 
+TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(entry_flush_fallback)
+       std     r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
+       std     r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
+       std     r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
+       mfctr   r9
+       L1D_DISPLACEMENT_FLUSH
        mtctr   r9
        ld      r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
        ld      r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
@@ -1505,32 +1509,7 @@ TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(rfi_flush_fallback)
        std     r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
        std     r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
        mfctr   r9
-       ld      r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13)
-       ld      r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SIZE(r13)
-       srdi    r11,r11,(7 + 3) /* 128 byte lines, unrolled 8x */
-       mtctr   r11
-       DCBT_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */
-
-       /* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */
-       sync
-
-       /*
-        * The load adresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines,
-        * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not
-        * hurt).
-        */
-1:
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*0(r10)
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*1(r10)
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*2(r10)
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*3(r10)
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*4(r10)
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*5(r10)
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*6(r10)
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*7(r10)
-       addi    r10,r10,0x80*8
-       bdnz    1b
-
+       L1D_DISPLACEMENT_FLUSH
        mtctr   r9
        ld      r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
        ld      r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
@@ -1548,32 +1527,7 @@ TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(hrfi_flush_fallback)
        std     r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
        std     r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
        mfctr   r9
-       ld      r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13)
-       ld      r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SIZE(r13)
-       srdi    r11,r11,(7 + 3) /* 128 byte lines, unrolled 8x */
-       mtctr   r11
-       DCBT_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */
-
-       /* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */
-       sync
-
-       /*
-        * The load adresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines,
-        * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not
-        * hurt).
-        */
-1:
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*0(r10)
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*1(r10)
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*2(r10)
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*3(r10)
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*4(r10)
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*5(r10)
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*6(r10)
-       ld      r11,(0x80 + 8)*7(r10)
-       addi    r10,r10,0x80*8
-       bdnz    1b
-
+       L1D_DISPLACEMENT_FLUSH
        mtctr   r9
        ld      r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
        ld      r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
@@ -1582,6 +1536,19 @@ TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(hrfi_flush_fallback)
        GET_SCRATCH0(r13);
        hrfid
 
+USE_TEXT_SECTION()
+
+_GLOBAL(do_uaccess_flush)
+       UACCESS_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION
+       nop
+       nop
+       nop
+       blr
+       L1D_DISPLACEMENT_FLUSH
+       blr
+_ASM_NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_uaccess_flush)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(do_uaccess_flush)
+
 /*
  * Real mode exceptions actually use this too, but alternate
  * instruction code patches (which end up in the common .text area)
index 62a3c2e5d918c50f94bebd75f997f369f5e5b943..a1eec409695e41749efedf8914b75f65999f82cb 100644 (file)
@@ -793,8 +793,12 @@ static enum l1d_flush_type enabled_flush_types;
 static void *l1d_flush_fallback_area;
 static bool no_rfi_flush;
 static bool no_entry_flush;
+static bool no_uaccess_flush;
 bool rfi_flush;
 bool entry_flush;
+bool uaccess_flush;
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(uaccess_flush_key);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(uaccess_flush_key);
 
 static int __init handle_no_rfi_flush(char *p)
 {
@@ -812,6 +816,14 @@ static int __init handle_no_entry_flush(char *p)
 }
 early_param("no_entry_flush", handle_no_entry_flush);
 
+static int __init handle_no_uaccess_flush(char *p)
+{
+       pr_info("uaccess-flush: disabled on command line.");
+       no_uaccess_flush = true;
+       return 0;
+}
+early_param("no_uaccess_flush", handle_no_uaccess_flush);
+
 /*
  * The RFI flush is not KPTI, but because users will see doco that says to use
  * nopti we hijack that option here to also disable the RFI flush.
@@ -855,6 +867,20 @@ void entry_flush_enable(bool enable)
        entry_flush = enable;
 }
 
+void uaccess_flush_enable(bool enable)
+{
+       if (enable) {
+               do_uaccess_flush_fixups(enabled_flush_types);
+               static_branch_enable(&uaccess_flush_key);
+               on_each_cpu(do_nothing, NULL, 1);
+       } else {
+               static_branch_disable(&uaccess_flush_key);
+               do_uaccess_flush_fixups(L1D_FLUSH_NONE);
+       }
+
+       uaccess_flush = enable;
+}
+
 static void __ref init_fallback_flush(void)
 {
        u64 l1d_size, limit;
@@ -909,6 +935,15 @@ void setup_entry_flush(bool enable)
                entry_flush_enable(enable);
 }
 
+void setup_uaccess_flush(bool enable)
+{
+       if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+               return;
+
+       if (!no_uaccess_flush)
+               uaccess_flush_enable(enable);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
 static int rfi_flush_set(void *data, u64 val)
 {
@@ -962,10 +997,37 @@ static int entry_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val)
 
 DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_entry_flush, entry_flush_get, entry_flush_set, "%llu\n");
 
