#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY
+/* Shut up about gnutls_sign_callback_set() being deprecated. We only use it
+ in the GnuTLS 2.12 case, and there just isn't another way of doing it. */
+#define GNUTLS_INTERNAL_BUILD 1
+#endif
+
#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
#include <gnutls/x509.h>
#include <gnutls/crypto.h>
return 0;
}
-#ifdef HAVE_TROUSERS
+/* In GnuTLS 2.12 this can't be a real private key; we have to use the sign_callback
+ instead. But we want to set the 'pkey' variable to *something* non-NULL in order
+ to indicate that we aren't just using an x509 key. */
+#define OPENCONNECT_TPM_PKEY ((void *)1UL)
+#ifdef HAVE_TROUSERS
/* TPM code based on client-tpm.c from Carolin Latze <latze@angry-red-pla.net>
and Tobias Soder */
static int tpm_sign_fn(gnutls_privkey_t key, void *_vpninfo,
}
return 0;
}
+static int sign_dummy_data(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, gnutls_privkey_t pkey,
+ const gnutls_datum_t *data, gnutls_datum_t *sig);
static int load_tpm_key(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, gnutls_datum_t *fdata, gnutls_privkey_t *pkey,
gnutls_datum_t *pkey_sig)
goto out_srkpol;
}
+#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY
gnutls_privkey_init(pkey);
/* This would be nicer if there was a destructor callback. I could
allocate a data structure with the TPM handles and the vpninfo
pointer, and destroy that properly when the key is destroyed. */
gnutls_privkey_import_ext(*pkey, GNUTLS_PK_RSA, vpninfo, tpm_sign_fn, NULL, 0);
+#else
+ *pkey = OPENCONNECT_TPM_PKEY;
+#endif
retry_sign:
- err = gnutls_privkey_sign_data(*pkey, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA1, 0, fdata, pkey_sig);
+ err = sign_dummy_data(vpninfo, *pkey, fdata, pkey_sig);
if (err == GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS) {
if (!vpninfo->tpm_key_policy) {
err = Tspi_Context_CreateObject(vpninfo->tpm_context,
free (asn1.data);
return -EIO;
}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY
+/* We *want* to use gnutls_privkey_import_ext() to create a privkey with our
+ own signing function tpm_sign_fn(). But GnuTLS 2.12 doesn't support that,
+ so instead we have to register this sign_callback function with the
+ *session* */
+static int gtls_tpm_sign_cb(gnutls_session_t sess, void *_vpninfo,
+ gnutls_certificate_type_t cert_type,
+ const gnutls_datum_t *cert, const gnutls_datum_t *data,
+ gnutls_datum_t *sig)
+{
+ struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = _vpninfo;
+
+ if (cert_type != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
+ return GNUTLS_E_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
+
+ return tpm_sign_fn(NULL, vpninfo, data, sig);
+}
+#endif /* !SET_KEY */
#endif /* HAVE_TROUSERS */
+#if defined (HAVE_P11KIT) || defined (HAVE_TROUSERS)
+/* We do a test signing of data, to check which certificate matches our key.
+ This helper does that with with gnutls_privkey_sign_data() in the sane
+ cases, or in the case of GnuTLS 2.12 with TPM it will generate the
+ appropriate BER-encoded hash and call our special TPM-signing function. */
+static int sign_dummy_data(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, gnutls_privkey_t pkey,
+ const gnutls_datum_t *data, gnutls_datum_t *sig)
+{
+#if defined (HAVE_TROUSERS) && !defined (GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY)
+ /* Actually the thing we care about is gnutls_privkey_import_ext()
+ not gnutls_certificate_set_key() — if we could create a privkey
+ to represent the TPM key, we wouldn't have to jump through these
+ hoops to reproduce what gnutls_privkey_sign_data() would have
+ done for us. But there's no point in a separate check for the
+ import_ext() function; it arrived with set_key() in GnuTLS 3.0 */
+
+ if (pkey == OPENCONNECT_TPM_PKEY) {
+ static const unsigned char ber_encode[15] = {
+ 0x30, 0x21, /* SEQUENCE, length 31 */
+ 0x30, 0x09, /* SEQUENCE, length 9 */
+ 0x06, 0x05, /* OBJECT_ID, length 5 */
+ 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* SHA1: 1.3.14.3.2.26 */
+ 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL (parameters) */
+ /* followed by the 20-byte sha1 */
+ };
+ gnutls_datum_t hash;
+ unsigned char digest[sizeof(ber_encode) + SHA1_SIZE];
+ size_t shalen = SHA1_SIZE;
+ int err;
+
+ err = gnutls_fingerprint(GNUTLS_DIG_SHA1, data,
+ &digest[sizeof(ber_encode)], &shalen);
+ if (err) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Failed to SHA1 input data for signing: %s\n"),
+ gnutls_strerror(err));
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(digest, ber_encode, sizeof(ber_encode));
+
+ hash.data = digest;
+ hash.size = sizeof(digest);
+
+ return tpm_sign_fn(NULL, vpninfo, &hash, sig);
+ }
+#endif
+ return gnutls_privkey_sign_data(pkey, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA1, 0, data, sig);
+}
+
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY
+/* For GnuTLS 2.12 even if we *have* a privkey (as we do for PKCS#11), we
+ can't register it. So we have to use the cert_callback function. This
+ just hands out the certificate chain we prepared in load_certificate().
