static u64 __read_mostly host_xss;
+static bool __read_mostly enable_pml = 1;
+module_param_named(pml, enable_pml, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
#define KVM_GUEST_CR0_MASK (X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD)
#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST (X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_NE)
#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON \
/* Dynamic PLE window. */
int ple_window;
bool ple_window_dirty;
+
+ /* Support for PML */
+#define PML_ENTITY_NUM 512
+ struct page *pml_pg;
};
enum segment_cache_field {
SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS;
}
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_pml(void)
+{
+ return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
+}
+
static inline bool report_flexpriority(void)
{
return flexpriority_enabled;
SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY |
SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES;
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES |
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
if (adjust_vmx_controls(min2, opt2,
MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
&_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control) < 0)
a current VMCS12
*/
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS;
+ /* PML is enabled/disabled in creating/destorying vcpu */
+ exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
+
return exec_control;
}
update_ple_window_actual_max();
+ /*
+ * Only enable PML when hardware supports PML feature, and both EPT
+ * and EPT A/D bit features are enabled -- PML depends on them to work.
+ */
+ if (!enable_ept || !enable_ept_ad_bits || !cpu_has_vmx_pml())
+ enable_pml = 0;
+
+ if (!enable_pml) {
+ kvm_x86_ops->slot_enable_log_dirty = NULL;
+ kvm_x86_ops->slot_disable_log_dirty = NULL;
+ kvm_x86_ops->flush_log_dirty = NULL;
+ kvm_x86_ops->enable_log_dirty_pt_masked = NULL;
+ }
+
return alloc_kvm_area();
out7:
return pi_test_pir(vector, &vmx->pi_desc);
}
+static int handle_pml_full(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ unsigned long exit_qualification;
+
+ trace_kvm_pml_full(vcpu->vcpu_id);
+
+ exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+
+ /*
+ * PML buffer FULL happened while executing iret from NMI,
+ * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
+ */
+ if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+ cpu_has_virtual_nmis() &&
+ (exit_qualification & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
+ vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+ GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+
+ /*
+ * PML buffer already flushed at beginning of VMEXIT. Nothing to do
+ * here.., and there's no userspace involvement needed for PML.
+ */
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* The exit handlers return 1 if the exit was handled fully and guest execution
* may resume. Otherwise they set the kvm_run parameter to indicate what needs
[EXIT_REASON_INVVPID] = handle_invvpid,
[EXIT_REASON_XSAVES] = handle_xsaves,
[EXIT_REASON_XRSTORS] = handle_xrstors,
+ [EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL] = handle_pml_full,
};
static const int kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers =
*info2 = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
}
+static int vmx_enable_pml(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+ struct page *pml_pg;
+ u32 exec_control;
+
+ pml_pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!pml_pg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ vmx->pml_pg = pml_pg;
+
+ vmcs_write64(PML_ADDRESS, page_to_phys(vmx->pml_pg));
+ vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
+
+ exec_control = vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
+ exec_control |= SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
+ vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void vmx_disable_pml(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+ u32 exec_control;
+
+ ASSERT(vmx->pml_pg);
+ __free_page(vmx->pml_pg);
+ vmx->pml_pg = NULL;
+
+ exec_control = vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
+ exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
+ vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);
+}
+
+static void vmx_flush_pml_buffer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+ struct kvm *kvm = vmx->vcpu.kvm;
+ u64 *pml_buf;
+ u16 pml_idx;
+
+ pml_idx = vmcs_read16(GUEST_PML_INDEX);
+
+ /* Do nothing if PML buffer is empty */
+ if (pml_idx == (PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1))
+ return;
+
+ /* PML index always points to next available PML buffer entity */
+ if (pml_idx >= PML_ENTITY_NUM)
+ pml_idx = 0;
+ else
+ pml_idx++;
+
+ pml_buf = page_address(vmx->pml_pg);
+ for (; pml_idx < PML_ENTITY_NUM; pml_idx++) {
+ u64 gpa;
+
+ gpa = pml_buf[pml_idx];
+ WARN_ON(gpa & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
+ mark_page_dirty(kvm, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ }
+
+ /* reset PML index */
+ vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Flush all vcpus' PML buffer and update logged GPAs to dirty_bitmap.
+ * Called before reporting dirty_bitmap to userspace.
+ */
+static void kvm_flush_pml_buffers(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+ /*
+ * We only need to kick vcpu out of guest mode here, as PML buffer
+ * is flushed at beginning of all VMEXITs, and it's obvious that only
+ * vcpus running in guest are possible to have unflushed GPAs in PML
+ * buffer.
+ */
+ kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
+ kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+}
+
/*
* The guest has exited. See if we can fix it or if we need userspace
* assistance.
u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
u32 vectoring_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
+ /*
+ * Flush logged GPAs PML buffer, this will make dirty_bitmap more
+ * updated. Another good is, in kvm_vm_ioctl_get_dirty_log, before
+ * querying dirty_bitmap, we only need to kick all vcpus out of guest
+ * mode as if vcpus is in root mode, the PML buffer must has been
+ * flushed already.
+ */
+ if (enable_pml)
+ vmx_flush_pml_buffer(vmx);
+
/* If guest state is invalid, start emulating */
if (vmx->emulation_required)
return handle_invalid_guest_state(vcpu);
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ if (enable_pml)
+ vmx_disable_pml(vmx);
free_vpid(vmx);
leave_guest_mode(vcpu);
vmx_load_vmcs01(vcpu);
vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull;
vmx->nested.current_vmcs12 = NULL;
+ /*
+ * If PML is turned on, failure on enabling PML just results in failure
+ * of creating the vcpu, therefore we can simplify PML logic (by
+ * avoiding dealing with cases, such as enabling PML partially on vcpus
+ * for the guest, etc.
+ */
+ if (enable_pml) {
+ err = vmx_enable_pml(vmx);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_vmcs;
+ }
+
return &vmx->vcpu;
free_vmcs:
shrink_ple_window(vcpu);
}
+static void vmx_slot_enable_log_dirty(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+ kvm_mmu_slot_leaf_clear_dirty(kvm, slot);
+ kvm_mmu_slot_largepage_remove_write_access(kvm, slot);
+}
+
+static void vmx_slot_disable_log_dirty(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+ kvm_mmu_slot_set_dirty(kvm, slot);
+}
+
+static void vmx_flush_log_dirty(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ kvm_flush_pml_buffers(kvm);
+}
+
+static void vmx_enable_log_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
+ gfn_t offset, unsigned long mask)
+{
+ kvm_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(kvm, memslot, offset, mask);
+}
+
static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops = {
.cpu_has_kvm_support = cpu_has_kvm_support,
.disabled_by_bios = vmx_disabled_by_bios,
.check_nested_events = vmx_check_nested_events,
.sched_in = vmx_sched_in,
+
+ .slot_enable_log_dirty = vmx_slot_enable_log_dirty,
+ .slot_disable_log_dirty = vmx_slot_disable_log_dirty,
+ .flush_log_dirty = vmx_flush_log_dirty,
+ .enable_log_dirty_pt_masked = vmx_enable_log_dirty_pt_masked,
};
static int __init vmx_init(void)
projects / users / griffoul / linux.git / commitdiff