KAISER: Kernel Address Isolation

KAISER: Kernel Address Isolation

This patch introduces our implementation of KAISER (Kernel Address Isolation to
have Side-channels Efficiently Removed), a kernel isolation technique to close
hardware side channels on kernel address information.

More information about the patch can be found on:

        https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER

From: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
From: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>
X-Subject: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map kernel in user mode
Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 14:26:50 +0200
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=149390087310405&w=2
Kaiser-4.10-SHA1: c4b1831d44c6144d3762ccc72f0c4e71a0c713e5

To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
To: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Cc: <clementine.maurice@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <anders.fogh@gdata-adan.de>
After several recent works [1,2,3] KASLR on x86_64 was basically
considered dead by many researchers. We have been working on an
efficient but effective fix for this problem and found that not mapping
the kernel space when running in user mode is the solution to this
problem [4] (the corresponding paper [5] will be presented at ESSoS17).

With this RFC patch we allow anybody to configure their kernel with the
flag CONFIG_KAISER to add our defense mechanism.

If there are any questions we would love to answer them.
We also appreciate any comments!

Cheers,
Daniel (+ the KAISER team from Graz University of Technology)

[1] http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a191.pdf
[2] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Fogh-Using-Undocumented-CPU-Behaviour-To-See-Into-Kernel-Mode-And-Break-KASLR-In-The-Process.pdf
[3] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Jang-Breaking-Kernel-Address-Space-Layout-Randomization-KASLR-With-Intel-TSX.pdf
[4] https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER
[5] https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf

[patch based also on
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/IAIK/KAISER/master/KAISER/0001-KAISER-Kernel-Address-Isolation.patch]

Signed-off-by: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
Signed-off-by: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>
Signed-off-by: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8a43ddfb93a0c6ae1a6e1f5c25705ec5d1843c40)
Orabug: 27333760
CVE: CVE-2017-5754
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S (not in this tree)
	arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S (patched instead of that)
	arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S (not in this tree)
	arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S (patched instead of that)
	arch/x86/include/asm/hw_irq.h
	arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c
	kernel/fork.c

Signed-off-by: Kirtikar Kashyap <kirtikar.kashyap@oracle.com>