LoongArch: Add RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET support

Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall,
the offset is defaultly limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX().

In order to avoid triggering stack canaries (due to __builtin_alloca())
and slowing down the entry path, use __no_stack_protector attribute to
disable stack protector for do_syscall() at function level.

With this patch, the REPORT_STACK test show that:

	`loongarch64 bits of stack entropy: 7`

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

diff --git a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
index ddc042895d01149f9cdb0870153944e668365170..fcf6451b4e384841256169923e9d82014c0243b4 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ config LOONGARCH
        select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE
        select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if PERF_EVENTS
        select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU
+       select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
        select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
        select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
        select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK

diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c
index ec17cd5163b7c40a92caa6788a072f064c9bc760..ba5d0930a74f766fc2ef8e1534b0b9557a13d89b 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c
@@ -9,11 +9,14 @@
 #include <linux/entry-common.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/objtool.h>
+#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/unistd.h>
 
 #include <asm/asm.h>
 #include <asm/exception.h>
+#include <asm/loongarch.h>
 #include <asm/signal.h>
 #include <asm/switch_to.h>
 #include <asm-generic/syscalls.h>
@@ -39,7 +42,7 @@ void *sys_call_table[__NR_syscalls] = {
 typedef long (*sys_call_fn)(unsigned long, unsigned long,
        unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
 
-void noinstr do_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)
+void noinstr __no_stack_protector do_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
        unsigned long nr;
        sys_call_fn syscall_fn;
@@ -55,11 +58,28 @@ void noinstr do_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)
 
        nr = syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, nr);
 
+       add_random_kstack_offset();
+
        if (nr < NR_syscalls) {
                syscall_fn = sys_call_table[nr];
                regs->regs[4] = syscall_fn(regs->orig_a0, regs->regs[5], regs->regs[6],
                                           regs->regs[7], regs->regs[8], regs->regs[9]);
        }
 
+       /*
+        * This value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), which is 10
+        * bits. The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler
+        * when applying stack alignment constraints: 16-bytes (i.e. 4-bits)
+        * aligned, which will remove the 4 low bits from any entropy chosen
+        * here.
+        *
+        * The resulting 6 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4].
+        */
+       choose_random_kstack_offset(drdtime());
+
        syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
+STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(do_syscall);
+#endif