type provides an operation to perform a match between the description on a
key and a criterion string.
- * Each key has an owner user ID, a group ID and a permissions mask. These
- are used to control what a process may do to a key from userspace, and
- whether a kernel service will be able to find the key.
+ * Each key has an owner user ID, a group ID and an ACL. These are used to
+ control what a process may do to a key from userspace, and whether a
+ kernel service will be able to find the key.
* Each key can be set to expire at a specific time by the key type's
instantiation function. Keys can also be immortal.
Key Access Permissions
======================
-Keys have an owner user ID, a group access ID, and a permissions mask. The mask
-has up to eight bits each for possessor, user, group and other access. Only
-six of each set of eight bits are defined. These permissions granted are:
+Keys have an owner user ID, a group ID and an ACL. The ACL is made up of a
+sequence of ACEs that each contain three elements:
- * View
+ * The type of subject.
+ * The subject.
- This permits a key or keyring's attributes to be viewed - including key
- type and description.
+ These two together indicate the subject to whom the permits are granted.
+ The type can be one of:
- * Read
+ * ``KEY_ACE_SUBJ_STANDARD``
- This permits a key's payload to be viewed or a keyring's list of linked
- keys.
+ The subject is a standard 'macro' type. The subject can be one of:
+
+ * ``KEY_ACE_EVERYONE``
+
+ The permits are granted to everyone. It replaces the old 'other'
+ type on the assumption that you wouldn't grant a permission to other
+ that you you wouldn't grant to everyone else.
+
+ * ``KEY_ACE_OWNER``
+
+ The permits are granted to the owner of the key (key->uid).
+
+ * ``KEY_ACE_GROUP``
+
+ The permits are granted to the key's group (key->gid).
+
+ * ``KEY_ACE_POSSESSOR``
+
+ The permits are granted to anyone who possesses the key.
+
+ * The set of permits granted to the subject. These include:
+
+ * ``KEY_ACE_VIEW``
+
+ This permits a key or keyring's attributes to be viewed - including the
+ key type and description.
+
+ * ``KEY_ACE_READ``
+
+ This permits a key's payload to be viewed or a keyring's list of linked
+ keys.
- * Write
+ * ``KEY_ACE_WRITE``
- This permits a key's payload to be instantiated or updated, or it allows a
- link to be added to or removed from a keyring.
+ This permits a key's payload to be instantiated or updated, or it allows
+ a link to be added to or removed from a keyring.
- * Search
+ * ``KEY_ACE_SEARCH``
- This permits keyrings to be searched and keys to be found. Searches can
- only recurse into nested keyrings that have search permission set.
+ This permits keyrings to be searched and keys to be found. Searches can
+ only recurse into nested keyrings that have search permission set.
- * Link
+ * ``KEY_ACE_LINK``
- This permits a key or keyring to be linked to. To create a link from a
- keyring to a key, a process must have Write permission on the keyring and
- Link permission on the key.
+ This permits a key or keyring to be linked to. To create a link from a
+ keyring to a key, a process must have Write permission on the keyring
+ and Link permission on the key.
- * Set Attribute
+ * ``KEY_ACE_SET_SECURITY``
- This permits a key's UID, GID and permissions mask to be changed.
+ This permits a key's UID, GID and permissions mask to be changed.
+
+ * ``KEY_ACE_INVAL``
+
+ This permits a key to be invalidated with KEYCTL_INVALIDATE.
+
+ * ``KEY_ACE_REVOKE``
+
+ This permits a key to be revoked with KEYCTL_REVOKE.
+
+ * ``KEY_ACE_JOIN``
+
+ This permits a keyring to be joined as a session by
+ KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING or KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT.
+
+ * ``KEY_ACE_CLEAR``
+
+ This permits a keyring to be cleared.
For changing the ownership, group ID or permissions mask, being the owner of
the key or having the sysadmin capability is sufficient.
+The legacy KEYCTL_SETPERM and KEYCTL_DESCRIBE functions can only see/generate
+View, Read, Write, Search, Link and SetAttr permits, and do this for each of
+possessor, user, group and other permission sets as a 32-bit flag mask. These
+will be approximated/inferred:
+
+ SETPERM Permit Implied ACE Permit
+ =============== =======================
+ Search Inval, Join
+ Write Revoke, Clear
+ Setattr Set Security, Revoke
+
+ ACE Permit Described as
+ =============== =======================
+ Inval Search
+ Join Search
+ Revoke Write (unless Setattr)
+ Clear write
+ Set Security Setattr
+
+'Other' will be approximated as/inferred from the 'Everyone' subject.
+
SELinux Support
===============
struct key *request_key(const struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
- const char *callout_info);
+ const char *callout_info,
+ struct key_acl *acl);
This is used to request a key or keyring with a description that matches
the description specified according to the key type's match_preparse()
If successful, the key will have been attached to the default keyring for
implicitly obtained request-key keys, as set by KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING.
+ If a key is created, it will be given the specified ACL.
+
See also Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst.
struct key *request_key_tag(const struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
struct key_tag *domain_tag,
- const char *callout_info);
+ const char *callout_info,
+ struct key_acl *acl);
This is identical to request_key(), except that a domain tag may be
specifies that causes search algorithm to only match keys matching that
struct key_tag *domain_tag,
const void *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
- void *aux);
+ void *aux,
+ struct key_acl *acl);
This is identical to request_key_tag(), except that the auxiliary data is
passed to the key_type->request_key() op if it exists, and the
struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
const struct cred *cred,
- key_perm_t perm,
+ struct key_acl *acl,
struct key_restriction *restrict_link,
unsigned long flags,
struct key *dest);
struct key *request_key(const struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
- const char *callout_info);
+ const char *callout_info,
+ struct key_acl *acl);
or::
struct key *request_key_tag(const struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
const struct key_tag *domain_tag,
- const char *callout_info);
+ const char *callout_info,
+ struct key_acl *acl);
or::
const struct key_tag *domain_tag,
const char *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
- void *aux);
+ void *aux,
+ struct key_acl *acl);
or::
hash,
NULL,
0,
- ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW),
+ &internal_key_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
keyring_alloc(".blacklist",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
current_cred(),
- (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
- KEY_USR_SEARCH,
+ &internal_keyring_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
KEY_FLAG_KEEP,
NULL, NULL);
builtin_trusted_keys =
keyring_alloc(".builtin_trusted_keys",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
- ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+ &internal_key_acl, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(builtin_trusted_keys))
panic("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n");
secondary_trusted_keys =
keyring_alloc(".secondary_trusted_keys",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
- ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH |
- KEY_USR_WRITE),
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+ &internal_writable_keyring_acl, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(),
NULL);
if (IS_ERR(secondary_trusted_keys))
NULL,
p,
plen,
- ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+ &internal_key_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN |
KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);
return -ENOMEM;
