x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation

Restructure spectre_v1 to use select/apply functions to create
consistent vulnerability handling.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250418161721.1855190-9-david.kaplan@amd.com

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b070ad7be04967128fd1674b6039fc09c03cdea9..1a42abb289ac641a44457b140e59eb2ef3561adf 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
  */
 
 static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void);
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -223,6 +224,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
        mmio_update_mitigation();
        rfds_update_mitigation();
 
+       spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();
        mds_apply_mitigation();
        taa_apply_mitigation();
        mmio_apply_mitigation();
@@ -1021,10 +1023,14 @@ static bool smap_works_speculatively(void)
 
 static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
 {
-       if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+       if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off())
                spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+       if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off())
                return;
-       }
 
        if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
                /*