+static int uaccess_flush_set(void *data, u64 val)
+{
+       bool enable;
+
+       if (val == 1)
+               enable = true;
+       else if (val == 0)
+               enable = false;
+       else
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       /* Only do anything if we're changing state */
+       if (enable != uaccess_flush)
+               uaccess_flush_enable(enable);
+
+       return 0;
+}
+
+static int uaccess_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val)
+{
+       *val = uaccess_flush ? 1 : 0;
+       return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_uaccess_flush, uaccess_flush_get, uaccess_flush_set, "%llu\n");
+
 static __init int rfi_flush_debugfs_init(void)
 {
        debugfs_create_file("rfi_flush", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_rfi_flush);
        debugfs_create_file("entry_flush", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_entry_flush);
+       debugfs_create_file("uaccess_flush", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_uaccess_flush);
        return 0;
 }
 device_initcall(rfi_flush_debugfs_init);
index 6c3cd47bdb8196d82f5e3e004472de3901b57932..efb9a6982561c2a4152d04484ec205b9f597e5cf 100644 (file)
@@ -140,6 +140,13 @@ SECTIONS
                __stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup = .;
        }
 
+       . = ALIGN(8);
+       __uaccess_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__uaccess_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+               __start___uaccess_flush_fixup = .;
+               *(__uaccess_flush_fixup)
+               __stop___uaccess_flush_fixup = .;
+       }
+
        . = ALIGN(8);
        __entry_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__entry_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
                __start___entry_flush_fixup = .;
index d21c05bc94a0699200910e112355c977f23cf943..6ebc3c9e7abb7f565311a71b8b7ef55135066b38 100644 (file)
@@ -232,6 +232,56 @@ void do_stf_barrier_fixups(enum stf_barrier_type types)
        do_stf_exit_barrier_fixups(types);
 }
 
+void do_uaccess_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types)
+{
+       unsigned int instrs[4], *dest;
+       long *start, *end;
+       int i;
+
+       start = PTRRELOC(&__start___uaccess_flush_fixup);
+       end = PTRRELOC(&__stop___uaccess_flush_fixup);
+
+       instrs[0] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
+       instrs[1] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
+       instrs[2] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
+       instrs[3] = 0x4e800020; /* blr */
+
+       i = 0;
+       if (types == L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK) {
+               instrs[3] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
+               /* fallthrough to fallback flush */
+       }
+
+       if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) {
+               instrs[i++] = 0x63ff0000; /* ori 31,31,0 speculation barrier */
+               instrs[i++] = 0x63de0000; /* ori 30,30,0 L1d flush*/
+       }
+
+       if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
+               instrs[i++] = 0x7c12dba6; /* mtspr TRIG2,r0 (SPR #882) */
+
+       for (i = 0; start < end; start++, i++) {
+               dest = (void *)start + *start;
+
+               pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)dest);
+
+               patch_instruction(dest, instrs[0]);
+
+               patch_instruction((dest + 1), instrs[1]);
+               patch_instruction((dest + 2), instrs[2]);
+               patch_instruction((dest + 3), instrs[3]);
+       }
+
+       printk(KERN_DEBUG "uaccess-flush: patched %d locations (%s flush)\n", i,
+               (types == L1D_FLUSH_NONE)       ? "no" :
+               (types == L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK)   ? "fallback displacement" :
+               (types &  L1D_FLUSH_ORI)        ? (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
+                                                       ? "ori+mttrig type"
+                                                       : "ori type" :
+               (types &  L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)     ? "mttrig type"
+                                               : "unknown");
+}
+
 void do_entry_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types)
 {
        unsigned int instrs[3], *dest;
index 28cb14a26503dee978c849c684fc70151c7f3717..0693fd16e2c95216234962a5b2de3773e5195f62 100644 (file)
@@ -126,10 +126,12 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void)
 
        /*
         * If we are non-Power9 bare metal, we don't need to flush on kernel
-        * entry: it fixes a P9 specific vulnerability.
+        * entry or after user access: they fix a P9 specific vulnerability.
         */
-       if (!pvr_version_is(PVR_POWER9))
+       if (!pvr_version_is(PVR_POWER9)) {
                security_ftr_clear(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY);
+               security_ftr_clear(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS);
+       }
 
        enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) && \
                 (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR)   || \
@@ -141,6 +143,10 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void)
        enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
                 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY);
        setup_entry_flush(enable);
+
+       enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
+                security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS);
+       setup_uaccess_flush(enable);
 }
 
 static void __init pnv_setup_arch(void)
index 5e58b0cf92df8e22ca50508cbfb48dac3f4d60f3..ab85fac02c046b4a08c8d6e3eb10d81a24dc1913 100644 (file)
@@ -548,6 +548,10 @@ void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void)
        enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
                 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY);
        setup_entry_flush(enable);
+
+       enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
+                security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS);
+       setup_uaccess_flush(enable);
 }
 
 static void __init pSeries_setup_arch(void)