key = request_key(key_string[0] == 'l' ? &key_type_logon : &key_type_user,
- key_desc + 1, NULL);
+ key_desc + 1, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
kzfree(new_key_string);
return PTR_ERR(key);
struct device *dev = &nvdimm->dev;
sprintf(desc, "%s%s", NVDIMM_PREFIX, nvdimm->dimm_id);
- key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, desc, "");
+ key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, desc, "", NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
if (PTR_ERR(key) == -ENOKEY)
dev_dbg(dev, "request_key() found no key\n");
_debug("key %s", cell->anonymous_key->description);
key = request_key(&key_type_rxrpc, cell->anonymous_key->description,
- NULL);
+ NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
if (PTR_ERR(key) != -ENOKEY) {
_leave(" = %ld", PTR_ERR(key));
#include "cifsproto.h"
static const struct cred *spnego_cred;
+static struct key_acl cifs_spnego_key_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .possessor_viewable = true,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_READ),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW),
+ }
+};
+
+static struct key_acl cifs_spnego_keyring_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_WRITE),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ | KEY_ACE_CLEAR),
+ }
+};
+
/* create a new cifs key */
static int
cifs_spnego_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "key description = %s\n", description);
saved_cred = override_creds(spnego_cred);
- spnego_key = request_key(&cifs_spnego_key_type, description, "");
+ spnego_key = request_key(&cifs_spnego_key_type, description, "",
+ &cifs_spnego_key_acl);
revert_creds(saved_cred);
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG2
keyring = keyring_alloc(".cifs_spnego",
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
- (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
+ &cifs_spnego_keyring_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
#include "cifsproto.h"
#include "cifs_debug.h"
+static struct key_acl cifs_idmap_key_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .possessor_viewable = true,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_READ),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW),
+ }
+};
+
+static struct key_acl cifs_idmap_keyring_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_WRITE),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ),
+ }
+};
+
/* security id for everyone/world system group */
static const struct cifs_sid sid_everyone = {
1, 1, {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1}, {0} };
rc = 0;
saved_cred = override_creds(root_cred);
- sidkey = request_key(&cifs_idmap_key_type, desc, "");
+ sidkey = request_key(&cifs_idmap_key_type, desc, "",
+ &cifs_idmap_key_acl);
if (IS_ERR(sidkey)) {
rc = -EINVAL;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Can't map %cid %u to a SID\n",
return -ENOMEM;
saved_cred = override_creds(root_cred);
- sidkey = request_key(&cifs_idmap_key_type, sidstr, "");
+ sidkey = request_key(&cifs_idmap_key_type, sidstr, "",
+ &cifs_idmap_key_acl);
if (IS_ERR(sidkey)) {
rc = -EINVAL;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Can't map SID %s to a %cid\n",
keyring = keyring_alloc(".cifs_idmap",
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
- (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
+ &cifs_idmap_keyring_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
}
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: desc=%s\n", __func__, desc);
- key = request_key(&key_type_logon, desc, "");
+ key = request_key(&key_type_logon, desc, "", NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
if (!ses->domainName) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "domainName is NULL\n");
/* didn't work, try to find a domain key */
sprintf(desc, "cifs:d:%s", ses->domainName);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: desc=%s\n", __func__, desc);
- key = request_key(&key_type_logon, desc, "");
+ key = request_key(&key_type_logon, desc, "", NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(key);
goto out_err;
if (!description)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- key = request_key(&key_type_logon, description, NULL);
+ key = request_key(&key_type_logon, description, NULL, NULL);
kfree(description);
if (IS_ERR(key))
return key;
static inline struct key *ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key(char *sig)
{
- return request_key(&key_type_encrypted, sig, NULL);
+ return request_key(&key_type_encrypted, sig, NULL, NULL);
}
#else
{
int rc = 0;
- (*auth_tok_key) = request_key(&key_type_user, sig, NULL);
+ (*auth_tok_key) = request_key(&key_type_user, sig, NULL, NULL);
if (!(*auth_tok_key) || IS_ERR(*auth_tok_key)) {
(*auth_tok_key) = ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key(sig);
if (!(*auth_tok_key) || IS_ERR(*auth_tok_key)) {
const char *buf;
int len;
- key = request_key(&key_type_user, "fscache:objlist", NULL);
+ key = request_key(&key_type_user, "fscache:objlist", NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key))
goto no_config;
const struct cred *cred;
};
+static struct key_acl nfs_idmap_key_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .possessor_viewable = true,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_READ),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW),
+ }
+};
+
+static struct key_acl nfs_idmap_keyring_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_WRITE),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ),
+ }
+};
+
static struct user_namespace *idmap_userns(const struct idmap *idmap)
{
if (idmap && idmap->cred)
keyring = keyring_alloc(".id_resolver",
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
- (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
+ &nfs_idmap_keyring_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
if (!idmap->cred || idmap->cred->user_ns == &init_user_ns)
- rkey = request_key(&key_type_id_resolver, desc, "");
+ rkey = request_key(&key_type_id_resolver, desc, "",
+ &nfs_idmap_key_acl);
if (IS_ERR(rkey)) {
mutex_lock(&idmap->idmap_mutex);
rkey = request_key_with_auxdata(&key_type_id_resolver_legacy,
- desc, NULL, "", 0, idmap);
+ desc, NULL, "", 0, idmap,
+ &nfs_idmap_key_acl);
mutex_unlock(&idmap->idmap_mutex);
}
if (!IS_ERR(rkey))
}
rcu_read_lock();
- rkey->perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
-
ret = key_validate(rkey);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_up;
snprintf(hmac_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "hmac(%s)",
c->auth_hash_name);
- keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_logon, c->auth_key_name, NULL);
+ keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_logon, c->auth_key_name, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_key)) {
ubifs_err(c, "Failed to request key: %ld",
/* key handle serial number */
typedef int32_t key_serial_t;
-/* key handle permissions mask */
-typedef uint32_t key_perm_t;
-
struct key;
struct net;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-#undef KEY_DEBUGGING
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
-#define KEY_POS_VIEW 0x01000000 /* possessor can view a key's attributes */
-#define KEY_POS_READ 0x02000000 /* possessor can read key payload / view keyring */
-#define KEY_POS_WRITE 0x04000000 /* possessor can update key payload / add link to keyring */
-#define KEY_POS_SEARCH 0x08000000 /* possessor can find a key in search / search a keyring */
-#define KEY_POS_LINK 0x10000000 /* possessor can create a link to a key/keyring */
-#define KEY_POS_SETATTR 0x20000000 /* possessor can set key attributes */
-#define KEY_POS_ALL 0x3f000000
-
-#define KEY_USR_VIEW 0x00010000 /* user permissions... */
-#define KEY_USR_READ 0x00020000
-#define KEY_USR_WRITE 0x00040000
-#define KEY_USR_SEARCH 0x00080000
-#define KEY_USR_LINK 0x00100000
-#define KEY_USR_SETATTR 0x00200000
-#define KEY_USR_ALL 0x003f0000
-
-#define KEY_GRP_VIEW 0x00000100 /* group permissions... */
-#define KEY_GRP_READ 0x00000200
-#define KEY_GRP_WRITE 0x00000400
