crypto: arm64/aes-ccm - avoid by-ref argument for ce_aes_ccm_auth_data

With the SIMD code path removed, we can clean up the CCM auth-only path
a bit further, by passing the 'macp' input buffer pointer by value,
rather than by reference, and taking the output value from the
function's return value.

This way, the compiler is no longer forced to allocate macp on the
stack. This is not expected to make any difference in practice, it just
makes for slightly cleaner code.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S
index 8adff299fcd319f66bf96d5631406dfec72a1ba9..b03f7f71f893cd0fa376a625b63f43314b9dbb8c 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S
@@ -12,22 +12,21 @@
        .arch   armv8-a+crypto
 
        /*
-        * void ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(u8 mac[], u8 const in[], u32 abytes,
-        *                           u32 *macp, u8 const rk[], u32 rounds);
+        * u32 ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(u8 mac[], u8 const in[], u32 abytes,
+        *                          u32 macp, u8 const rk[], u32 rounds);
         */
 SYM_FUNC_START(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data)
-       ldr     w8, [x3]                        /* leftover from prev round? */
        ld1     {v0.16b}, [x0]                  /* load mac */
-       cbz     w8, 1f
-       sub     w8, w8, #16
+       cbz     w3, 1f
+       sub     w3, w3, #16
        eor     v1.16b, v1.16b, v1.16b
 0:     ldrb    w7, [x1], #1                    /* get 1 byte of input */
        subs    w2, w2, #1
-       add     w8, w8, #1
+       add     w3, w3, #1
        ins     v1.b[0], w7
        ext     v1.16b, v1.16b, v1.16b, #1      /* rotate in the input bytes */
        beq     8f                              /* out of input? */
-       cbnz    w8, 0b
+       cbnz    w3, 0b
        eor     v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b
 1:     ld1     {v3.4s}, [x4]                   /* load first round key */
        prfm    pldl1strm, [x1]
@@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data)
        beq     10f
        adds    w2, w2, #16
        beq     10f
-       mov     w8, w2
+       mov     w3, w2
 7:     ldrb    w7, [x1], #1
        umov    w6, v0.b[0]
        eor     w6, w6, w7
@@ -71,15 +70,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data)
        beq     10f
        ext     v0.16b, v0.16b, v0.16b, #1      /* rotate out the mac bytes */
        b       7b
-8:     cbz     w8, 91f
-       mov     w7, w8
-       add     w8, w8, #16
+8:     cbz     w3, 91f
+       mov     w7, w3
+       add     w3, w3, #16
 9:     ext     v1.16b, v1.16b, v1.16b, #1
        adds    w7, w7, #1
        bne     9b
 91:    eor     v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b
        st1     {v0.16b}, [x0]
-10:    str     w8, [x3]
+10:    mov     w0, w3
        ret
 SYM_FUNC_END(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data)
 

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c
index d973655fab7e22e6d6f5c3bac13eebcf7e762009..c4f14415f5f01c21287fb1f4bf4f1b64893ebad4 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ static int num_rounds(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx)
        return 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
 }
 
-asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(u8 mac[], u8 const in[], u32 abytes,
-                                    u32 *macp, u32 const rk[], u32 rounds);
+asmlinkage u32 ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(u8 mac[], u8 const in[], u32 abytes,
+                                   u32 macp, u32 const rk[], u32 rounds);
 
 asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 cbytes,
                                   u32 const rk[], u32 rounds, u8 mac[],
@@ -94,13 +94,6 @@ static int ccm_init_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 maciv[], u32 msglen)
        return 0;
 }
 
-static void ccm_update_mac(struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, u8 mac[], u8 const in[],
-                          u32 abytes, u32 *macp)
-{
-       ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, in, abytes, macp, key->key_enc,
-                            num_rounds(key));
-}
-
 static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[])
 {
        struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
@@ -120,7 +113,8 @@ static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[])
                ltag.len = 6;
        }
 
-       ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, (u8 *)&ltag, ltag.len, &macp);
+       macp = ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, (u8 *)&ltag, ltag.len, macp,
+                                   ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx));
        scatterwalk_start(&walk, req->src);
 
        do {
@@ -133,13 +127,14 @@ static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[])
                }
                n = min_t(u32, n, SZ_4K); /* yield NEON at least every 4k */
                p = scatterwalk_map(&walk);
-               ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, p, n, &macp);
+
+               macp = ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, p, n, macp, ctx->key_enc,
+                                           num_rounds(ctx));
 
                if (len / SZ_4K > (len - n) / SZ_4K) {
                        kernel_neon_end();
                        kernel_neon_begin();
                }
-
                len -= n;
 
                scatterwalk_unmap(p);