KVM: x86: SVM: Intercept #GP to support access to VMware backdoor ports

If KVM enable_vmware_backdoor module parameter is set,
the commit change VMX to now intercept #GP instead of being directly
deliviered from CPU to guest.

It is done to support access to VMware Backdoor I/O ports
even if TSS I/O permission denies it.
In that case:
1. A #GP will be raised and intercepted.
2. #GP intercept handler will simulate I/O port access instruction.
3. I/O port access instruction simulation will allow access to VMware
backdoor ports specifically even if TSS I/O permission bitmap denies it.

Note that the above change introduce slight performance hit as now #GPs
are now not deliviered directly from CPU to guest but instead
cause #VMExit and instruction emulation.
However, this behavior is introduced only when enable_vmware_backdoor
KVM module parameter is set.

Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 3ce5ba8dc58b2aeb45ce7f3e0fc4aaa59ea8547c..fa1c4977e1c24296dbd4cb8229b6ec0386477ca7 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1364,6 +1364,14 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
        set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR);
        set_exception_intercept(svm, AC_VECTOR);
        set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
+       /*
+        * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
+        * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
+        * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
+        * as VMware does.
+        */
+       if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
+               set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
 
        set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
        set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_NMI);
@@ -2552,6 +2560,23 @@ static int ac_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
        return 1;
 }
 
+static int gp_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+       struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+       u32 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+       int er;
+
+       WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vmware_backdoor);
+
+       er = emulate_instruction(vcpu,
+               EMULTYPE_VMWARE | EMULTYPE_NO_UD_ON_FAIL);
+       if (er == EMULATE_USER_EXIT)
+               return 0;
+       else if (er != EMULATE_DONE)
+               kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
+       return 1;
+}
+
 static bool is_erratum_383(void)
 {
        int err, i;
@@ -4551,6 +4576,7 @@ static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct vcpu_svm *svm) = {
        [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + PF_VECTOR]        = pf_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + MC_VECTOR]        = mc_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + AC_VECTOR]        = ac_interception,
+       [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + GP_VECTOR]        = gp_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_INTR]                         = intr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_NMI]                          = nmi_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_SMI]                          = nop_on_interception,