-#define KEY_GRP_SEARCH 0x00000800
-#define KEY_GRP_LINK 0x00001000
-#define KEY_GRP_SETATTR 0x00002000
-#define KEY_GRP_ALL 0x00003f00
-
-#define KEY_OTH_VIEW 0x00000001 /* third party permissions... */
-#define KEY_OTH_READ 0x00000002
-#define KEY_OTH_WRITE 0x00000004
-#define KEY_OTH_SEARCH 0x00000008
-#define KEY_OTH_LINK 0x00000010
-#define KEY_OTH_SETATTR 0x00000020
-#define KEY_OTH_ALL 0x0000003f
-
-#define KEY_PERM_UNDEF 0xffffffff
+#undef KEY_DEBUGGING
struct seq_file;
struct user_struct;
void *data[4];
};
+struct key_ace {
+ unsigned int type;
+ unsigned int perm;
+ union {
+ kuid_t uid;
+ kgid_t gid;
+ unsigned int subject_id;
+ };
+};
+
+struct key_acl {
+ refcount_t usage;
+ unsigned short nr_ace;
+ bool possessor_viewable;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+ struct key_ace aces[];
+};
+
+#define KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(perms) { \
+ .type = KEY_ACE_SUBJ_STANDARD, \
+ .perm = perms, \
+ .subject_id = KEY_ACE_POSSESSOR \
+ }
+
+#define KEY_OWNER_ACE(perms) { \
+ .type = KEY_ACE_SUBJ_STANDARD, \
+ .perm = perms, \
+ .subject_id = KEY_ACE_OWNER \
+ }
+
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* key reference with possession attribute handling
struct rw_semaphore sem; /* change vs change sem */
struct key_user *user; /* owner of this key */
void *security; /* security data for this key */
+ struct key_acl __rcu *acl;
union {
time64_t expiry; /* time at which key expires (or 0) */
time64_t revoked_at; /* time at which key was revoked */
time64_t last_used_at; /* last time used for LRU keyring discard */
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
- key_perm_t perm; /* access permissions */
unsigned short quotalen; /* length added to quota */
unsigned short datalen; /* payload data length
* - may not match RCU dereferenced payload
#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 7 /* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */
#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP 8 /* set if key should not be removed */
#define KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING 9 /* set if key is a user or user session keyring */
+#define KEY_FLAG_HAS_ACL 10 /* Set if KEYCTL_SETACL called on key */
/* the key type and key description string
* - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria
const char *desc,
kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
const struct cred *cred,
- key_perm_t perm,
+ struct key_acl *acl,
unsigned long flags,
struct key_restriction *restrict_link);
extern struct key *request_key_tag(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
struct key_tag *domain_tag,
- const char *callout_info);
+ const char *callout_info,
+ struct key_acl *acl);
extern struct key *request_key_rcu(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
struct key_tag *domain_tag,
const void *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
- void *aux);
+ void *aux,
+ struct key_acl *acl);
/**
* request_key - Request a key and wait for construction
* @type: Type of key.
* @description: The searchable description of the key.
* @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).
+ * @acl: The ACL to attach to a new key (or NULL).
*
* As for request_key_tag(), but with the default global domain tag.
*/
static inline struct key *request_key(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
- const char *callout_info)
+ const char *callout_info,
+ struct key_acl *acl)
{
- return request_key_tag(type, description, NULL, callout_info);
+ return request_key_tag(type, description, NULL, callout_info, acl);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NET
* @description: The searchable description of the key.
* @net: The network namespace that is the key's domain of operation.
* @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).
+ * @acl: The ACL to attach to a new key (or NULL).
*
* As for request_key() except that it does not add the returned key to a
* keyring if found, new keys are always allocated in the user's quota, the
* Furthermore, it then works as wait_for_key_construction() to wait for the
* completion of keys undergoing construction with a non-interruptible wait.
*/
-#define request_key_net(type, description, net, callout_info) \
- request_key_tag(type, description, net->key_domain, callout_info);
+#define request_key_net(type, description, net, callout_info, acl) \
+ request_key_tag(type, description, net->key_domain, callout_info, acl);
#endif /* CONFIG_NET */
extern int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr);
const char *description,
const void *payload,
size_t plen,
- key_perm_t perm,
+ struct key_acl *acl,
unsigned long flags);
extern int key_update(key_ref_t key,
extern struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
const struct cred *cred,
- key_perm_t perm,
+ struct key_acl *acl,
unsigned long flags,
struct key_restriction *restrict_link,
struct key *dest);
extern void key_set_timeout(struct key *, unsigned);
extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long flags,
- key_perm_t perm);
+ u32 desired_perm);
extern void key_free_user_ns(struct user_namespace *);
/*
* The permissions required on a key that we're looking up.
*/
-#define KEY_NEED_VIEW 0x01 /* Require permission to view attributes */
-#define KEY_NEED_READ 0x02 /* Require permission to read content */
-#define KEY_NEED_WRITE 0x04 /* Require permission to update / modify */
-#define KEY_NEED_SEARCH 0x08 /* Require permission to search (keyring) or find (key) */
-#define KEY_NEED_LINK 0x10 /* Require permission to link */
-#define KEY_NEED_SETATTR 0x20 /* Require permission to change attributes */
-#define KEY_NEED_ALL 0x3f /* All the above permissions */
+#define KEY_NEED_VIEW 0x001 /* Require permission to view attributes */
+#define KEY_NEED_READ 0x002 /* Require permission to read content */
+#define KEY_NEED_WRITE 0x004 /* Require permission to update / modify */
+#define KEY_NEED_SEARCH 0x008 /* Require permission to search (keyring) or find (key) */
+#define KEY_NEED_LINK 0x010 /* Require permission to link */
+#define KEY_NEED_SETSEC 0x020 /* Require permission to set owner, group, ACL */
+#define KEY_NEED_INVAL 0x040 /* Require permission to invalidate key */
+#define KEY_NEED_REVOKE 0x080 /* Require permission to revoke key */
+#define KEY_NEED_JOIN 0x100 /* Require permission to join keyring as session */
+#define KEY_NEED_CLEAR 0x200 /* Require permission to clear a keyring */
+#define KEY_NEED_ALL 0x3ff
+
+#define OLD_KEY_NEED_SETATTR 0x20 /* Used to be Require permission to change attributes */
+
+extern struct key_acl internal_key_acl;
+extern struct key_acl internal_keyring_acl;
+extern struct key_acl internal_writable_keyring_acl;
static inline short key_read_state(const struct key *key)
{
#include <linux/types.h>
+/*
+ * Keyring permission grant definitions
+ */
+enum key_ace_subject_type {
+ KEY_ACE_SUBJ_STANDARD = 0, /* subject is one of key_ace_standard_subject */
+ nr__key_ace_subject_type
+};
+
+enum key_ace_standard_subject {
+ KEY_ACE_EVERYONE = 0, /* Everyone, including owner and group */
+ KEY_ACE_GROUP = 1, /* The key's group */
+ KEY_ACE_OWNER = 2, /* The owner of the key */
+ KEY_ACE_POSSESSOR = 3, /* Any process that possesses of the key */
+ nr__key_ace_standard_subject
+};
+
+#define KEY_ACE_VIEW 0x00000001 /* Can describe the key */
+#define KEY_ACE_READ 0x00000002 /* Can read the key content */
+#define KEY_ACE_WRITE 0x00000004 /* Can update/modify the key content */
+#define KEY_ACE_SEARCH 0x00000008 /* Can find the key by search */
+#define KEY_ACE_LINK 0x00000010 /* Can make a link to the key */
+#define KEY_ACE_SET_SECURITY 0x00000020 /* Can set owner, group, ACL */
+#define KEY_ACE_INVAL 0x00000040 /* Can invalidate the key */
+#define KEY_ACE_REVOKE 0x00000080 /* Can revoke the key */
+#define KEY_ACE_JOIN 0x00000100 /* Can join keyring */
+#define KEY_ACE_CLEAR 0x00000200 /* Can clear keyring */
+#define KEY_ACE__PERMS 0xffffffff
+
+/*
+ * Old-style permissions mask, deprecated in favour of ACL.
