net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
                                                 */
        spinlock_t              rules_mod_lock;
 
+       u32                     hash_mix;
        atomic64_t              cookie_gen;
 
        struct list_head        list;           /* list of network namespaces */
 
 #ifndef __NET_NS_HASH_H__
 #define __NET_NS_HASH_H__
 
-#include <asm/cache.h>
-
-struct net;
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
 
 static inline u32 net_hash_mix(const struct net *net)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS
-       return (u32)(((unsigned long)net) >> ilog2(sizeof(*net)));
-#else
-       return 0;
-#endif
+       return net->hash_mix;
 }
 #endif
 
 
        refcount_set(&net->count, 1);
        refcount_set(&net->passive, 1);
+       get_random_bytes(&net->hash_mix, sizeof(u32));
        net->dev_base_seq = 1;
        net->user_ns = user_ns;
        idr_init(&net->netns_ids);