CIFS: Fix memory over bound bug in cifs_parse_mount_options

While password processing we can get out of options array bound if
the next character after array is delimiter. The patch adds a check
if we reach the end.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c
index db9d55b507d0afe36b816889165975edd3a7198b..4bc862a80efa5a722ab8f6088a95c30b040fcd7b 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/cifs/connect.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c
@@ -807,8 +807,7 @@ static int
 cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname,
                         struct smb_vol *vol)
 {
-       char *value;
-       char *data;
+       char *value, *data, *end;
        unsigned int  temp_len, i, j;
        char separator[2];
        short int override_uid = -1;
@@ -851,6 +850,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname,
        if (!options)
                return 1;
 
+       end = options + strlen(options);
        if (strncmp(options, "sep=", 4) == 0) {
                if (options[4] != 0) {
                        separator[0] = options[4];
@@ -916,6 +916,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname,
                        the only illegal character in a password is null */
 
                        if ((value[temp_len] == 0) &&
+                           (value + temp_len < end) &&
                            (value[temp_len+1] == separator[0])) {
                                /* reinsert comma */
                                value[temp_len] = separator[0];