+ */
+#define KEY_POS_VIEW 0x01000000 /* possessor can view a key's attributes */
+#define KEY_POS_READ 0x02000000 /* possessor can read key payload / view keyring */
+#define KEY_POS_WRITE 0x04000000 /* possessor can update key payload / add link to keyring */
+#define KEY_POS_SEARCH 0x08000000 /* possessor can find a key in search / search a keyring */
+#define KEY_POS_LINK 0x10000000 /* possessor can create a link to a key/keyring */
+#define KEY_POS_SETATTR 0x20000000 /* possessor can set key attributes */
+#define KEY_POS_ALL 0x3f000000
+
+#define KEY_USR_VIEW 0x00010000 /* user permissions... */
+#define KEY_USR_READ 0x00020000
+#define KEY_USR_WRITE 0x00040000
+#define KEY_USR_SEARCH 0x00080000
+#define KEY_USR_LINK 0x00100000
+#define KEY_USR_SETATTR 0x00200000
+#define KEY_USR_ALL 0x003f0000
+
+#define KEY_GRP_VIEW 0x00000100 /* group permissions... */
+#define KEY_GRP_READ 0x00000200
+#define KEY_GRP_WRITE 0x00000400
+#define KEY_GRP_SEARCH 0x00000800
+#define KEY_GRP_LINK 0x00001000
+#define KEY_GRP_SETATTR 0x00002000
+#define KEY_GRP_ALL 0x00003f00
+
+#define KEY_OTH_VIEW 0x00000001 /* third party permissions... */
+#define KEY_OTH_READ 0x00000002
+#define KEY_OTH_WRITE 0x00000004
+#define KEY_OTH_SEARCH 0x00000008
+#define KEY_OTH_LINK 0x00000010
+#define KEY_OTH_SETATTR 0x00000020
+#define KEY_OTH_ALL 0x0000003f
+
/* special process keyring shortcut IDs */
#define KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING -1 /* - key ID for thread-specific keyring */
#define KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING -2 /* - key ID for process-specific keyring */
else
key = key_ref_to_ptr(kref);
} else {
- key = request_key(&key_type_user, name, NULL);
+ key = request_key(&key_type_user, name, NULL, NULL);
}
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
pr_err("key not found, id: %s\n", name);
int err = 0;
struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey;
- ukey = request_key(&key_type_ceph, name, NULL);
+ ukey = request_key(&key_type_ceph, name, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(ukey)) {
/* request_key errors don't map nicely to mount(2)
errors; don't even try, but still printk */
#define DNS_ERRORNO_OPTION "dnserror"
+static struct key_acl dns_keyring_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_WRITE),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ | KEY_ACE_CLEAR),
+ }
+};
+
/*
* Preparse instantiation data for a dns_resolver key.
*
keyring = keyring_alloc(".dns_resolver",
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
- (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
+ &dns_keyring_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
#include "internal.h"
+static struct key_acl dns_key_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .possessor_viewable = true,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_READ),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_INVAL),
+ }
+};
+
/**
* dns_query - Query the DNS
* @net: The network namespace to operate in.
* add_key() to preinstall malicious redirections
*/
saved_cred = override_creds(dns_resolver_cache);
- rkey = request_key_net(&key_type_dns_resolver, desc, net, options);
+ rkey = request_key_net(&key_type_dns_resolver, desc, net, options,
+ &dns_key_acl);
revert_creds(saved_cred);
kfree(desc);
if (IS_ERR(rkey)) {
down_read(&rkey->sem);
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL, &rkey->flags);
- rkey->perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
-
ret = key_validate(rkey);
if (ret < 0)
goto put;
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include "ar-internal.h"
+static struct key_acl rxrpc_null_key_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 1,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_READ),
+ }
+};
+
static int rxrpc_vet_description_s(const char *);
static int rxrpc_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
static int rxrpc_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
if (IS_ERR(description))
return PTR_ERR(description);
- key = request_key_net(&key_type_rxrpc, description, sock_net(&rx->sk), NULL);
+ key = request_key_net(&key_type_rxrpc, description, sock_net(&rx->sk),
+ NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
kfree(description);
_leave(" = %ld", PTR_ERR(key));
if (IS_ERR(description))
return PTR_ERR(description);
- key = request_key_net(&key_type_keyring, description, sock_net(&rx->sk), NULL);
+ key = request_key_net(&key_type_keyring, description, sock_net(&rx->sk),
+ NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
kfree(description);
_leave(" = %ld", PTR_ERR(key));
_enter("");
key = key_alloc(&key_type_rxrpc, "x",
- GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred, 0,
+ GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
+ &internal_key_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
_leave(" = -ENOMEM [alloc %ld]", PTR_ERR(key));
key = key_alloc(&key_type_rxrpc, keyname,
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
- KEY_POS_SEARCH, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ &rxrpc_null_key_acl, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key))
return key;
key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(builtin_regdb_keys, 1),
"asymmetric", NULL, p, plen,
- ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+ &internal_key_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN |
KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);
builtin_regdb_keys =
keyring_alloc(".builtin_regdb_keys",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
- ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
+ &internal_keyring_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(builtin_regdb_keys))
return PTR_ERR(builtin_regdb_keys);
if (!keyring[id]) {
keyring[id] =
- request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
+ request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id],
+ NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static int __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, key_perm_t perm,
+static int __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, struct key_acl *acl,
struct key_restriction *restriction)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int err = 0;
keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
- KGIDT_INIT(0), cred, perm,
+ KGIDT_INIT(0), cred, acl,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, restriction, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
{
struct key_restriction *restriction;
- key_perm_t perm;
-
- perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW
- | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH;
+ struct key_acl *acl = &internal_keyring_acl;
if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM) {
restriction = NULL;
return -ENOMEM;
restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
- perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;
+ acl = &internal_writable_keyring_acl;
out:
- return __integrity_init_keyring(id, perm, restriction);
+ return __integrity_init_keyring(id, acl, restriction);
}
-int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data,
- off_t size, key_perm_t perm)
+static int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data,
+ off_t size, struct key_acl *acl)
{
key_ref_t key;
int rc = 0;
return -EINVAL;
key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1), "asymmetric",
- NULL, data, size, perm,
+ NULL, data, size, acl ?: &internal_key_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(key);
void *data;
loff_t size;
int rc;
- key_perm_t perm;
rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0,
READING_X509_CERTIFICATE);
return rc;
}
- perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ;
-
pr_info("Loading X.509 certificate: %s\n", path);
- rc = integrity_add_key(id, (const void *)data, size, perm);
+ rc = integrity_add_key(id, data, size, NULL);
vfree(data);
return rc;
}
int __init integrity_load_cert(const unsigned int id, const char *source,
- const void *data, size_t len, key_perm_t perm)
+ const void *data, size_t len, struct key_acl *acl)
{
if (!data)
return -EINVAL;
pr_info("Loading X.509 certificate: %s\n", source);
- return integrity_add_key(id, data, len, perm);
+ return integrity_add_key(id, data, len, acl);
}
else
key = key_ref_to_ptr(kref);
} else {
- key = request_key(&key_type_asymmetric, name, NULL);
+ key = request_key(&key_type_asymmetric, name, NULL, NULL);
}
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
int rc;
- evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL);
+ evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(evm_key))
return -ENOENT;
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+static struct key_acl integrity_blacklist_keyring_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_WRITE),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ | KEY_ACE_WRITE | KEY_ACE_SEARCH),
+ }
+};
+
struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring;
/*
ima_blacklist_keyring = keyring_alloc(".ima_blacklist",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
- (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
- KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH,
+ &integrity_blacklist_keyring_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
restriction, NULL);
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+struct key_acl;
+
/* iint action cache flags */
#define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001
#define IMA_MEASURED 0x00000002
int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path);
int __init integrity_load_cert(const unsigned int id, const char *source,
- const void *data, size_t len, key_perm_t perm);
+ const void *data, size_t len, struct key_acl *acl);
#else
static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
static inline int __init integrity_load_cert(const unsigned int id,
const char *source,
const void *data, size_t len,
- key_perm_t perm)
+ struct key_acl *acl)
{
return 0;
}
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "../integrity.h"
+static struct key_acl platform_key_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_READ),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW),
+ }
+};
+
/**
* add_to_platform_keyring - Add to platform keyring without validation.
