KVM: nVMX: Honor userspace MSR filter lists for nested VM-Enter/VM-Exit

KVM: nVMX: Honor userspace MSR filter lists for nested VM-Enter/VM-Exit

Synthesize a consistency check VM-Exit (VM-Enter) or VM-Abort (VM-Exit) if
L1 attempts to load/store an MSR via the VMCS MSR lists that userspace has
disallowed access to via an MSR filter.  Intel already disallows including
a handful of "special" MSRs in the VMCS lists, so denying access isn't
completely without precedent.

More importantly, the behavior is well-defined _and_ can be communicated
the end user, e.g. to the customer that owns a VM running as L1 on top of
KVM.  On the other hand, ignoring userspace MSR filters is all but
guaranteed to result in unexpected behavior as the access will hit KVM's
internal state, which is likely not up-to-date.

Unlike KVM-internal accesses, instruction emulation, and dedicated VMCS
fields, the MSRs in the VMCS load/store lists are 100% guest controlled,
thus making it all but impossible to reason about the correctness of
ignoring the MSR filter.  And if userspace *really* wants to deny access
to MSRs via the aforementioned scenarios, userspace can hide the
associated feature from the guest, e.g. by disabling the PMU to prevent
accessing PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL via its VMCS field.  But for the MSR lists, KVM
is blindly processing MSRs; the  MSR filters are the _only_ way for
userspace to deny access.

This partially reverts commit ac8d6cad3c7b ("KVM: x86: Only do MSR
filtering when access MSR by rdmsr/wrmsr").

Cc: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722235922.3351122-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>