____call_usermodehelper() now erases any credentials set by the
subprocess_inf::init() function.  The problem is that commit
17f60a7da150 ("capabilites: allow the application of capability limits
to usermode helpers") creates and commits new credentials with
prepare_kernel_cred() after the call to the init() function.  This wipes
all keyrings after umh_keys_init() is called.
The best way to deal with this is to put the init() call just prior to
the commit_creds() call, and pass the cred pointer to init().  That
means that umh_keys_init() and suchlike can modify the credentials
_before_ they are published and potentially in use by the rest of the
system.
This prevents request_key() from working as it is prevented from passing
the session keyring it set up with the authorisation token to
/sbin/request-key, and so the latter can't assume the authority to
instantiate the key.  This causes the in-kernel DNS resolver to fail
with ENOKEY unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
  * is a special value that we use to trap recursive
  * core dumps
  */
-static int umh_pipe_setup(struct subprocess_info *info)
+static int umh_pipe_setup(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *new)
 {
        struct file *rp, *wp;
        struct fdtable *fdt;
 
 #endif
 
 
-struct key;
+struct cred;
 struct file;
 
 enum umh_wait {
        char **envp;
        enum umh_wait wait;
        int retval;
-       int (*init)(struct subprocess_info *info);
+       int (*init)(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *new);
        void (*cleanup)(struct subprocess_info *info);
        void *data;
 };
 
 /* Set various pieces of state into the subprocess_info structure */
 void call_usermodehelper_setfns(struct subprocess_info *info,
-                   int (*init)(struct subprocess_info *info),
+                   int (*init)(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *new),
                    void (*cleanup)(struct subprocess_info *info),
                    void *data);
 
 static inline int
 call_usermodehelper_fns(char *path, char **argv, char **envp,
                        enum umh_wait wait,
-                       int (*init)(struct subprocess_info *info),
+                       int (*init)(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *new),
                        void (*cleanup)(struct subprocess_info *), void *data)
 {
        struct subprocess_info *info;
 
         */
        set_user_nice(current, 0);
 
-       if (sub_info->init) {
-               retval = sub_info->init(sub_info);
-               if (retval)
-                       goto fail;
-       }
-
        retval = -ENOMEM;
        new = prepare_kernel_cred(current);
        if (!new)
                                             new->cap_inheritable);
        spin_unlock(&umh_sysctl_lock);
 
+       if (sub_info->init) {
+               retval = sub_info->init(sub_info, new);
+               if (retval) {
+                       abort_creds(new);
+                       goto fail;
+               }
+       }
+
        commit_creds(new);
 
        retval = kernel_execve(sub_info->path,
  * context in which call_usermodehelper_exec is called.
  */
 void call_usermodehelper_setfns(struct subprocess_info *info,
-                   int (*init)(struct subprocess_info *info),
+                   int (*init)(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *new),
                    void (*cleanup)(struct subprocess_info *info),
                    void *data)
 {
 
  * This is called in context of freshly forked kthread before kernel_execve(),
  * so we can simply install the desired session_keyring at this point.
  */
-static int umh_keys_init(struct subprocess_info *info)
+static int umh_keys_init(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *cred)
 {
-       struct cred *cred = (struct cred*)current_cred();
        struct key *keyring = info->data;
 
        return install_session_keyring_to_cred(cred, keyring);