* @source: Source of key
void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source, const void *data,
size_t len)
{
- key_perm_t perm;
int rc;
- perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW;
-
rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, source, data, len,
- perm);
+ &platform_key_acl);
if (rc)
pr_info("Error adding keys to platform keyring %s\n", source);
}
const struct user_key_payload *upayload;
struct key *ukey;
- ukey = request_key(&key_type_user, master_desc, NULL);
+ ukey = request_key(&key_type_user, master_desc, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(ukey))
goto error;
struct trusted_key_payload *tpayload;
struct key *tkey;
- tkey = request_key(&key_type_trusted, trusted_desc, NULL);
+ tkey = request_key(&key_type_trusted, trusted_desc, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(tkey))
goto error;
key_user_put(key->user);
key_put_tag(key->domain_tag);
+ key_put_acl(rcu_access_pointer(key->acl));
kfree(key->description);
memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(*key));
if (key->type == key_gc_dead_keytype) {
gc_state |= KEY_GC_FOUND_DEAD_KEY;
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags);
- key->perm = 0;
goto skip_dead_key;
} else if (key->type == &key_type_keyring &&
key->restrict_link) {
extern spinlock_t key_serial_lock;
extern struct mutex key_construction_mutex;
extern wait_queue_head_t request_key_conswq;
+extern struct key_acl default_key_acl;
+extern struct key_acl joinable_keyring_acl;
extern void key_set_index_key(struct keyring_index_key *index_key);
+
extern struct key_type *key_type_lookup(const char *type);
extern void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype);
const void *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
void *aux,
+ struct key_acl *acl,
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags);
extern int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
- key_perm_t perm);
+ u32 desired_perm);
+extern unsigned int key_acl_to_perm(const struct key_acl *acl);
+extern long key_set_acl(struct key *key, struct key_acl *acl);
+extern void key_put_acl(struct key_acl *acl);
/*
* Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way.
const char __user *, key_serial_t);
extern long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t, char __user *, size_t);
extern long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t, uid_t, gid_t);
-extern long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t, key_perm_t);
+extern long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t, unsigned int);
extern long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t, const void __user *,
size_t, key_serial_t);
extern long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t, unsigned, key_serial_t);
* @uid: The owner of the new key.
* @gid: The group ID for the new key's group permissions.
* @cred: The credentials specifying UID namespace.
- * @perm: The permissions mask of the new key.
+ * @acl: The ACL to attach to the new key.
* @flags: Flags specifying quota properties.
* @restrict_link: Optional link restriction for new keyrings.
*
*/
struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, const struct cred *cred,
- key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags,
+ struct key_acl *acl, unsigned long flags,
struct key_restriction *restrict_link)
{
struct key_user *user = NULL;
desclen = strlen(desc);
quotalen = desclen + 1 + type->def_datalen;
+ if (!acl)
+ acl = &default_key_acl;
+
/* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
user = key_user_lookup(uid);
if (!user)
key->datalen = type->def_datalen;
key->uid = uid;
key->gid = gid;
- key->perm = perm;
+ refcount_inc(&acl->usage);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(key->acl, acl);
key->restrict_link = restrict_link;
key->last_used_at = ktime_get_real_seconds();
* @description: The searchable description for the key.
* @payload: The data to use to instantiate or update the key.
* @plen: The length of @payload.
- * @perm: The permissions mask for a new key.
+ * @acl: The ACL to attach if a key is created.
* @flags: The quota flags for a new key.
*
* Search the destination keyring for a key of the same description and if one
const char *description,
const void *payload,
size_t plen,
- key_perm_t perm,
+ struct key_acl *acl,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct keyring_index_key index_key = {
goto found_matching_key;
}
- /* if the client doesn't provide, decide on the permissions we want */
- if (perm == KEY_PERM_UNDEF) {
- perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
- perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
-
- if (index_key.type->read)
- perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
-
- if (index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||
- index_key.type->update)
- perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
- }
-
/* allocate a new key */
key = key_alloc(index_key.type, index_key.description,
- cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, perm, flags, NULL);
+ cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, acl, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
goto error_link_end;
/* create or update the requested key and add it to the target
* keyring */
key_ref = key_create_or_update(keyring_ref, type, description,
- payload, plen, KEY_PERM_UNDEF,
- KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
+ payload, plen, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
key_ref_put(key_ref);
/* do the search */
key = request_key_and_link(ktype, description, NULL, callout_info,
- callout_len, NULL, key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref),
+ callout_len, NULL, NULL,
+ key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref),
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key);
struct key *key;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_REVOKE);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
- if (ret != -EACCES)
- goto error;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
- if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
- goto error;
- }
+ goto error;
}
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
kenter("%d", id);
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_INVAL);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
struct key *keyring;
long ret;
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_CLEAR);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
size_t buflen)
{
struct key *key, *instkey;
+ unsigned int perm;
key_ref_t key_ref;
char *infobuf;
long ret;
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
desclen = strlen(key->description);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ perm = key_acl_to_perm(rcu_dereference(key->acl));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
/* calculate how much information we're going to return */
ret = -ENOMEM;
infobuf = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL,
key->type->name,
from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->uid),
from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->gid),
- key->perm);
+ perm);
if (!infobuf)
goto error2;
infolen = strlen(infobuf);
goto error;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
- KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
+ KEY_NEED_SETSEC);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
* the key need not be fully instantiated yet. If the caller does not have
* sysadmin capability, it may only change the permission on keys that it owns.
