Kill MAX_BUF_LEN

There's no real point in having a hard limit for struct oc_text_buf, the
whole point of which is that it is dynamically allocated. Just guard
against the int buf_len overflowing.

In process_http_response() the hard-coded buf[] array is only used for
headers one line at a time now, so 8KiB should suffice.

Fixes: #39
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

diff --git a/http.c b/http.c
index fa3279b186cd0acd249270d0add84f4dbc157d79..fa85c496fb5a9df75f3a08f31d47c08132d036a5 100644 (file)
--- a/http.c
+++ b/http.c
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@
 static int proxy_write(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len);
 static int proxy_read(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len);
 
-#define MAX_BUF_LEN 131072
 #define BUF_CHUNK_SIZE 4096
 
 struct oc_text_buf *buf_alloc(void)
@@ -89,14 +88,14 @@ void buf_truncate(struct oc_text_buf *buf)
 
 int buf_ensure_space(struct oc_text_buf *buf, int len)
 {
-       int new_buf_len;
+       unsigned int new_buf_len;
 
        new_buf_len = (buf->pos + len + BUF_CHUNK_SIZE - 1) & ~(BUF_CHUNK_SIZE - 1);
 
        if (new_buf_len <= buf->buf_len)
                return 0;
 
-       if (new_buf_len > MAX_BUF_LEN) {
+       if (new_buf_len > INT_MAX) {
                buf->error = -E2BIG;
                return buf->error;
        } else {
@@ -371,7 +370,7 @@ int process_http_response(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, int connect,
                          int (*header_cb)(struct openconnect_info *, char *, char *),
                          struct oc_text_buf *body)
 {
-       char buf[MAX_BUF_LEN];
+       char buf[8192];
        int bodylen = BODY_HTTP10;
        int closeconn = 0;
        int result;