We applied a fix for CVE-2012-0038
fa8b18edd7 "xfs: validate acl count",
but there was a follow on patch which is not in our kernel. If count
was a negative then we could get by the new check.
From
093019cf1b18dd31b2c3b77acce4e000e2cbc9ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2011 21:55:52 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] xfs: fix acl count validation in xfs_acl_from_disk()
Commit
fa8b18ed didn't prevent the integer overflow and possible
memory corruption. "count" can go negative and bypass the check.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e;
struct posix_acl *acl;
struct xfs_acl_entry *ace;
- int count, i;
+ unsigned int count, i;
count = be32_to_cpu(aclp->acl_cnt);
if (count > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES)