kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down

The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary
code in ring 0, which is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It
makes sense to disable kexec_load() in this situation.

This does not affect kexec_file_load() syscall which can check for a
signature on the image to be booted.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index e5dd446ef35b33a77b0e49914cdfe3d6033ea6c2..b607a8ac97fe6b18d3ae400abd7f068bc0956633 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
        LOCKDOWN_NONE,
        LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
        LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM,
+       LOCKDOWN_KEXEC,
        LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
        LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
 };

diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index 1b018f1a6e0d85647e4cc5e6646cacc15e5a2bee..bc933c0db9bf019aefa7c5bc7061bc2541fb2a00 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -205,6 +205,14 @@ static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments,
        if (result < 0)
                return result;
 
+       /*
+        * kexec can be used to circumvent module loading restrictions, so
+        * prevent loading in that case
+        */
+       result = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC);
+       if (result)
+               return result;
+
        /*
         * Verify we have a legal set of flags
         * This leaves us room for future extensions.

diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 240ecaa10a1d18f56346c0e725320663bbc2e680..aaf30ad351f990d9846b80d735aab83b651f8e5b 100644 (file)
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
        [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
        [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
        [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
+       [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
        [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
        [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
 };