]> www.infradead.org Git - users/jedix/linux-maple.git/commit
x86/intel/spectre_v4: Deprecate spec_store_bypass_disable=userspace
authorBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Wed, 21 Nov 2018 21:15:28 +0000 (16:15 -0500)
committerBrian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Tue, 27 Nov 2018 18:09:11 +0000 (13:09 -0500)
commitd73a8ecf70755d5c70fd2b77db75fc8ac98147e0
treeea90a42889adbbe0584a4fe1b82bb5561215c153
parent119f2a0e1d4aea7c4f74cdb427b335f61a6e3169
x86/intel/spectre_v4: Deprecate spec_store_bypass_disable=userspace

Enforcing userspace-only spectre_v4 mitigations cannot be done performantly
when retpoline mitigations for spectre_v2 are in force. To do so we would
need to write MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL when entering and leaving kernel (i.e. system
calls, interrupts, etc.) Since retpoline is the preferred method of spectre_v2
mitigations exactly because it avoids writing this extremely slow MSR, adding
these two writes for SSBD bit management will make using retpoline pointless.

While there may be some cases where running with speculative storage bypass
enabled in kernel only is better even in presense of the extra writes to
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL we don't expect this to be the case in majority of cases.
Plus removing this mode makes code less unreadable.

Orabug: 28814570

Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs_64.c