The LFENCE mitigation alone was deemed to be insufficient and the
related code was mostly removed by commit
cf3b86bc07619
(Revert "x86/spec_ctrl: Add 'nolfence' knob to disable fallback for
spectre_v2 mitigation")
This patch cleans up two additional references that still exist.
Orabug:
28631590
CVE: CVE-2018-15572
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Kanda <mark.kanda@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
- SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_LFENCE,
};
extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64);
* or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context
* switch is required.
*/
- if (((mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS) && (mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_LFENCE)) &&
+ if ((mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS) &&
((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) &&
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era())) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);