vfs: Don't allow changing the link count of an inode with an invalid uid or gid

Changing the link count of an inode via unlink or link will cause a
write back of that inode.  If the uids or gids are invalid (aka not known
to the kernel) writing the inode back may change the uid or gid in the
filesystem.   To prevent possible filesystem and to avoid the need for
filesystem maintainers to worry about it don't allow operations on
inodes with an invalid uid or gid.

Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 186bd2464fd5a842480a37c55b57d60d9164cf86..942c1f096f6bd1c0add2dea3a63445d08c48ff1a 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -984,13 +984,15 @@ static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
  */
 static int may_linkat(struct path *link)
 {
-       struct inode *inode;
+       struct inode *inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
+
+       /* Inode writeback is not safe when the uid or gid are invalid. */
+       if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
+               return -EOVERFLOW;
 
        if (!sysctl_protected_hardlinks)
                return 0;
 
-       inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
-
        /* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like,
         * otherwise, it must be a safe source.
         */
@@ -2749,6 +2751,11 @@ static int may_delete(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *victim, bool isdir)
        BUG_ON(!inode);
 
        BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir);
+
+       /* Inode writeback is not safe when the uid or gid are invalid. */
+       if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
+               return -EOVERFLOW;
+
        audit_inode_child(dir, victim, AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE);
 
        error = inode_permission(dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);