*/
-long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
+long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned int perm)
{
+ struct key_acl *acl;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
+ int nr, i, j;
- ret = -EINVAL;
if (perm & ~(KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL | KEY_GRP_ALL | KEY_OTH_ALL))
- goto error;
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ nr = 0;
+ if (perm & KEY_POS_ALL) nr++;
+ if (perm & KEY_USR_ALL) nr++;
+ if (perm & KEY_GRP_ALL) nr++;
+ if (perm & KEY_OTH_ALL) nr++;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
- KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
+ KEY_NEED_SETSEC);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
- /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chmod races */
- ret = -EACCES;
- down_write(&key->sem);
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_HAS_ACL, &key->flags))
+ goto error_key;
- /* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
- if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid())) {
- key->perm = perm;
- ret = 0;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ acl = kzalloc(struct_size(acl, aces, nr), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!acl)
+ goto error_key;
+
+ refcount_set(&acl->usage, 1);
+ acl->nr_ace = nr;
+ j = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+ struct key_ace *ace = &acl->aces[j];
+ unsigned int subset = (perm >> (i * 8)) & KEY_OTH_ALL;
+
+ if (!subset)
+ continue;
+ ace->type = KEY_ACE_SUBJ_STANDARD;
+ ace->subject_id = KEY_ACE_EVERYONE + i;
+ ace->perm = subset;
+ if (subset & (KEY_OTH_WRITE | KEY_OTH_SETATTR))
+ ace->perm |= KEY_ACE_REVOKE;
+ if (subset & KEY_OTH_SEARCH)
+ ace->perm |= KEY_ACE_INVAL;
+ if (key->type == &key_type_keyring) {
+ if (subset & KEY_OTH_SEARCH)
+ ace->perm |= KEY_ACE_JOIN;
+ if (subset & KEY_OTH_WRITE)
+ ace->perm |= KEY_ACE_CLEAR;
+ }
+ j++;
}
+ /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chmod races */
+ down_write(&key->sem);
+ ret = key_set_acl(key, acl);
up_write(&key->sem);
+error_key:
key_put(key);
error:
return ret;
long ret;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
- KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
+ KEY_NEED_SETSEC);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
/* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted
* if we have the authorisation token handy */
* Attempt to install the calling process's session keyring on the process's
* parent process.
*
- * The keyring must exist and must grant the caller LINK permission, and the
+ * The keyring must exist and must grant the caller JOIN permission, and the
* parent process must be single-threaded and must have the same effective
* ownership as this process and mustn't be SUID/SGID.
*
struct cred *cred;
int ret;
- keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_NEED_LINK);
+ keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_NEED_JOIN);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
char *restriction = NULL;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SETSEC);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
case KEYCTL_SETPERM:
return keyctl_setperm_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
- (key_perm_t) arg3);
+ (unsigned int)arg3);
case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE:
return keyctl_instantiate_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
return ret;
}
-/*
- * Allocate a keyring and link into the destination keyring.
+/**
+ * keyring_alloc - Allocate a keyring and link into the destination
+ * @description: The key description to allow the key to be searched out.
+ * @uid: The owner of the new key.
+ * @gid: The group ID for the new key's group permissions.
+ * @cred: The credentials specifying UID namespace.
+ * @acl: The ACL to attach to the new key.
+ * @flags: Flags specifying quota properties.
+ * @restrict_link: Optional link restriction for new keyrings.
+ * @dest: Destination keyring.
*/
struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
- const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct key_acl *acl,
unsigned long flags,
struct key_restriction *restrict_link,
struct key *dest)
int ret;
keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, description,
- uid, gid, cred, perm, flags, restrict_link);
+ uid, gid, cred, acl, flags, restrict_link);
if (!IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, dest, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
/*
* Find a keyring with the specified name.
*
- * Only keyrings that have nonzero refcount, are not revoked, and are owned by a
- * user in the current user namespace are considered. If @uid_keyring is %true,
- * the keyring additionally must have been allocated as a user or user session
- * keyring; otherwise, it must grant Search permission directly to the caller.
+ * Only keyrings that have nonzero refcount, are not revoked, and are owned by
+ * a user in the current user namespace are considered. If @uid_keyring is
+ * %true, the keyring additionally must have been allocated as a user or user
+ * session keyring; otherwise, it must grant JOIN permission directly to the
+ * caller (ie. not through possession).
*
* Returns a pointer to the keyring with the keyring's refcount having being
* incremented on success. -ENOKEY is returned if a key could not be found.
continue;
} else {
if (key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
- KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
+ KEY_NEED_JOIN) < 0)
continue;
}
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include "internal.h"
+struct key_acl default_key_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .possessor_viewable = true,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE__PERMS & ~KEY_ACE_JOIN),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW),
+ }
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(default_key_acl);
+
+struct key_acl joinable_keyring_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .possessor_viewable = true,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE__PERMS & ~KEY_ACE_JOIN),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ | KEY_ACE_LINK | KEY_ACE_JOIN),
+ }
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(joinable_keyring_acl);
+
+struct key_acl internal_key_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_SEARCH),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ | KEY_ACE_SEARCH),
+ }
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(internal_key_acl);
+
+struct key_acl internal_keyring_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_SEARCH),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ | KEY_ACE_SEARCH),
+ }
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(internal_keyring_acl);
+
+struct key_acl internal_writable_keyring_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_WRITE),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ | KEY_ACE_WRITE | KEY_ACE_SEARCH),
+ }
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(internal_writable_keyring_acl);
+
/**
* key_task_permission - Check a key can be used
* @key_ref: The key to check.
* @cred: The credentials to use.
- * @perm: The permissions to check for.
+ * @desired_perm: The permission to check for.
*
* Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way,
* but permit the security modules to override.
* permissions bits or the LSM check.
*/
int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
- unsigned perm)
+ unsigned int desired_perm)
{
- struct key *key;
- key_perm_t kperm;
- int ret;
+ const struct key_acl *acl;
+ const struct key *key;
+ unsigned int allow = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(KEY_NEED_VIEW != KEY_ACE_VIEW ||
+ KEY_NEED_READ != KEY_ACE_READ ||
+ KEY_NEED_WRITE != KEY_ACE_WRITE ||
+ KEY_NEED_SEARCH != KEY_ACE_SEARCH ||
+ KEY_NEED_LINK != KEY_ACE_LINK ||
+ KEY_NEED_SETSEC != KEY_ACE_SET_SECURITY ||
+ KEY_NEED_INVAL != KEY_ACE_INVAL ||
+ KEY_NEED_REVOKE != KEY_ACE_REVOKE ||
+ KEY_NEED_JOIN != KEY_ACE_JOIN ||
+ KEY_NEED_CLEAR != KEY_ACE_CLEAR);
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
- /* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */
- if (uid_eq(key->uid, cred->fsuid)) {
- kperm = key->perm >> 16;
- goto use_these_perms;
- }
+ rcu_read_lock();
- /* use the third 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller has a group
- * membership in common with */
- if (gid_valid(key->gid) && key->perm & KEY_GRP_ALL) {
- if (gid_eq(key->gid, cred->fsgid)) {
- kperm = key->perm >> 8;
- goto use_these_perms;
- }
+ acl = rcu_dereference(key->acl);
+ if (!acl || acl->nr_ace == 0)
+ goto no_access_rcu;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < acl->nr_ace; i++) {
+ const struct key_ace *ace = &acl->aces[i];
- ret = groups_search(cred->group_info, key->gid);
- if (ret) {
- kperm = key->perm >> 8;
- goto use_these_perms;
+ switch (ace->type) {
+ case KEY_ACE_SUBJ_STANDARD:
+ switch (ace->subject_id) {
+ case KEY_ACE_POSSESSOR:
+ if (is_key_possessed(key_ref))
+ allow |= ace->perm;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ACE_OWNER:
+ if (uid_eq(key->uid, cred->fsuid))
+ allow |= ace->perm;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ACE_GROUP:
+ if (gid_valid(key->gid)) {
+ if (gid_eq(key->gid, cred->fsgid))
+ allow |= ace->perm;
+ else if (groups_search(cred->group_info, key->gid))
+ allow |= ace->perm;
+ }
+ break;
+ case KEY_ACE_EVERYONE:
+ allow |= ace->perm;
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
}
}
- /* otherwise use the least-significant 8-bits */
- kperm = key->perm;
-
-use_these_perms:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
- /* use the top 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller possesses
- * - possessor permissions are additive with other permissions
- */
- if (is_key_possessed(key_ref))
- kperm |= key->perm >> 24;
+ if (!(allow & desired_perm))
+ goto no_access;
- kperm = kperm & perm & KEY_NEED_ALL;
+ return security_key_permission(key_ref, cred, desired_perm);
- if (kperm != perm)
- return -EACCES;
-
- /* let LSM be the final arbiter */
- return security_key_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
+no_access_rcu:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+no_access:
+ return -EACCES;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_task_permission);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_validate);
+
+/*
+ * Roughly render an ACL to an old-style permissions mask. We cannot
+ * accurately render what the ACL, particularly if it has ACEs that represent
+ * subjects outside of { poss, user, group, other }.
