]> www.infradead.org Git - users/jedix/linux-maple.git/commit
proc: restrict kernel stack dumps to root
authorJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fri, 5 Oct 2018 22:51:58 +0000 (15:51 -0700)
committerBrian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
Tue, 5 Feb 2019 00:04:11 +0000 (19:04 -0500)
commitad60d0a8fa31504a66cd8a2fa07a2c6c167d0d9f
tree5efd8c2189007c790c3aa6df0357f8a2f6f48114
parent0ce7a636075aaf7c6e6dcb0b3d3d72a3ae405e42
proc: restrict kernel stack dumps to root

Currently, you can use /proc/self/task/*/stack to cause a stack walk on
a task you control while it is running on another CPU.  That means that
the stack can change under the stack walker.  The stack walker does
have guards against going completely off the rails and into random
kernel memory, but it can interpret random data from your kernel stack
as instruction pointers and stack pointers.  This can cause exposure of
kernel stack contents to userspace.

Restrict the ability to inspect kernel stacks of arbitrary tasks to root
in order to prevent a local attacker from exploiting racy stack unwinding
to leak kernel task stack contents.  See the added comment for a longer
rationale.

There don't seem to be any users of this userspace API that can't
gracefully bail out if reading from the file fails.  Therefore, I believe
that this change is unlikely to break things.  In the case that this patch
does end up needing a revert, the next-best solution might be to fake a
single-entry stack based on wchan.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180927153316.200286-1-jannh@google.com
Fixes: 2ec220e27f50 ("proc: add /proc/*/stack")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Ken Chen <kenchen@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit f8a00cef17206ecd1b30d3d9f99e10d9fa707aa7)

Orabug: 29114879
CVE: CVE-2018-17972

Signed-off-by: John Donnelly <john.p.donnelly@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Somasundaram Krishnasamy <somasundaram.krishnasamy@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com>
fs/proc/base.c