+ If we have a pkey then return that too; otherwise leave the key NULL —
+ we'll also have registered a sign_callback for the session, which will
+ handle that. */
+static int gtls_cert_cb(gnutls_session_t sess, const gnutls_datum_t *req_ca_dn,
+ int nreqs, const gnutls_pk_algorithm_t *pk_algos,
+ int pk_algos_length, gnutls_retr2_st* st) {
+
+ struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = gnutls_session_get_ptr(sess);
+ int algo = GNUTLS_PK_RSA; /* TPM */
+ int i;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_P11KIT
+ if (vpninfo->my_p11key) {
+ st->key_type = GNUTLS_PRIVKEY_PKCS11;
+ st->key.pkcs11 = vpninfo->my_p11key;
+ algo = gnutls_pkcs11_privkey_get_pk_algorithm(vpninfo->my_p11key, NULL);
+ };
+#endif
+ for (i = 0; i < pk_algos_length; i++) {
+ if (algo == pk_algos[i])
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i == pk_algos_length)
+ return GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_PK_ALGORITHM;
+
+ st->cert_type = GNUTLS_CRT_X509;
+ st->cert.x509 = vpninfo->my_certs;
+ st->ncerts = vpninfo->nr_my_certs;
+ st->deinit_all = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !SET_KEY */
+#endif /* P11KIT || TROUSERS */
+
static int load_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
{
gnutls_datum_t fdata;
gnutls_x509_privkey_t key = NULL;
-#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY
+#if defined (HAVE_P11KIT) || defined (HAVE_TROUSERS)
gnutls_privkey_t pkey = NULL;
gnutls_datum_t pkey_sig = {NULL, 0};
void *dummy_hash_data = &load_certificate;
#ifdef HAVE_P11KIT
char *cert_url = (char *)vpninfo->cert;
char *key_url = (char *)vpninfo->sslkey;
+ gnutls_pkcs11_privkey_t p11key = NULL;
#endif
gnutls_x509_crl_t crl = NULL;
gnutls_x509_crt_t last_cert, cert = NULL;
/* Load certificate(s) first... */
#ifdef HAVE_P11KIT
-#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY
- if (key_is_p11) {
- /* With GnuTLS 2.12 we can't *see* the key so we can't
- do the expiry check or fill in intermediate CAs. */
- err = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(vpninfo->https_cred,
- cert_url, key_url,
- GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
- if (err) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Error loading PKCS#11 certificate: %s\n"),
- gnutls_strerror(err));
- ret = -EIO;
- goto out;
- }
- ret = 0;
- goto out;
- }
-#endif /* PKCS#11 for GnuTLS v2.12 */
-
- /* GnuTLS 2.12 *can* handle the cert being in PKCS#11, if the key
- isn't. Although it's not clear why anyone would ever do that. */
if (cert_is_p11) {
vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
_("Using PKCS#11 certificate %s\n"), cert_url);
goto got_certs;
got_certs:
/* Now we have the certificate(s) and we're looking for the private key... */
-#if defined (HAVE_P11KIT) && defined (HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY)
+#if defined (HAVE_P11KIT)
if (key_is_p11) {
- gnutls_pkcs11_privkey_t p11key = NULL;
-
vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
_("Using PKCS#11 key %s\n"), key_url);
* bit at match_cert: below, and go directly to the bit where it prints the
* 'no match found' error and exits. */
-#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY
+#if defined (HAVE_P11KIT) || defined (HAVE_TROUSERS)
match_cert:
- /* We only get here if we have a key in pkey from PKCS#11 or TPM anyway, but
- the check makes it clearer... and allows us to define some local variables. */
+ /* If we have a privkey from PKCS#11 or TPM, we can't do the simple comparison
+ of key ID that we do for software keys to find which certificate is a
+ match. So sign some dummy data and then check the signature against each
+ of the available certificates until we find the right one. */
if (pkey) {
-
/* The TPM code may have already signed it, to test authorisation. We
- only sign here for PKCS#11 keys, in which ccase fdata might be
+ only sign here for PKCS#11 keys, in which case fdata might be
empty too so point it at dummy data. */
if (!pkey_sig.data) {
if (!fdata.data) {
fdata.size = 20;
}