+ */
+unsigned int key_acl_to_perm(const struct key_acl *acl)
+{
+ unsigned int perm = 0, tperm;
+ int i;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(KEY_OTH_VIEW != KEY_ACE_VIEW ||
+ KEY_OTH_READ != KEY_ACE_READ ||
+ KEY_OTH_WRITE != KEY_ACE_WRITE ||
+ KEY_OTH_SEARCH != KEY_ACE_SEARCH ||
+ KEY_OTH_LINK != KEY_ACE_LINK ||
+ KEY_OTH_SETATTR != KEY_ACE_SET_SECURITY);
+
+ if (!acl || acl->nr_ace == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < acl->nr_ace; i++) {
+ const struct key_ace *ace = &acl->aces[i];
+
+ switch (ace->type) {
+ case KEY_ACE_SUBJ_STANDARD:
+ tperm = ace->perm & KEY_OTH_ALL;
+
+ /* Invalidation and joining were allowed by SEARCH */
+ if (ace->perm & (KEY_ACE_INVAL | KEY_ACE_JOIN))
+ tperm |= KEY_OTH_SEARCH;
+
+ /* Revocation was allowed by either SETATTR or WRITE */
+ if ((ace->perm & KEY_ACE_REVOKE) && !(tperm & KEY_OTH_SETATTR))
+ tperm |= KEY_OTH_WRITE;
+
+ /* Clearing was allowed by WRITE */
+ if (ace->perm & KEY_ACE_CLEAR)
+ tperm |= KEY_OTH_WRITE;
+
+ switch (ace->subject_id) {
+ case KEY_ACE_POSSESSOR:
+ perm |= tperm << 24;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ACE_OWNER:
+ perm |= tperm << 16;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ACE_GROUP:
+ perm |= tperm << 8;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ACE_EVERYONE:
+ perm |= tperm << 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return perm;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy a key's ACL.
+ */
+void key_put_acl(struct key_acl *acl)
+{
+ if (acl && refcount_dec_and_test(&acl->usage))
+ kfree_rcu(acl, rcu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Try to set the ACL. This either attaches or discards the proposed ACL.
+ */
+long key_set_acl(struct key *key, struct key_acl *acl)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* If we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own. */
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid())) {
+ key_put_acl(acl);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < acl->nr_ace; i++) {
+ const struct key_ace *ace = &acl->aces[i];
+ if (ace->type == KEY_ACE_SUBJ_STANDARD &&
+ ace->subject_id == KEY_ACE_POSSESSOR) {
+ if (ace->perm & KEY_ACE_VIEW)
+ acl->possessor_viewable = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rcu_swap_protected(key->acl, acl, lockdep_is_held(&key->sem));
+ key_put_acl(acl);
+ return 0;
+}
unsigned persistent_keyring_expiry = 3 * 24 * 3600; /* Expire after 3 days of non-use */
+static struct key_acl persistent_register_keyring_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_WRITE),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ),
+ }
+};
+
+static struct key_acl persistent_keyring_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .possessor_viewable = true,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ | KEY_ACE_WRITE |
+ KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_LINK |
+ KEY_ACE_CLEAR | KEY_ACE_INVAL),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ),
+ }
+};
+
/*
* Create the persistent keyring register for the current user namespace.
*
struct key *reg = keyring_alloc(".persistent_register",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
current_cred(),
- ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+ &persistent_register_keyring_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(reg))
return PTR_ERR(reg);
persistent = keyring_alloc(index_key->description,
uid, INVALID_GID, current_cred(),
- ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+ &persistent_keyring_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL,
ns->persistent_keyring_register);
if (IS_ERR(persistent))
}
static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
+ __acquires(rcu)
__acquires(key_serial_lock)
{
key_serial_t pos = *_pos;
struct key *key;
+ rcu_read_lock();
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
if (*_pos > INT_MAX)
static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
__releases(key_serial_lock)
+ __releases(rcu)
{
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
}
static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
+ const struct key_acl *acl;
struct rb_node *_p = v;
struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);
unsigned long flags;
time64_t now, expiry;
char xbuf[16];
short state;
+ bool check_pos;
u64 timo;
int rc;
KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE),
};
- key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
+ acl = rcu_dereference(key->acl);
+ check_pos = acl->possessor_viewable;
/* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can
* skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it
*/
- if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {
- rcu_read_lock();
+ key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
+ if (check_pos) {
skey_ref = search_cred_keyrings_rcu(&ctx);
- rcu_read_unlock();
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_ref_put(skey_ref);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */
rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
if (rc < 0)
- return 0;
+ goto out;
now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
- rcu_read_lock();
-
/* come up with a suitable timeout value */
expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry);
if (expiry == 0) {
showflag(flags, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED),
refcount_read(&key->usage),
xbuf,
- key->perm,
+ key_acl_to_perm(acl),
from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->uid),
from_kgid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->gid),
key->type->name);
key->type->describe(key, m);
seq_putc(m, '\n');
- rcu_read_unlock();
+out:
return 0;
}
.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
};
+static struct key_acl user_reg_keyring_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .possessor_viewable = true,
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_WRITE | KEY_ACE_SEARCH),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ),
+ }
+};
+
+static struct key_acl user_keyring_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .possessor_viewable = true,
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ | KEY_ACE_WRITE |
+ KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_LINK),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE__PERMS & ~(KEY_ACE_JOIN | KEY_ACE_SET_SECURITY)),
+ }
+};
+
+static struct key_acl session_keyring_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .possessor_viewable = true,
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE__PERMS & ~KEY_ACE_JOIN),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ),
+ }
+};
+
+static struct key_acl thread_and_process_keyring_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .possessor_viewable = true,
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE__PERMS & ~(KEY_ACE_JOIN | KEY_ACE_SET_SECURITY)),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW),
+ }
+};
+
/*
* Get or create a user register keyring.
