IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand

For now the only LSM security enforcement mechanism available is
specific to InfiniBand. Bypass enforcement for non-IB link types.

This fixes a regression where modify_qp fails for iWARP because
querying the PKEY returns -EINVAL.

Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Don Dutile <ddutile@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
Fixes: d291f1a65232("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs")
Fixes: 47a2b338fe63("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Tested-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
index 23278ed5be4517fd42d8bba6eb07ccd485e5f7f6..a337386652b07381ec1f858ec1279fcba7128a8e 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
@@ -417,8 +417,17 @@ void ib_close_shared_qp_security(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
 
 int ib_create_qp_security(struct ib_qp *qp, struct ib_device *dev)
 {
+       u8 i = rdma_start_port(dev);
+       bool is_ib = false;
        int ret;
 
+       while (i <= rdma_end_port(dev) && !is_ib)
+               is_ib = rdma_protocol_ib(dev, i++);
+
+       /* If this isn't an IB device don't create the security context */
+       if (!is_ib)
+               return 0;
+
        qp->qp_sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*qp->qp_sec), GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!qp->qp_sec)
                return -ENOMEM;
@@ -441,6 +450,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_create_qp_security);
 
 void ib_destroy_qp_security_begin(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
 {
+       /* Return if not IB */
+       if (!sec)
+               return;
+
        mutex_lock(&sec->mutex);
 
        /* Remove the QP from the lists so it won't get added to
@@ -470,6 +483,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_abort(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
        int ret;
        int i;
 
+       /* Return if not IB */
+       if (!sec)
+               return;
+
        /* If a concurrent cache update is in progress this
         * QP security could be marked for an error state
         * transition.  Wait for this to complete.
@@ -505,6 +522,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_end(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
 {
        int i;
 
+       /* Return if not IB */
+       if (!sec)
+               return;
+
        /* If a concurrent cache update is occurring we must
         * wait until this QP security structure is processed
         * in the QP to error flow before destroying it because
@@ -557,7 +578,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
 {
        int ret = 0;
        struct ib_ports_pkeys *tmp_pps;
-       struct ib_ports_pkeys *new_pps;
+       struct ib_ports_pkeys *new_pps = NULL;
        struct ib_qp *real_qp = qp->real_qp;
        bool special_qp = (real_qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI ||
                           real_qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_GSI ||
@@ -565,18 +586,27 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
        bool pps_change = ((qp_attr_mask & (IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX | IB_QP_PORT)) ||
                           (qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH));
 
+       WARN_ONCE((qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT &&
+                  rdma_protocol_ib(real_qp->device, qp_attr->port_num) &&
+                  !real_qp->qp_sec),
+                  "%s: QP security is not initialized for IB QP: %d\n",
+                  __func__, real_qp->qp_num);
+
        /* The port/pkey settings are maintained only for the real QP. Open
         * handles on the real QP will be in the shared_qp_list. When
         * enforcing security on the real QP all the shared QPs will be
         * checked as well.
         */
 
-       if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
+       if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {
                mutex_lock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex);
                new_pps = get_new_pps(real_qp,
                                      qp_attr,
                                      qp_attr_mask);
-
+               if (!new_pps) {
+                       mutex_unlock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex);
+                       return -ENOMEM;
+               }
                /* Add this QP to the lists for the new port
                 * and pkey settings before checking for permission
                 * in case there is a concurrent cache update
@@ -600,7 +630,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
                                                 qp_attr_mask,
                                                 udata);
 
-       if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
+       if (new_pps) {
                /* Clean up the lists and free the appropriate
                 * ports_pkeys structure.
                 */
@@ -631,6 +661,9 @@ int ib_security_pkey_access(struct ib_device *dev,
        u16 pkey;
        int ret;
 
+       if (!rdma_protocol_ib(dev, port_num))
+               return 0;
+
        ret = ib_get_cached_pkey(dev, port_num, pkey_index, &pkey);
        if (ret)
                return ret;
@@ -665,6 +698,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
 {
        int ret;
 
+       if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
+               return 0;
+
        ret = security_ib_alloc_security(&agent->security);
        if (ret)
                return ret;
@@ -690,6 +726,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
 
 void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
 {
+       if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
+               return;
+
        security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
        if (agent->lsm_nb_reg)
                unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
@@ -697,6 +736,9 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
 
 int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index)
 {
+       if (!rdma_protocol_ib(map->agent.device, map->agent.port_num))
+               return 0;
+
        if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI && !map->agent.smp_allowed)
                return -EACCES;