- err = gnutls_privkey_sign_data(pkey, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA1, 0,
- &fdata, &pkey_sig);
+ err = sign_dummy_data(vpninfo, pkey, &fdata, &pkey_sig);
if (err) {
vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
_("Error signing test data with private key: %s\n"),
}
gnutls_free(pkey_sig.data);
}
-#endif
+#endif /* P11KIT || TROUSERS */
+
/* We shouldn't reach this. It means that we didn't find *any* matching cert */
vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
_("No SSL certificate found to match private key\n"));
_("Adding supporting CA '%s'\n"), name);
}
-#if defined(HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY)
+#if defined (HAVE_P11KIT) || defined (HAVE_TROUSERS)
if (pkey) {
+#if defined(HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY)
/* Ug. If we got a gnutls_privkey_t from PKCS#11 rather than the
gnutls_x509_privkey_t that we get from PEM or PKCS#12 files, then
we can't use gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key(). Instead we have
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
+#else /* !HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY so fake it using sign_callback */
+ vpninfo->my_pkey = pkey;
+#ifdef HAVE_P11KIT
+ vpninfo->my_p11key = p11key;
+#endif
+
+ if (supporting_certs) {
+ vpninfo->my_certs = supporting_certs;
+ vpninfo->nr_my_certs = nr_supporting_certs;
+ /* We are *keeping* the certs in supporting_certs, unlike in
+ GnuTLS 3 where we can free them after calling g_c_set_key().
+ So steal the ones we need out of the extra_certs array.
+ The first one is 'cert', which was already stolen. So
+ start at 1. */
+ for (i = 1; i < nr_supporting_certs; i++) {
+ int j;
+ for (j = 0; j < nr_extra_certs; j++) {
+ if (supporting_certs[i] == extra_certs[j]) {
+ extra_certs[j] = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ supporting_certs = NULL;
+ } else {
+ vpninfo->my_certs = gnutls_calloc(1, sizeof(cert));
+ if (!vpninfo->my_certs) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ vpninfo->my_certs[0] = cert;
+ vpninfo->nr_my_certs = 1;
+ }
+ cert = NULL;
+ gnutls_certificate_set_retrieve_function(vpninfo->https_cred,
+ gtls_cert_cb);
+ err = 0;
+ vpninfo->my_pkey = pkey;
+#endif
pkey = NULL; /* we gave it away, along with pcerts */
} else
-#endif
+#endif /* P11KIT || TROUSERS */
err = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key(vpninfo->https_cred,
supporting_certs ? supporting_certs : &cert,
supporting_certs ? nr_supporting_certs : 1,
}
gnutls_free(extra_certs);
gnutls_free(supporting_certs);
-#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY
- if (pkey)
+#if defined (HAVE_P11KIT) || defined (HAVE_TROUSERS)
+ if (pkey && pkey != OPENCONNECT_TPM_PKEY)
gnutls_privkey_deinit(pkey);
if (fdata.data != dummy_hash_data)
#endif /* It's conditional if we support arbitrary privkeys: */
}
gnutls_init (&vpninfo->https_sess, GNUTLS_CLIENT);
gnutls_session_set_ptr (vpninfo->https_sess, (void *) vpninfo);
+#if defined(HAVE_TROUSERS) && !defined(HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY)
+ if (vpninfo->my_pkey == OPENCONNECT_TPM_PKEY)
+ gnutls_sign_callback_set(vpninfo->https_sess, gtls_tpm_sign_cb, vpninfo);
+#endif
err = gnutls_priority_set_direct (vpninfo->https_sess, "NONE:+VERS-TLS1.0:+SHA1:+AES-128-CBC:+RSA:+COMP-NULL:%COMPAT:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION", NULL);
if (err) {
vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
Tspi_Context_Close(vpninfo->tpm_context);
vpninfo->tpm_context = 0;
}
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY
+ if (vpninfo->my_pkey && vpninfo->my_pkey != OPENCONNECT_TPM_PKEY) {
+ gnutls_privkey_deinit(vpninfo->my_pkey);
+ vpninfo->my_pkey = NULL;
+ /* my_p11key went with it */
+ }
+ if (vpninfo->my_certs) {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < vpninfo->nr_my_certs; i++)
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(vpninfo->my_certs[i]);
+ free(vpninfo->my_certs);
+ vpninfo->my_certs = NULL;
+ }
#endif
}
}
projects / users / dwmw2 / openconnect.git / commitdiff