*/
if (!reg_keyring) {
reg_keyring = keyring_alloc(".user_reg",
user_ns->owner, INVALID_GID,
- &init_cred,
- KEY_POS_WRITE | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
- 0,
- NULL, NULL);
+ &init_cred, &user_reg_keyring_acl,
+ 0, NULL, NULL);
if (!IS_ERR(reg_keyring))
smp_store_release(&user_ns->user_keyring_register,
reg_keyring);
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
struct key *reg_keyring, *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
- key_perm_t user_keyring_perm;
key_ref_t uid_keyring_r, session_keyring_r;
uid_t uid = from_kuid(user_ns, cred->user->uid);
char buf[20];
int ret;
- user_keyring_perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL;
-
kenter("%u", uid);
reg_keyring = get_user_register(user_ns);
kdebug("_uid %p", uid_keyring_r);
if (uid_keyring_r == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN)) {
uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, cred->user->uid, INVALID_GID,
- cred, user_keyring_perm,
+ cred, &user_keyring_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, reg_keyring);
kdebug("_uid_ses %p", session_keyring_r);
if (session_keyring_r == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN)) {
session_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, cred->user->uid, INVALID_GID,
- cred, user_keyring_perm,
+ cred, &user_keyring_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, NULL);
return 0;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
- KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
+ &thread_and_process_keyring_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return 0;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
- KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
+ &thread_and_process_keyring_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid, cred,
- KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
- flags, NULL, NULL);
+ &session_keyring_acl, flags, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
} else {
* returned key reference.
*/
key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
- key_perm_t perm)
+ unsigned int desired_perm)
{
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed,
case -ERESTARTSYS:
goto invalid_key;
default:
- if (perm)
+ if (desired_perm)
goto invalid_key;
case 0:
break;
}
- } else if (perm) {
+ } else if (desired_perm) {
ret = key_validate(key);
if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
goto invalid_key;
/* check the permissions */
- ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, perm);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto invalid_key;
+ if (desired_perm) {
+ ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, desired_perm);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto invalid_key;
+ }
key->last_used_at = ktime_get_real_seconds();
if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
/* not found - try and create a new one */
keyring = keyring_alloc(
- name, old->uid, old->gid, old,
- KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK,
+ name, old->uid, old->gid, old, &joinable_keyring_acl,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
}
+ goto no_perm_test;
} else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
goto error3;
}
+ ret = key_task_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, false), old,
+ KEY_NEED_JOIN);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error3;
+
+no_perm_test:
/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
if (ret < 0)
cred = get_current_cred();
keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
- KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
- KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL, NULL);
+ NULL, KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL, NULL);
put_cred(cred);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags,
struct key_user *user,
+ struct key_acl *acl,
struct key **_key)
{
struct assoc_array_edit *edit = NULL;
struct key *key;
- key_perm_t perm;
key_ref_t key_ref;
int ret;
*_key = NULL;
mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);
- perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
- perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
- if (ctx->index_key.type->read)
- perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
- if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||
- ctx->index_key.type->update)
- perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
-
key = key_alloc(ctx->index_key.type, ctx->index_key.description,
ctx->cred->fsuid, ctx->cred->fsgid, ctx->cred,
- perm, flags, NULL);
+ acl, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key))
goto alloc_failed;
const char *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
void *aux,
+ struct key_acl *acl,
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags)
{
goto error_put_dest_keyring;
}
- ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);
+ ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, acl, &key);
key_user_put(user);
if (ret == 0) {
* @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).
* @callout_len: The length of callout_info.
* @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.
+ * @acl: The ACL to attach if a new key is created.
* @dest_keyring: Where to cache the key.
* @flags: Flags to key_alloc().
*
const void *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
void *aux,
+ struct key_acl *acl,
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags)
{
goto error_free;
key = construct_key_and_link(&ctx, callout_info, callout_len,
- aux, dest_keyring, flags);
+ aux, acl, dest_keyring, flags);
}
error_free:
* @description: The searchable description of the key.
* @domain_tag: The domain in which the key operates.
* @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).
+ * @acl: The ACL to attach if a new key is created.
*
* As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key
* to a keyring if found, new keys are always allocated in the user's quota,
struct key *request_key_tag(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
struct key_tag *domain_tag,
- const char *callout_info)
+ const char *callout_info,
+ struct key_acl *acl)
{
struct key *key;
size_t callout_len = 0;
callout_len = strlen(callout_info);
key = request_key_and_link(type, description, domain_tag,
callout_info, callout_len,
- NULL, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
+ NULL, acl, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, false);
if (ret < 0) {
* @callout_info: The data to pass to the instantiation upcall (or NULL).
* @callout_len: The length of callout_info.
* @aux: Auxiliary data for the upcall.
+ * @acl: The ACL to attach if a new key is created.
*
* As for request_key_and_link() except that it does not add the returned key
* to a keyring if found and new keys are always allocated in the user's quota.
struct key_tag *domain_tag,
const void *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
- void *aux)
+ void *aux,
+ struct key_acl *acl)
{
struct key *key;
int ret;
key = request_key_and_link(type, description, domain_tag,
callout_info, callout_len,
- aux, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
+ aux, acl, NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, false);
if (ret < 0) {
static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);
static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t);
+static struct key_acl request_key_auth_acl = {
+ .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
+ .nr_ace = 2,
+ .possessor_viewable = true,
+ .aces = {
+ KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ | KEY_ACE_SEARCH |
+ KEY_ACE_LINK),
+ KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW),
+ }
+};
+
/*
* The request-key authorisation key type definition.
*/
authkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,
cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
- KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK |
- KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ &request_key_auth_acl,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
goto error_free_rka;
{
struct key *key;
struct key_security_struct *ksec;
+ unsigned oldstyle_perm;
u32 sid;
/* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
if (perm == 0)
return 0;
+ oldstyle_perm = perm & (KEY_NEED_VIEW | KEY_NEED_READ | KEY_NEED_WRITE |
+ KEY_NEED_SEARCH | KEY_NEED_LINK);
+ if (perm & KEY_NEED_SETSEC)
+ oldstyle_perm |= OLD_KEY_NEED_SETATTR;
+ if (perm & KEY_NEED_INVAL)
+ oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_SEARCH;
+ if (perm & KEY_NEED_REVOKE && !(perm & OLD_KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
+ oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_WRITE;
+ if (perm & KEY_NEED_JOIN)
+ oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_SEARCH;
+ if (perm & KEY_NEED_CLEAR)
+ oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_WRITE;
+
sid = cred_sid(cred);
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
ksec = key->security;
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
+ sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, oldstyle_perm, NULL);
}
static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#endif
if (perm & (KEY_NEED_READ | KEY_NEED_SEARCH | KEY_NEED_VIEW))
request |= MAY_READ;
- if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
+ if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETSEC |
+ KEY_NEED_INVAL | KEY_NEED_REVOKE | KEY_NEED_CLEAR))
request |= MAY_WRITE;
rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
projects / linux-platform-drivers-x86.git / commitdiff