entry_ibpb() should invalidate all indirect predictions, including return
target predictions. Not all IBPB implementations do this, in which case the
fallback is RSB filling.
Prevent SRSO-style hijacks of return predictions following IBPB, as the return
target predictor can be corrupted before the IBPB completes.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Wikner <kwikner@ethz.ch>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
#include <asm/segment.h>
#include <asm/cache.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include "calling.h"
movl $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax
xorl %edx, %edx
wrmsr
+
+ /* Make sure IBPB clears return stack preductions too. */
+ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET
RET
SYM_FUNC_END(entry_ibpb)
/* For KVM */