For example, when mount opt is redundently specified
(e.g., "user=A,user=B,user=C"), kernel kept allocating new key/val
with kstrdup() and overwrite previous ptr (to be freed).
Althouhg mount.cifs in userspace performs a bit of sanitization
(e.g., forcing one user option), current implementation is not
robust. Other options such as iocharset and domainanme are similarly
vulnerable.
Signed-off-by: Taesoo Kim <tsgatesv@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
                                pr_warn("CIFS: username too long\n");
                                goto cifs_parse_mount_err;
                        }
+
+                       kfree(vol->username);
                        vol->username = kstrdup(string, GFP_KERNEL);
                        if (!vol->username)
                                goto cifs_parse_mount_err;
                                goto cifs_parse_mount_err;
                        }
 
+                       kfree(vol->domainname);
                        vol->domainname = kstrdup(string, GFP_KERNEL);
                        if (!vol->domainname) {
                                pr_warn("CIFS: no memory for domainname\n");
                        }
 
                         if (strncasecmp(string, "default", 7) != 0) {
+                               kfree(vol->iocharset);
                                vol->iocharset = kstrdup(string,
                                                         GFP_KERNEL);
                                if (!vol->iocharset) {