seccomp: audit abnormal end to a process due to seccomp

The audit system likes to collect information about processes that end
abnormally (SIGSEGV) as this may me useful intrusion detection information.
This patch adds audit support to collect information when seccomp forces a
task to exit because of misbehavior in a similar way.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 426ab9f4dd853b18d3e8df1b6a3fd2831fec0a57..6e1c533f9b46044c895ad18855adb47b79748f47 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -430,6 +430,7 @@ extern void audit_putname(const char *name);
 extern void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry);
 extern void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry *dentry,
                                const struct inode *parent);
+extern void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall);
 extern void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t);
 
 static inline int audit_dummy_context(void)
@@ -453,6 +454,12 @@ static inline void audit_inode_child(const struct dentry *dentry,
 }
 void audit_core_dumps(long signr);
 
+static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall)
+{
+       if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
+               __audit_seccomp(syscall);
+}
+
 static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
 {
        if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
@@ -558,6 +565,7 @@ extern int audit_signals;
 #define audit_inode(n,d) do { (void)(d); } while (0)
 #define audit_inode_child(i,p) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_core_dumps(i) do { ; } while (0)
+#define audit_seccomp(i) do { ; } while (0)
 #define auditsc_get_stamp(c,t,s) (0)
 #define audit_get_loginuid(t) (-1)
 #define audit_get_sessionid(t) (-1)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 7c495147c3d935889c044e0657b5a90657eff97a..e9bcb93800d8b6bad4622d2795cc8c816eb26ca7 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2529,6 +2529,25 @@ void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
        context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
 }
 
+static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr)
+{
+       uid_t auid, uid;
+       gid_t gid;
+       unsigned int sessionid;
+
+       auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+       sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+       current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
+
+       audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
+                        auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
+       audit_log_task_context(ab);
+       audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
+       audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+       audit_log_format(ab, " reason=");
+       audit_log_string(ab, reason);
+       audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
+}
 /**
  * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
  * @signr: signal value
@@ -2539,10 +2558,6 @@ void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
 {
        struct audit_buffer *ab;
-       u32 sid;
-       uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid;
-       gid_t gid;
-       unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
 
        if (!audit_enabled)
                return;
@@ -2551,24 +2566,17 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
                return;
 
        ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
-       current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
-       audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
-                        auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
-       security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
-       if (sid) {
-               char *ctx = NULL;
-               u32 len;
+       audit_log_abend(ab, "memory violation", signr);
+       audit_log_end(ab);
+}
 
-               if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
-                       audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
-               else {
-                       audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
-                       security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
-               }
-       }
-       audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
-       audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
-       audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
+void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall)
+{
+       struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+       ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
+       audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", SIGKILL);
+       audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
        audit_log_end(ab);
 }
 

diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 57d4b13b631de36161349feb99ae6f76a2984b06..e8d76c5895ea15f3bb4867a85f48851dedf90cd4 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
  * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing mode.
  */
 
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
@@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
 #ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
        dump_stack();
 #endif
+       audit_seccomp(this_syscall);
        do_exit(SIGKILL);
 }